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

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NEGOTIATION FROM STRENGTH?

A REAPPRAISAL OF WESTERN–ARAB RELATIONS

CHARLES ISSAWI

THE uninterrupted series of disasters which the West [1] has suffered in the eastern half of the Arab world during the last few years renders necessary a re-examination of its policy in the region. This policy was based, if not, in Professor D. W. Brogan's phrase, on the 'illusion of omnipotence', at least on the illusion of 'plenipotence'. Yet, at present, the West seems to be in a weaker position in the Arab countries than at any time during the last hundred and fifty years. This weakness is apparent in all fields—moral, cultural, economic, political, and military.

Morally, the West is completely discredited in the eyes of the Arabs. It is regarded as a predatory imperialist, ever ready to pounce upon defenceless Asians and Africans and prevented from doing so only by fear of Russian reprisals. It is pictured as a rabid warmonger, eager to throw atomic bombs and unleash the ultimate horror on a peace-loving world. Its moral professions are dismissed as so much cant; phrases like 'the free world', 'the dignity of the individual', 'Christian Western civilization', or 'the rule of law' arouse either derision or anger, depending on the mood of the hearer. And one is constantly reminded of such events as Palestine, Algeria, Suez, Kenya, Cyprus, and Little Rock. On the other hand, the numerous acts of great statesmanship and unparalleled generosity of the West in the last fifteen years, such as the liberation of the Indian subcontinent and other colonial areas, the Marshall Plan, and the immense aid given to many countries, are either ignored or explained away.

Culturally, the West has also suffered a serious setback. Of course, the overwhelming majority of educated Arabs have been trained in, or at least by, the West and allegiances so formed are not easily given up. But the Western monopoly of culture has been broken. Soviet achievements in science and technology have deeply impressed Arabs, along with other Asians, and Russian literature and art are beginning to make their mark. Today the Arabs are sure of one thing: isolation from the West would not

[1] Throughout this paper the West has been treated as an entity about which certain general propositions can be made and which is capable of pursuing a unified policy. Of course the West is not monolithic; its constituent parts have different, and often divergent, interests, outlooks, and reactions and their policies, both in the Middle East and elsewhere, have been far from uniform. Nevertheless, this approach seems justified; first, because the present writer firmly believes that what Western countries have in common is far greater than what divides them and that consequently they can, and ultimately do, co-ordinate their actions to a degree which makes it possible to speak of a Western policy; secondly, and partly confirming the first point, because Arabs regard the West as a unity, praise or condemn it in general terms, and have an outlook towards its various parts which is basically similar.

mean the cutting off of all sources of culture, even if the substitutes offered are much less attractive. Nevertheless, cultural ties are probably the greatest single asset remaining to the West, and one that should be used more fully.[1]

In the field of economics, the setback is much greater and extends over a wider area. There is, to begin with, the fact that, for the first time in modern history, Arabs have an alternative market for their produce and an alternative source of supply for the machinery, consumer goods, and raw materials needed by them. Here again the substitute offered is not perfect. In Egypt, consumers of all classes are missing the pharmaceutical products, household goods, and equipment formerly imported from Western Europe and America, while the shortage of Western machinery and spare parts is causing serious damage to the economy. Similarly, people are beginning to realize that the terms offered by the Eastern bloc for Egyptian cotton are by no means as advantageous as they seemed at first. And it is slowly dawning on others that if, as was alleged, the sale to Britain of 25 per cent of Egypt's exports constituted political dependence, the sale to the Eastern bloc of 60 per cent may not be completely devoid of danger. But the crucial fact remains that the West can no longer paralyse the Arab economy, and this fact, which makes all the difference, should be as obvious to the West as it is to the Arabs.

There is, secondly, the wholesale loss of Western economic interests in the region. The nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and the sequestration of British and French property have eliminated the bulk of foreign investments in Egypt and much of the remainder is being Egyptianized. In the other Arab countries foreign capital investment is negligible, except in oil, and oil constitutes at present a weakness for the West in the Middle East, not a strength. A large amount of the contracting work, for example the building of railways, bridges, and factories, formerly handed over to Western firms as a matter of course, is now being done by East European organizations. Hundreds of Western technicians have been replaced by Russians or East Europeans, and this is likely to continue.

Lastly, there is the rejection of the economic ideas cherished by the West, particularly the United States. For obvious reasons, *laissez-faire* free enterprise was never taken too seriously in the Middle East, except in Lebanon and Syria, and now the trend towards control and planning is marked. In Egypt, State control over the economy has reached a higher point than at any time since the liquidation of Mohammad Ali's system

[1] The power of the Soviet cultural challenge may be illustrated by two examples. In 1957, the famous Janacek Quartette gave six concerts in Egypt, charging the sponsoring Egyptian organization in all £E150. The corresponding cost for a Western quartette would, apparently, have been £E200 per concert plus travel and hotel bills. At the end of July 1958 the Government of the United Arab Republic announced that it would send 610 students abroad during the coming year, for scientific and technical training. Of these no fewer than 300 were to go to the Soviet Union, and presumably a further number to the East European countries.

of monopolies in 1841, while in Syria State control is in full swing. There is no reason to doubt that the other countries will in due course follow suit. The high rate of growth of the Soviet economy is being increasingly regarded as proof of the superiority of a planned economy, and development is being sought through intensive State-sponsored industrialization rather than through international specialization, external trade, and the influx of foreign capital, as recommended by most Western advisers.

The deterioration in the military position of the West is also considerable. Almost all the British, and all the French, bases in the region have been given up. A less obvious, but also significant, development is the change in the relative power of Arab and Western forces in the region. Although their military value is still very small, the Arab armies are considerably larger than they were in the past. It is true that some of the Western forces are equipped with thermonuclear weapons, but it is hard to envisage the use of such weapons in the region except as part of a world war.

Finally, there is the disparity between the size of Western and Soviet armies in or near the region, a disparity which by no means corresponds to the relative power of the two sides but, nevertheless, does have a psychological impact on the Arabs. On 20 July 1958, Egyptian newspapers carried three news items: the landing of 400 British troops in Tobruk; the reinforcement of U.S. troops in Lebanon, bringing the total up to about 8,000; and the manœuvres of 500,000 Russians on the Iranian and Turkish borders.

Partly as a result of the developments discussed above, the political power of the West in the Arab countries has been drastically reduced, so that it is no longer able to impose its will on the Arab Governments. First Egypt, then Syria, and now Iraq have achieved a position where they can no longer be coerced from outside. Nor are there internal forces which can easily be used against their Governments. For in these countries the army is now well in control and as long as it remains united and loyal their regimes seem to be safe against subversion from within. This does not imply that the peoples are perfectly satisfied with the regimes—indeed there are indications of considerable discontent. But, in the first place, the army leaders are riding the wave of nationalism and social revolution sweeping the Arab world. Secondly, there are no organized groups or social classes able to pit themselves against the army. The monarchy has been eliminated and the power of the tribesman was broken long ago. The Muslim clergy has lost much of its prestige and is no longer in a position to challenge the Government. The minority groups have learned the lesson that it is both dangerous and ultimately futile to rely on outside help against the majority. No less important has been the weakening of the social classes most favourable to the West, the landlords, merchants,

and other wealthy groups; indeed, one of the most striking aspects of the political and social revolutions that have taken place is the decline in the power of the moneyed interest.

In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Arabs are no longer awed by the West. Not so many years ago, the dispatch of a cruiser to the Eastern Mediterranean or Persian Gulf would have been sufficient to enforce any demands made by a Western Government; but when, last July, the Sixth Fleet sailed off the Lebanese coast an Egyptian newspaper had the impertinence to describe its manœuvres as 'a Broadway show'. Even the landing of troops in Lebanon and Jordan did not produce as marked an effect on Arab attitudes as might have been expected since it became apparent almost immediately that they would not be used outside the borders of the two countries and that they would sooner or later be withdrawn, and probably sooner than later. This does not necessarily imply that the landings were a mistake, for by showing that there were limits beyond which the West could not be provoked they may well have had a sobering effect on the Soviets and even on the Arabs. But, by and large, Arabs are proceeding on the assumption that, whether the West likes it or not, they can achieve in their own way the objectives they have set out for themselves.

It is not within the scope of this article to discuss the numerous measures and mistakes in Western policy that have led to the present state of affairs. In the opinion of this writer, they all sprang from one basic error, namely, the belief that the West had enough power—moral, military, political, and economic—to impose its will on the Arabs. The West has always proceeded on the assumption that if it exerted enough political and economic pressure and if it offered sufficient inducements, such as financial aid, it could make Arab Governments do things to which their peoples were opposed, such as signing treaties of alliance and defence with the West. Now, while this may have been true in the past, it ceased to be true in the last few years and is clearly no longer true today.[1] In other words, the Arab countries are no longer a Western sphere of influence, and this fact should be taken into account by Western Governments. To achieve its aims, Western policy must be shifted to a new basis and one which pays due regard to the change in the situation and to the objectives at which the Arabs are aiming.

These objectives are sixfold. First and foremost comes the elimination of the remaining Western positions of strength in the area—whether direct, such as Aden, or indirect, such as Jordan. Secondly, there is the urge towards unity; while opinions differ as to what form that unity should take, there is widespread acceptance of Egypt's leadership. Thirdly,

[1] Of course, the West has enough *military* power to occupy the Arab countries in a few days. However, because of internal and external political factors, it is doubtful whether that power can be used save in very exceptional circumstances.

there is the determination to settle the Arab–Israeli dispute on terms acceptable to the Arabs. Fourthly, there is the desire to carry out a social revolution whose scope would be at least as extensive as that of the Egyptian revolution; this implies the overthrow of remaining monarchies and a drastic curtailment of the power of large landlords and tribal chiefs. Fifthly, there is the desire to secure much fuller control over the principal source of wealth of the area, i.e. oil; this control is most often envisaged in terms of expropriation of existing concessionary companies.[1] Lastly, there is the wish to build on these foundations a more dynamic and self-sufficient economy and a more just and cohesive social system.

So much for the Arab objectives. As regards the West, given the great weakening in position described above, it is clear that at this stage all it can hope to do is to safeguard its most essential interests, those that can be truly described as vital. In the last analysis these interests can be reduced to two: a negative one, keeping the Middle East from Soviet domination,[2] and a positive one, ensuring that Arab oil continues to flow to Europe on reasonable terms. If these two goals can be reached, the West should deem itself fortunate, whatever other aims may have had to be relinquished.

Soviet domination of the Middle East may be achieved either by invasion or by subversion. Since the former method would most probably start a world war, and since it is a military matter well beyond the scope of the present writer, it will not be discussed here. As regards subversion, it is clear that in such matters outside help can be only secondary and that the deciding factor must be the attitude of the people concerned. Now, no outside observer can fail to be amazed by the lightheartedness with which the vast majority of Arabs regard this matter and by their unshakable assurance that such things cannot happen to them. They base their confidence on the fact that the Arab leaders are not Communist or sympathetic to Communism and that the number of Arab Communists, many of whom are in gaol, is still very small; and on the belief that Arab nationalism has a much stronger appeal to the masses than does Communism. Moreover, just as the Arabs rely on the Soviets to help them against possible Western aggression, they implicitly look to the West to protect them against a possible Russian invasion. Of course such faith and optimism are natural and proper: no political movement would ever get started, much less

[1] There are indications that, in the oil-producing countries, responsible people are thinking less of nationalization and more of renegotiating agreements so as to obtain a larger share of revenues. But this attitude has not yet spread widely and the appeal of nationalization to the masses and the semi-educated is still very great.

[2] There are two ways in which the Middle East can be kept out of the Soviet orbit. The first is for it to remain in the Western sphere of influence, a course which is no longer practicable. The second is by recognizing the desire for neutrality which is so widespread in the Arab countries. Of course, neutrality can be acceptable to the West only if it is genuine and complete as between the two power blocs; and although their present policy is far from true neutrality, there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Arabs when they proclaim neutrality as their ultimate goal.

succeed, if its promoters began by being overwhelmed by the difficulties facing them, and the present confidence of the Arabs is certainly an improvement on the feeling of frustration and impotence prevailing a few years ago. Nevertheless, one cannot but feel that not enough thought has been given to social dynamics. Few Arabs have paused to consider the great obstacles standing in the way of an orderly transformation of Arab society. Few have asked themselves whether the powerful popular forces now being released can be channelled within the present bounds of Arab nationalist ideologies. Few have inquired whether the Arab Governments will be able to deliver the goods, and, if not, what will happen. Few, if any, have reflected on the ultimate effects of the propaganda with which their peoples are being fed, the whipping up of passions, the raising of great expectations of a much richer and better life and of greater social justice. And very few have understood how powerful the appeal of Communism can be both to the masses and to the discontented half-baked intellectuals who are being produced by the thousand; if they did, they would be more disturbed by the flood of propaganda being poured out by Communists and fellow-travellers who have infiltrated many of the leading newspapers and who are bringing out hundreds of books.

But, while such considerations should sober Arab leaders, they are not matters about which the West can do very much at this stage. Even advice and warning from the West are received with suspicion and regarded as springing from sinister motives such as the desire to scare Arabs into remaining within the Western sphere of influence. About all that the West can do to achieve its negative aim of keeping the Russians out of the Arab world is to refrain from foolish action. If it cannot prevent the Arabs from slipping into the Soviet orbit at least it can stop pushing them into that orbit by its mistaken policies. Arabs are not wrong when they claim that such measures as the Baghdad Pact, the attempt to force Jordan into that pact, the offer and subsequent withdrawal of the High Dam loan, the Suez attack, and the Eisenhower Doctrine have done more to increase Soviet prestige and influence in the region than anything Arab Communists could possibly have hoped to do.

The safeguarding of the second vital Western interest, namely, the continued flow of Arab oil on terms acceptable to the West, demands more positive action. Until now this flow has been protected by two sets of instruments: the oil concessions, which grant Western companies complete control over production and marketing, and the omnipresence of Western political and military power in the region; and it is most unlikely that the former can long survive the eclipse of the latter. Even the amendment of the concession agreements to give local Governments better terms may no longer suffice to prevent nationalization. A comprehensive and thoroughgoing policy is evidently needed to deal with the situation.

The first possibility that suggests itself is an agreement between the West and the Soviet Union regarding the Middle East. Since this could almost certainly come about only as part of a more comprehensive settlement between the two blocs, it will not be discussed further here.

The second possibility is the one tried in 1956, namely, to strike at the heart of Arab nationalism, Egypt, and thereby paralyse the whole movement. This course failed completely during the Suez crisis and it is very significant that it was not taken up either against Egypt or against Iraq in 1958. The drawbacks of this policy are twofold. First, a military attack against an Arab country would run into too many obstacles: adverse world opinion; internal doubts, scruples, and fears within Western countries; the ease with which oil communications can be cut; and, lastly, the danger of Russian intervention. Secondly, in such a large area, military action cannot provide more than a very short-term solution to the problems posed by nationalist movements.

The third course is to isolate and confine the centre of Arab nationalism, preventing it from spreading over the whole area. This seems to have been the principal strand in United States policy after the Suez attack. Egypt and Syria were to be left alone, but given no aid or encouragement, while excellent relations were to be built up with the States surrounding them: Libya, the Sudan, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. It was probably hoped that such political and economic isolation would, if not bring down the regimes in Egypt and Syria, at least prevent them from achieving any notable successes and thus discredit them in the eyes of the other Arabs. It need hardly be pointed out that the course of events has been different. The revolution in Iraq has not only extended Egyptian influence to the oilfields but has completely upset the balance of power in the region, tilting the scales heavily in Egypt's favour. Moreover, it should be clear to all that the Iraqi revolution will be followed by others, probably in Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. And, indeed, it would seem that the speed of revolution-making is accelerating.

In these circumstances, there are only two further courses left to Western policy: to hold on to a few and easily defendable oil areas, whatever the repercussions on the other Arab countries may be; or to come to terms with Arab nationalism and concede its major objectives.

The first alternative would consist of holding on to a few rich oil principalities, such as Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, making it perfectly clear that any attack or infiltration from outside would be sharply repulsed and any internal agitation promptly suppressed. Such a course would ensure Western access to sufficient oil for quite a few years, during which a vigorous effort could be made to develop alternative sources of energy. As part of this delaying action, an attempt could be made to retain control of some of the less vulnerable Western positions in the

region, e.g. Aden and some of the Persian Gulf principalities, and to give discreet help to the few Arab Governments which are still not hostile to the West, without, however, entertaining any illusions regarding the durability of such Governments.

The difficulties raised by this policy should not, however, be underestimated. In the first place, the dangers of agitation and sabotage of oil installations would be considerable. Secondly, the respite thus gained might not be very long. Thirdly, and most serious, this policy might gravely jeopardize what should always be the first aim of Western policy in the Middle East, namely, to keep the region outside Russian domination. For the presence of Western forces in the Persian Gulf would constitute one of the greatest possible irritants to Arab nationalism, and one which more than anything would goad Arabs towards Russia. Lastly, such action on the part of the West would further weaken its moral position in Asia and Africa.

This leaves only one other policy: to stop opposing Arab nationalism and to concede its major objectives. The implications of this course of action are staggering, since they might include abandonment of all Western bases and centres of political influence in the Arab world and probably acquiescence in the nationalization of oil as well.

At first sight this policy would seem to imply that the West would not only render itself defenceless but would place itself at the mercy of a people who are far from easy to deal with. For not only are the Arabs not noted for their moderation; not only do they have many accumulated grudges and grievances which may be expected to influence their conduct long after the causes which gave birth to them have disappeared; but Arabs, along with other Semites, suffer from what may be called the 'Samson complex', the urge to wreak havoc on one's enemies even if it brings on one's own destruction as well: a favourite Arabic expression is *'alaya wa ala adai'*—'upon me and upon my enemies'. This does not mean that Arabs, and more particularly their rulers, are unaware of economic advantages or indifferent to considerations of self-interest; it does, however, mean that such considerations are liable to be clouded over, perhaps for long intervals, by gusts of popular passion.

Clearly, then, such a policy can be contemplated only if the West builds up a strong bargaining power in its dealings with the Arabs. This it may be able to do if it sets about, immediately and urgently, to develop alternative sources of energy which can enable it to dispense, indefinitely if need be, with Arab oil at a cost which is not crippling. There seems little doubt that the West, and particularly the United States, has been remiss in providing such substitutes. The search for oil in Africa and the Western Hemisphere might be intensified. The development of atomic energy could certainly be accelerated, especially in the United States.

More experiments could be carried out on producing oil from coal. And much more could be done to reduce the cost of producing oil from shale, bringing nearer the day when it can compete with petroleum; for it should not be forgotten that shale-oil resources in the United States alone are believed to be greater than the proved oil reserves of the whole world.[1]

Such a programme, together with the building of a fleet of super-tankers and of the necessary terminals at both ends, which would make it possible, if need be, to dispense with the Suez Canal and the pipelines leading to the Mediterranean, would restore to the West the bargaining strength it is losing, and will go on losing, with the decline of its political and military power in the Middle East. For, sooner or later, it will become evident to the Arabs that they need Western markets as much as the West needs their oil. There are no alternative markets for Arab oil: internal consumption, and those of Asia and Africa, are too low to absorb more than a tiny fraction of the present output of Arab oil, while the Soviet bloc has a small net surplus and is likely to continue having one for some time. Provided the West cannot be starved into submission by the interruption of Arab oil supplies for a few years, it should be in an excellent position to bargain with the Arabs and reach mutually satisfactory terms. In other words, Europe's need for Arab oil, which is at present its main source of weakness in the area, could be converted into a source of strength. Normal relations between the West and the Arabs, based on give and take and mutual concessions, could at last be envisaged.

It is not the intention of the present writer to recommend either of the two alternative policies. For one thing, the Middle Eastern policy of the West, which of course must deal with a much larger area than the Arab countries, is only part, and a small part at that, of its global foreign policy. Secondly, even within the narrow bounds of regional policy, no outside observer can presume to have enough information at his disposal to make recommendations. This article will have fully served its purpose if it has succeeded in analysing the present situation in the Arab countries and in raising questions regarding the possibilities lying before the West at a crucial moment in its relations with the area.

September 1958

[1] In this context, the following quotation from *The Economist* of 6 September 1958 (p. 755) may be found interesting: 'The vast deposits of oil-bearing shale in Colorado (and also Wyoming and Utah) could, if market conditions warranted, become a major source of crude oil at prices that are currently competitive. The Denver Research Institute, which has operated a 24-ton-a-day pilot plant for the last nine months, claims that with its new extraction process shale oil could sell on the West Coast at $1.42 to $1.92 a barrel, excluding profit; crude oil is at present selling at rather more than $3 a barrel. The Union Oil Company, on the other hand, has decided to close the pilot plant which it has been running for three years. While agreeing that the product could compete successfully, the company, having gained all the necessary technical experience, is unwilling to launch out on a commercial scale at the present time; any interruption of foreign imports, however, would make such a venture attractive.' For recent estimates of shale and tar-sand reserves see *Petroleum Press Service*, June 1958, p. 222.

REFLECTIONS ON THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

MARIO TOSCANO

THE present crisis in international relations is the product of a recurring historical situation in which many institutions which developed in the past no longer exactly fit the conditions of today. At the same time we have not succeeded either in bringing them up to date or in finding satisfactory substitutes for them.

The first important point suggested by examination of the current international situation relates to a particular characteristic of the new equilibrium which developed at the end of the second World War. So far as its traditional aspect is concerned—that of the relation between material forces in general and military power in particular—it might provide the basis for a much greater stability than seems apparent at first sight. The dynamic possibilities of a shift in this equilibrium are probably limited to some of its other component elements, elements which, until lately, have exercised a relatively minor influence and which therefore have not received the same attention that we usually devote to material forces.

At the end of the second World War only two great Powers faced each other as protagonists on the international scene, together concentrating in their hands, to a degree perhaps never equalled in the past, almost all the material elements of power which constitute the basis of the new general equilibrium. The other members of the international community—even the British Commonwealth and China—are all, in varying degrees, directly or indirectly, either receiving aid from Washington or Moscow or, as neutrals, no longer pursuing an active foreign policy.

Notwithstanding the enormous capacity for action of these two great Powers, everything suggests that the colossal power at their disposal is not actually sufficient to ensure to either of them, through recourse to armed conflict, absolute dominion over the entire globe—a dominion which, it is well to remember, would be without historical precedent. In other words, while no one doubts the ability of Russia and the United States to deal each other mortal blows, few people today believe in the possibility that either of them can totally annihilate the other without suffering the same fate.

Any attempt to rupture the present international balance through the traditional means of military conflict, thus triggering-off a third world war, must presuppose in at least one, if not in both, of the two camps the conviction that victory is possible—in other words, the conviction that the

opponent can be unilaterally eliminated. Without this conviction, however erroneous, a conscious policy of deliberately unleashing war is inconceivable.

Psychological situations of this kind can be found at the origins of both World Wars. On the eve of the first, Austria–Hungary was convinced that she could crush Serbia, Germany that she could quickly put France out of action and defeat Russia with the help of Vienna; in St Petersburg, Paris, and London, the Governments reasoned from diametrically opposed premises. One group of Powers had to be wrong, but this did not mean that the intensity of conviction was any less strong among the generals, the politicians, and the public of the Central Powers than it was among the generals, politicians, and public of the Triple Entente—on the contrary.

On the eve of the second World War the Axis Powers were so firmly convinced that they could militarily annihilate the democracies that they unabashedly took the initiative in starting military operations. In the opposite camp the political and diplomatic stiffening induced by the occupation of Prague fostered the belief that the outcome of hostilities, at least in the long run, would be exactly the reverse. Even in Warsaw the conquest of Berlin was considered perfectly possible.

In the present situation no such certainty is visible. The destructive power of the new thermonuclear weapons [1] is such that their possessors know perfectly well that the enemy cannot be annihilated without his being able, in turn, and regardless of the losses he has sustained, to reply immediately with an equally destructive attack—thus automatically eliminating any possibility of the aggressor gaining the slightest advantage from a military conflict of this kind. Consequently, notwithstanding her successful experiments in launching intercontinental missiles and artificial satellites, Moscow still fears the American war potential and has not been able to exploit militarily certain local and fortuitous situations that seemed extraordinarily favourable to the Russians. At the same time, Washington views with no less apprehension the Soviet war potential, and very probably this state of mind will continue even after the Pentagon makes up the leeway recently lost in some limited sectors of armaments. In other words, all the signs indicate that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States desires to initiate a total war.

This being the case, one might justifiably stress the point, on the basis of recent experience, that even though no one has deliberately wanted a general war in the past, it was made inevitable at a certain moment by fatal errors of calculation which, by stimulating a war psychosis and the conviction of victory, were at the origin of the two World Wars (cf. Berchtold's conviction that Serbia could be 'crushed' without bringing the

[1] For some interesting technical details, see, among others, Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York, Harper, 1957), and the bibliography there cited.

Russians on to the scene; the certainty of Hitler and Ribbentrop that they could 'punish' Poland without spurring London and Paris into action). In other words, it could be argued that a third World War might involuntarily arise from an action undertaken with limited objectives.

Closer examination suggests, however, that such a peril is today much more remote. The fact that the protagonists of the international scene are now reduced to two diminishes the possibility of miscalculation and automatically confers a worldwide character on both the direct disputes between Moscow and Washington and the indirect ones of their 'clients'. Today the real goal is no longer to obtain simple frontier rectifications or limited territories (Alsace–Lorraine, Trento and Trieste, Danzig and the Polish Corridor), but is clearly that of absolute primacy. The problem is to gain control of entire groups of States, of continents. The rub lies in the fact that attainment of world dominion automatically postulates a third world war.

The possibility of equivocation—especially after the Korean episode, in which Washington found herself tenaciously defending a territory already evacuated and declared of no vital interest—seems greatly reduced. One has the impression that in the West, no less than in the East, there are some doubts about what can be gained through military action. The concern and uncertainty discernible in both camps about the possibility of achieving definite military results derive precisely from this awareness. Otherwise, such a state of mind could not be reconciled with the present enormous military potential of the Soviet Union and the United States, nor could one explain Moscow's conduct when she had before her a practically undefended Europe.

But that is not all. When, on the eve of the first and second World Wars, the great Powers realized they had committed the above-mentioned errors of calculation, they did not call a halt. Instead, convinced they could profit from a hypothetical victory at the end of a total war, at a certain point they deliberately wished for a general conflagration and therefore declared war on each other. Now it is precisely this fatal moment, the one following the realization of the initial miscalculation—such as, for example believing that the Austro–Serbian or the German–Polish conflict could remain localized—which today appears much less likely to arise. Actually, were miscalculations of this kind to be repeated, the two principal Powers—if animated by an equally hostile will—would be unlikely to persist to the point of broadening a limited conflict into general war, because neither would see any advantage to be gained from doing so. They would be forced to seek a compromise solution, and to establish a peace in which there would be neither victors nor vanquished. This seems to have been the case in Korea, where Moscow initially miscalculated, but subsequently corrected the error.

The cause of this situation lies partly in the fact that the present international military balance is markedly one of impotence—of inability profitably to make any move—hence the apparently surprising prolongation of peace. It might be objected that such an affirmation—which I elaborated several years ago,[1] and which corresponds to the more recent formulas of 'atomic stalemate' and 'balance of terror' employed by American columnists—ignores the fact that, after all, every balance implies a relationship of impotence. Still, however negative this aspect, it assumes today a primary significance. That significance is to be measured by reference to the already-mentioned psychology of fear that holds sway in both camps.

The description of the present international situation in terms of a 'balance of impotence' is further justified by the fact that there are no precedents for a general equilibrium of the entire international community based on only two great Powers and their aspiration to dominion over the whole planet. Up to now we have known only local balances and dominions, but nothing similar to the current situation. The aspiration to primacy over the five continents is, in fact, new, and its realization is perhaps beyond the strength, however conspicuous, of either protagonist. Hence, while the earlier instances were balances of equivalent power, the present one derives from an equality of incapacity.

The present 'balance of impotence' reveals, therefore, an existing potential incapacity, however paradoxical this may appear at first glance. In other words, it seems to be accompanied by the conviction that the balance cannot be changed in the immediate future by a simple quantitative increase in the military power at present at the disposal of the two major antagonists. From this derives the possibility of its unpredictable stability. Its rupture would not occur at the present level, that is, the military one, but on a new plane.

The possibilities of such a rupture are twofold. On the technical military level, the unilateral and monopolistic discovery of new weapons would make possible, through the immediate, total, and unilateral destruction of one of the two contendants, dominion over the entire planet.[2] On the level of domestic policy, a radical transformation of the present ideological positions could profoundly affect the war potential of the State concerned. For example, it is perfectly conceivable that if the Soviet peoples could be associated with the cause of the Western democracies the annihilation of the Soviet Union would no longer be physically impossible,

[1] Mario Toscano, 'L'équilibre des impuissances', *Le Monde*, 5 July 1951.

[2] Naturally, such discoveries might be made by a 'third' Power, in which case the balance would be shifted in its favour. An increase—which is quite probable—in the number of producers and possessors of the existing weapons of destruction, on the other hand, would only result in reducing the already limited possibilities of the so-called 'local wars' (discussed below) and broadening the basis of the present balance, which would no longer be hinged on only two great Powers.

just as the effectiveness of the atomic armaments of the West would vanish if Moscow were to succeed in associating the more numerous or more active sections of the Western populations with the Communist cause.

All of these considerations obviously presuppose not only that the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the United States act rationally and under the stimulus of reciprocally intense antagonism, but that they also demonstrate the normal concern for preserving and strengthening the State. On the other hand, it is a conceivable hypothesis that the Soviet Government might abandon every material preoccupation with the defence of the Soviet State in order to pursue the sole ideological objective of forcing the triumph of Marxist doctrines in and for themselves, independently of how this might be done. To put it in another way, the conviction might take hold in Moscow that the quickest road to establishing Communism as the world's rule of life is precisely that of waging war without regard to any consideration of the State's victory or defeat. A sufficient reason for waging total war may be that of creating such misery, destruction, and exasperation in all countries that Communism would be accepted by the populations affected. This hypothesis—advanced only in order to exhaust the rational possibilities—appears to be contradicted, however, by the whole practice of the Soviet Government since 1917.

Leaving aside this last hypothesis, then, and considering only the national State, the present international balance, on the material level, may be described as a stable one. The logical consequences of this stability are manifold and some of them merit close attention.

In the first place, the prospect of an indefinite prolongation of the present situation should assist the Western European peoples in freeing themselves from their permanent fear of an imminent third world war, a fear which paralyses strength (much of which, both in capital and in personnel, tends to transfer itself overseas), induces them to abandon long-range constructive planning, and condemns many of them to live in difficult circumstances from day to day. If our resources were actually utilized *in loco* and not sent elsewhere in search of a hypothetical and unattainable security, the rebirth of Europe could be effected at a much faster rate and on a much broader scale. Raising the people's living standards and solving some of the more urgent social problems would contribute to the consolidation of the present balance just where it is most precarious.

In the second place, the fact that possible shifts in the existing ideological positions constitute one of the two dynamic factors capable of rupturing the present balance should lead to a better evaluation of the importance of the psychological front, no less vital than that of the military, economic, and diplomatic fronts. The significance of this often escapes us, even though in describing the present international situation as a

'cold war' we unconsciously stress the non-material aspect deriving from the particular type of equilibrium which we tried to identify earlier. In fact, it is precisely because of the military stability of this balance that attempts are being made by both sides to modify it from within by turning to non-warlike activities such as fifth-column ventures, propaganda (radio, television, the press, etc.), offers of technical, economic, and financial assistance, the exaltation of progress in the scientific or social field, the illustration of ideological values at the base of the two hostile systems of political life; by turning, in short, to the type of activities best calculated to favour the advent to power of sympathetic political trends, or at least of those trends that are disposed to renounce the use of the so-called atomic deterrent.

Neither scholars nor statesmen seem to have adequately assessed the singular importance of this recourse to non-military methods of carrying on the East–West struggle. If the existence of the so-called 'atomic stalemate' discourages or, better still, prevents the two great hostile Powers from resorting to total war, this does not by any means signify a renunciation of the desire to get the upper hand over the opponent, but simply that the level on which the encounter occurs is no longer the military one. Now if propaganda and economic wars are the only types of conflict reasonably possible in present circumstances, it follows that one must prepare to meet them, that armaments, however indispensable for avoiding armed conflicts, no longer suffice to ensure even the *status quo*. In fact, it is obvious that possession of all the more perfected thermonuclear weapons, intercontinental missiles, artificial satellites, and so on would serve no purpose whatsoever if the parties in control of the two governments and the military forces had no intention of using them.

It is true that when the expressions 'psychological warfare', 'economic warfare', and 'competitive coexistence' are used, the general intention is to indicate the existence of a situation of that nature. But, perhaps because these expressions make use of words which at one time had a different and, in any case, a much more limited meaning, we in the West tend not to give the phenomenon the attention it deserves. Consider the fact, for example, that while there are many international military organizations, such as SHAPE, and national General Staffs, whose task is to draft plans for a war that has little chance of being fought, there are neither international nor national organizations for carrying on psychological or economic wars, the only wars that are at present going on on a major scale. In other words, we are witnessing an attempt to circumvent the condition of impotence in regard to material forces by means of efforts directed towards the psychological weakening of ideological forces that would adversely affect the enemy's war potential.

At this point further clarification is needed. The 'psychological war-

fare' concept has a twofold aspect: that of creating the instruments for waging it, and that of formulating the principles and ideal values which are intended to prevail. Obviously, it would be pointless to create organs of propaganda on either the national or the international level if the propaganda content were inadequate, and this content will remain inadequate so long as the moral supremacy of the Western world is not reinforced to the point where it appears manifest even to its adversaries. And here we must recognize that in this respect we have not yet advanced with sufficient firmness and clarity of purpose. In fact, on the international level too many barriers erected by national egoisms, too many anti-historical creations, remain to be overcome; several noble initiatives have failed and others, if not completely discarded, have not been able to develop adequately. On the national level, we have seen a decline of respect for some fundamental ideal, moral, and religious values, now strongly undermined by materialistic conceptions. At the same time, we have still not succeeded in finding satisfactory solutions to certain important new problems of constitutional, political, and economic organization. We have still not succeeded in freeing ourselves from short-sighted, egoistic, individual viewpoints sufficiently to achieve a satisfactory social justice within a regime of liberty. One cannot insist enough on this essential aspect of the problem. Though it merits more detailed treatment, here it must suffice to emphasize how, in the last analysis, the success of the free world is inextricably bound up with our capacity for a real moral regeneration.

In the third place, just as the rational impossibility of a short-term, general, and total armed conflict derives from the 'balance of impotence', from it, too, derives the impossibility of concluding a peace different from that which we have today. So long as the present equilibrium endures, the only possible peace will be that under which we now live and work. We have to accustom ourselves to this idea, by adjusting ourselves psychologically to existing conditions and by overcoming nostalgia for a situation which is past and which is probably in any case no longer capable of recurring.

This concept becomes more comprehensible if one remembers that traditional diplomacy managed to get peace treaties and various international agreements accepted only in so far as it had at its disposal the alternative threat of war in the classical military sense. With this alternative no longer present, and with conflict now waged principally on a non-military level, the negotiating capacity of diplomacy is strictly limited: we have thus reached a state of affairs with which no one is satisfied, because the characteristics of the present international balance are not precisely understood.

In the fourth place, what has been said thus far demonstrates that it will be possible to continue in the present situation as long as the opposing

governments continue to appreciate clearly its essential conditions and remain firm in their determination to maintain it. If the psychological determination of either side were to weaken, the risk would arise, not so much of a total war being unleashed, but rather, in the face of a simple threat of atomic attack, of the terrain's being abandoned to the enemy without a blow being struck. In effect, if no question, including that of defending the *status quo*, is worth a war, an aggressor who does not employ atomic weapons may go unpunished. It is true that this grave danger is slightly diminished by the fact that, since the local military commanders are authorized to reply immediately to an atomic attack, any eventual weaknesses or misapprehensions of the central governments give no assurance to the aggressor. Nevertheless, the danger of a capitulation of this kind must be carefully considered; its seriousness once more underlines the real importance of safeguarding the psychological front.

Fifthly, it is to be noted that while the 'balance of impotence' involves only the military capabilities of the Soviet Union and the United States, it tends to extend its influence into the political field, so far as the minor Powers without strategic atomic weapons are concerned. In fact, with the end of America's atomic monopoly many countries of Western Europe, unable to contribute significantly to the creation of a balance of military power, tended to take refuge in neutralist formulas aimed at achieving a hypothetical security. This tendency can be adequately countered only by increased awareness of the importance of the psychological-ideological and economic fronts, to which all can contribute, and by considering an eventual distribution of strategic atomic arms to all of the Atlantic Allies.

Finally, it must be pointed out how the foregoing analysis of the current international situation should help us to interpret more accurately the events of this disturbed post-war period. In addition to considering the cold war and the prevailing kind of peace, mention should be made of the Soviet failure to occupy that part of the European continent lying on this side of the Iron Curtain at a time when there was no organized military defence and no Soviet declaration of the principle of 'competitive co-existence'—which is nothing more than the expression of the conviction that the present 'atomic stalemate' can be circumvented only on a non-military plane.

But an investigation into the peculiar characteristics of the present international situation involves more than the mere identification of the peculiar quality of the equilibrium on which the present peace is based. If we move on to examine the question of international treaties and agreements—thus shifting the emphasis from 'peace' to 'understandings'—several further circumstances and tendencies present themselves for our consideration.

Within the framework of the international community several particular communities have been created, among them an Atlantic community and an eastern Marxist community. The Western community still clings to and cherishes the principles that internationalists have long identified as typical of our international law: the equality and independence of individual members, and the basic rule of *pacta sunt servanda*. In the eastern Marxist community these principles have been replaced by the principles of the Soviet, of dependence on the 'Guide State', and of the basic rule of *pacta non sunt servanda* vis-à-vis capitalist and bourgeois countries. This does not mean, of course, that the members of the Communist community do not find themselves, in turn, united in another international community, the United Nations, whose Charter is invoked in the international agreements linking both the Atlantic and the Communist communities. Between the States belonging to these two communities there has been a continual exchange of charges of violation of almost all the principal formal political agreements concluded between them prior to the creation of the particular communities—so much so, indeed, that it would be difficult to indicate a single treaty that has escaped such charges, with the possible exception of the United Nations Charter itself. On the other hand, a happier fate seems to have been reserved for certain *de facto* tacit understandings recently put into effect among the same parties on a local level.

These assertions concerning the charges of violation of earlier formal agreements can be demonstrated by reference to the texts of the notes exchanged in the last five years between the Governments of Moscow, London, Washington, Paris, Rome, etc.; but further elucidation may be needed concerning the *de facto* understandings. Some concrete examples may be useful.

Let us begin with the events in Korea. Here we had from the beginning a rigorous application of two *de facto* military understandings: one, requiring that the Communist submarines and air force should not molest the naval operations of the United Nations fleet; the other, that United Nations aviation should not bomb objectives in the 'Manchurian sanctuary', where lay the principal supply centres of the Chinese 'volunteers' who constituted the bulk of the Communist army. These *de facto* understandings arose out of the particular balance of material power illustrated above, a relationship which, on the one hand, kept the two principal opposing Powers from resorting to total war and, on the other, compelled both of them to recognize the convenience of observing these agreements.

Then, more than a year after land operations had virtually ceased, the above-mentioned tacit military understandings gave way to a new tacit *de facto* political agreement: to maintain the *status quo*, the division of the contested area into two zones of influence, North Korea and South Korea.

In fact, once the armistice was signed, and notwithstanding its formal obligations and all the solemn verbal declarations, Moscow and Washington (as well as the other belligerent Powers acknowledging their leadership) ended up by tacitly agreeing to accept the *de facto* situation, which corresponded to the actual relationship of material power and which could not be changed without serious mutual risks. In other words, this power relationship gave birth to a tacit *de facto* understanding that has taken precedence over the formal clauses of the Panmunjom armistice.

All things considered, the events surrounding the political clauses of the Geneva agreements for the cessation of the Indo-China conflict present a singular parallel to those concerning Korea, and suggest the existence of a new tacit *de facto* understanding for Vietnam as well. In regard to Formosa, too, at any rate till recently,[1] everything seemed to indicate, given the existing relationship of the opposed military forces and notwithstanding the mutual impossibility of a formal agreement, at least a temporary *de facto modus vivendi*. Further, until a few years ago there seemed to be a tacit *de facto* understanding in the Middle East, according to which the Soviet Union refrained from intervening directly in this area and respected a *status quo* favouring the West. Yet, precisely because of the Kremlin's success in propaganda and economic penetration, the East–West power relationship has been appreciably modified of late and we now find ourselves in a dynamic phase in which the initial presuppositions of the *de facto* understanding no longer exist. Nor have we been able to find a substitute.

Even in regard to the German problem the situation does not appear to be very different. Here, too, we find formal agreements concerning German reunification and the repetition of reciprocally solemn public declarations of intentions. Yet, despite the clamour on both sides and the intensive exchange of protest notes, to say nothing of frequently serious crises such as the Berlin blockade, the three zones of Anglo-French-U.S. military occupation were unified, while Russia sovietized her own zone. Later on, the occupying Powers passed from economic reorganization to the constitutional reorganization of two Germanies, Eastern and Western, concluding with the creation of two armies, the stipulations providing for two separate peace treaties, and the entry of the two States into two different and hostile alliance systems. One is led to suspect that both camps fear the dynamic consequences of German unity so much that they are more against it than for it. Just as the 1936 *Anschluss* constituted the point of departure, not of arrival, for Hitler's territorial claims—which were immediately extended to the Sudetenland and later to Bohemia and Moravia, to Memel, Danzig, and the Polish Corridor, until they eventually brought on

[1] This paper was delivered before the events of September 1958.

the second World War—so now it is feared that the union of the two Germanies, far from solving the German problem and assuring a stable peace, would inevitably bring up the problem of the Oder–Neisse frontier and subsequently stimulate a whole series of further German demands even more dangerous to peace than the present situation. Consequently, the Soviet Union rejects German unity on terms reasonable to the West (at times one suspects that the Kremlin does not even want an entirely Communist Germany, which, in Marxist guise, might eventually attempt to make a third bid for world supremacy). Nor do the Russians' Western interlocutors seem really disposed to go further in meeting the demands of Moscow.

Must we conclude, therefore, that even in regard to the German problem there is a tacit *de facto* understanding between the four great Powers similar to those indicated above for Korea and Indo-China? Though such an affirmation would arouse the most resolute denials in both camps, it does not seem too far from the truth,[1] which undoubtedly differs from the laudable intentions and maximum programmes proclaimed.

While all of these tacit understandings in the Far East, the Middle East, and Europe were taking form, major efforts were made to conclude formal political agreements between the member States of the two communities but, in every instance where the effort was made *after* the creation of the communities, the attempt failed. Consequently, it might be well to ask ourselves at this point, in view of the fact that these *de facto* agreements appear to correspond better to the difficulties of the situation and to their derivation from a power relationship, whether in East–West relations such agreements are not a more convenient form of political accord.

Continuing on the purely historico-political plane and abstaining from any kind of final juridical deduction, we must face the fact that, at least temporarily, it would be dangerous and unrealistic to persist in trying to reach formal agreements regulating the current political differences between the members of the two communities. It would be dangerous in that, should the goal prove unattainable, we risk aggravating the present tension and involuntarily favouring a negative evolution of the international situation. If, by chance, formally perfect agreements could be concluded, one would risk, given the present state of affairs, handing over to the enemy some strong vantage points on the psychological front that is so

[1] George F. Kennan, on the other hand, has expressed a different point of view ('The Problem of Eastern and Central Europe', *The Listener*, 28 November 1957). He seems, however, to neglect the fact that the Kremlin, in addition to being unable formally to contribute to the elimination of a Communist state, has already repeatedly rejected the offer of a 25-year treaty guaranteeing the demilitarization of a unified Germany, offered by Byrnes in the name of the United States, Great Britain, and France during the sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London, Moscow, and Paris in 1945 and 1946 (James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, New York, Harper, 1947, pp. 171–4), while the fact that up to 1954 the Bonn Government had not joined the Atlantic Pact did not in any way bring the solution of the problem of German reunification nearer.

essential to the maintenance of the current peace. We risk forgetting the material basis of any such possible agreements; there is danger of repeating the same negative experience that occurred in the case of those treaties concluded before the creation of the two blocs. Such an approach is also unrealistic, for we should deprive ourselves of the possibility of facing up to the situation and of avoiding falling back on outmoded formulas and schemes, no longer effective in the conditions of today.

Hence, if the practice of *de facto* understandings in East–West relations better serves the requirements of the present situation, we must regard as mistaken those who believe in the possibility, once actual parity in armaments is reached, of concluding a truce between the two hostile worlds by means of a spectacular meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev and a concurrent solemn and formal accord dividing the respective spheres of influence. Anything of that kind not only appears improbable but is also, with things as they are, rather to be feared. Perhaps not so improbable, and in any case much more profitable, on the other hand, would be a general *de facto* understanding developed on the basis of more limited *de facto* agreements and using procedures similar to those adopted in the cases previously mentioned. Such an understanding, the nature and origins of which would not give rise to psychological misconceptions, and which would therefore have a better chance of lasting, would, moreover, be the only kind of agreement that would not alter the present basic equilibrium on the psychological front to the advantage of either side.

These conclusions, notwithstanding the foregoing arguments, may still leave some doubts in your minds. It is therefore, perhaps, worth while to reinforce the argument by pointing to the analogy between the present situation and that which existed between the members of the *Respublica Christiana* on the one hand and the Muslim or pagan State systems (the so-called world of the 'infidels') on the other. Really to understand present East–West relations one must do more than consider them on the political, economic, military, and ideological levels, as they are usually studied. We must also recall the events of some of the religious conflicts of the past, from which we can extract some decisive elements for our own orientation.[1]

When one considers certain recent or more remote episodes of East–West relations (for example, certain cases of espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union in America, the Far East, Australia, and Europe, which involved no material compensation from the Soviet Union to those acting on its behalf—indeed in some cases the protagonists themselves met their expenses out of their own pockets), one realizes at once that they can only be explained by regarding them as an expression of true and genuine

[1] In this connection, see a more detailed treatment in Mario Toscano, 'Histoire des religions et relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest', *Le Monde*, 19 November 1955.

religious faith. Now we have only to turn to the history of the religious wars, in particular to those between Christianity and Islam or to those of the Reformation, to perceive certain similarities with the present situation. Why, then, among all the various analogies, should we reject precisely those which relate to the splitting-up of the international community and to the type of agreements between members of the different blocs?

If we now transfer our enquiry on the peculiarities of the present international situation from considerations of 'peace' and 'understandings' to those of 'war', we can discern several tendencies deserving of emphasis. I stressed earlier that, given the impossibility under today's equilibrium of rationally resorting to a total war that no one can win, the principal forms of struggle cannot be military but rather in the field of psychological propaganda and economics. Let us here pause to consider the only types of armed conflict which still appear possible: local wars and civil wars.

The question of local wars has been the object of ample discussion of late, especially in Britain and the United States. These inquiries presuppose that the only way to avoid retreats in marginal areas under fear of bringing about a total war is to possess the means required to carry on limited atomic warfare. This view is undoubtedly justified, and was echoed only a short time ago by Mr Dulles. Consequently, the possibility of a limited war, except in the case of minor clashes occurring in remote areas between small isolated States *who have no atomic weapons*, appears conditioned by two facts: (*a*) that Moscow and Washington will both accept (as in Korea) an outcome of armed conflict which leaves neither victors nor vanquished; (*b*) that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union will intervene simultaneously and officially with their regular armed forces.

In fact, if one of the two parties wished to force the conflict to final victory, the other would be compelled to expand into atomic operations, and the conflict would end up in total war. Moreover, the direct and simultaneous intervention of both Soviet and American regular armed forces would pose psychological problems of public opinion so serious as to make it extremely difficult to accept a verdict of parity without first having resorted to those offensive weapons which automatically postulate all-out war.

The second category of armed conflict, more probable in the present state of affairs, is without doubt that of the so-called civil war. Within certain limits this type of war can escape from the dramatic alternative of total war and, by permitting the two great Powers behind the scenes not to become directly involved, can provide the possibility of a compromise solution. For this reason, on the basis of recent experience and in view of what has been said, it would seem that those who contemplate the possi-

bility of a future armed conflict in the traditional classical form are far removed from reality. A conflict beginning with a declaration of war and the crossing of the frontier by a regular army, flags unfurled to the breeze, is no longer within the realm of possibility. Two categories of civil wars, on the other hand, seem much more likely: the one, with a regular government, in control of one part of the national territory, fighting for reunification, perhaps with foreign support (something of the kind happened in Korea between Northerners and Southerners, in Indo-China between the Vietminh and Vietnam, and in China between Nationalists and Communists, and might still occur between East and West Germany, or between the Finns of Eastern Karelia and those of Helsinki); the other, in the form of a genuine insurrection, also supported from the outside, such as that now occurring in Algeria, a typical example of this form of armed conflict and one which has all the appearance of becoming the classical war of the future.

What I have said may perhaps seem unorthodox and surprising (and, moreover, at a time when the possibility of a new war crisis seems simply catastrophic, the subconscious desire to find a few reasons for optimism may have influenced my remarks). This is psychologically natural. Even in the ordinary experience of family life we have difficulty in freeing ourselves from certain habits to which we have been accustomed since infancy and which are no longer those of our children. This continuous process of changing our ideas and absorbing new ones is wearying and at times disagreeable, but it seems necessary; certainly, not to do so leads to errors and increases the contrasts between the generations.

A similar need exists and has always existed in the field of international politics. With the advent of spectacular technical progress, already surpassing the limits of our earlier imagination and plunging us precipitously into what we may already call the atomic era, with this acceleration of the evolutionary process, recent events have made it much more difficult for us to orientate ourselves. All of which is one more reason to examine fundamental realities more thoroughly, to make a greater effort to bring ourselves up to date.

Address at Chatham House,
20 May 1958

LATIN AMERICA AND THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING WORLD

J. A. CAMACHO

THE title of this talk carries with it the inherent danger of lumping together the English-speaking world as a single whole, as if there were no differences between its component parts. A bigger danger is that I should do the same for the Latin American world and give the impression that the twenty republics of Latin America are a homogeneous whole which can be so thought of and assessed. Nothing could be further from the truth. And I am not referring only to the more apparent differences. We all know that Brazil is far and away the biggest and speaks Portuguese, and that Haiti is among the smallest and speaks French; we all know that the Amerindian racial element is numerically dominant in Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Mexico; that it is strong in Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela; and that it is negligible in Uruguay, Argentina, and Costa Rica. We all know that the African Negro is strongly represented—and in some countries dominant—in the Caribbean, and relatively insignificant elsewhere, except in Brazil where the degree of miscegenation is almost certainly greater than anywhere else in the world. And we know also that it is the European element, stronger in some countries than in others, that has substantially imposed its way of life, its standards, religion, and culture upon this vast area of the world, which by 1960, and including the West Indies, will have a total population of over 200 million. Nor is there any need to stress the different stages of development that have been achieved, with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico in the vanguard, and, perhaps, Paraguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, and some of the Central American and Caribbean republics bringing up the rear. And, finally, there are few informed people who are not aware of the phenomenal prosperity of Venezuela as a result of the exploitation of her oil and, more recently, of her iron ore.

All these more apparent differences have in turn bred certain differences of character and attitude, strengthened by geographical differences, of size, configuration, fertility, mineral wealth, climate, and proximity to and ease of communication with other world population groups. These differences of attitude and emotional reaction are none the less real for being imponderable, and in a brief talk such as this there is no time for a detailed analysis of them. What I have said so far serves only as a reminder of certain basic facts, and above all of the inherent possibility of distortion and superficiality in any sort of generalization.

As you know, Vice-President Nixon met with a degree of unexpected hostility on his tour of Latin America last May. I believe that official America, and in particular the United States State Department, was genuinely surprised at this; and in an article in the *Manchester Guardian*[1] I explained my reasons for this belief as follows:

> The untravelled North American, including until recently Vice-President Nixon, is convinced that Latin Americans are well disposed; a little feckless, perhaps, in matters of money and lacking the dynamic energy of the North, but with a proper feeling of respect and affection for [their] prosperous and kindly Northern neighbour.
>
> They are in any case Roman Catholics and in the main safe from Communist influence; they enjoy the benefits of one-third of all private United States investments abroad; in the last ten years they have received over 40 per cent of Export–Import Bank loans; and every year Congress votes them a good measure of technical assistance.

There are, I believe, political motives, to which I will refer later, which provide the main reason for Mr Nixon's experience. But for the moment I think we would do well to remember that he is by no means the first English-speaking traveller who has experienced a degree of hostility in Latin America, though few of them can have met it quite so nakedly exposed or crudely expressed as Mr Nixon did.

I have reason to think that there is to be found in Latin America a latent animosity towards English-speaking people, oddly combined at times with admiration and respect, which springs partly from envy of the greater wealth, efficiency, and power of Britain and the United States, and partly from what Latin Americans believe to be a too frequent assumption of superiority on the part of Anglo-Saxons. It is an animosity akin to the latent resentment to be found among a proportion of the working classes of this country for the 'establishment', the upper middle class, the Oxford accent, and so on. In Latin America, Britain and the United States are in a measure the equivalent of our own British 'establishment'; we're too superior, too respectable, and, frankly, too tactless by half. I sometimes wonder how much harm has been done to the English-speaking peoples by their quite remarkable talent for inventing nicknames—words like Wop and Wog, dago and nigger—and by the indefinable connotations and overtones of their use of the word 'native'.

All this may sound rather trivial, but I think it is representative of something very important. And I believe I am in a rather special position which helps me to be more objective. In Latin America, before I achieved a certain fame as a B.B.C. political commentator, I travelled around with a British passport, but was not easily identifiable as anything but another Latin American; and this was not surprising in view of my Colombian origin and what I may say, without lack of modesty, is fluent and unaccented Spanish. I must ask you to believe me when I tell you that I was

[1] 16 May 1958.

as frequently surprised by the virulence of anti-British feeling as I was by the strength of the admiration for the British. Many of those born in Latin America of British stock are not in agreement with me; and they claim a greater basic knowledge of Latin America than I who spent my childhood in France and England. But I would remind them that British stock and a British surname are more self-evident than a British passport, and that most Latin Americans are polite and do not like to give offence—though it is true that I could not dispute Mr Nixon's right to take a contrary view.

Even if you agree with me, and even if you think there is some truth in my view about the latent resentment some Latin Americans harbour for the English-speaking peoples, you may still think it does not really matter. They are, after all, relatively not important in world affairs, and even if they represent a very considerable proportion of the foreign trade and foreign investment of the United States, the Latin American countries are not today anything like so important, on this material plane, to the United Kingdom. As far as the United States is concerned, it is evident that Latin American countries are so substantially dependent upon their northern neighbour that they cannot really afford to fall out with the United States, however embarrassing the excited mobs in Lima or Caracas may be. But I would suggest that there is a great deal still to be learned about relations with the peoples of the less developed—and sometimes almost wholly undeveloped—countries of the world, in Latin America no less than anywhere else; and I think it is important that this should be learned quickly by the United States and Britain if, as I hope and believe, Latin America is to continue to endorse the Western way of life.

A great deal of interest has been awakened recently by the United Nations publication, *The Future Growth of World Population*.[1] Not unnaturally attention has been concentrated on the fact that, whereas by 1960 the population of the world will be under 3 billion (and by billion I mean 1,000,000,000), by the year 2000 it could rise to nearly 7 billion. But there are a great many more interesting points. At the top of the list of areas in order of rate of population growth between 1925 and 1950 are Central America and tropical South America, with increases in a quarter of a century of 65 and 67 per cent respectively. The same areas remain at the top of the list in 1975 with estimated increases of about 100 and 80 per cent respectively over the 1950 figures; and these areas draw still farther away from the rest of the world by the year 2000 with increases of 332 and 302 per cent respectively over the 1950 figures. Interesting, too, are the figures in regard to density of population. If we except Australasia and Southern Africa, it is thought that even in the year 2000 tropical and temperate South America will have the lowest densities of population of

[1] Population Studies, No. 28, New York, United Nations, 1958.

any area of the world. If we bear in mind that Asia will have a population of 2 billion by 1975 and of anything between 3 and 4 billion by the year 2000, it is clear that South America, if not the whole of Latin America, could well come to be regarded as a coveted prize. But even if that does not arise the estimated figures for population by 1975 have still another significance. By that year the population of the United States and Canada will be 312 million; that of the part of Europe not under Communist domination, 360 million; that of Australia and New Zealand, 21 million; and that of Latin America will be 373 million. In other words, Latin America will be the largest group within the Western family. By the year 2000 its numerical predominance will be even higher, with a population of over 500 million.

These figures are not, I suggest, without importance. I would go further; I believe they make clear that it is vital for the United States and the United Kingdom really to understand, and cultivate the friendship of, Latin Americans.

We have a great deal of leeway to make up. We must remember that in Latin America, too, a social revolution is taking place. The underdog is being emancipated—faster in some countries than in others. The old-fashioned dictator *caudillo* may be able to maintain himself in power in a few small countries, but as a concept he is nearly ended; the politically conscious Latin American will have nothing to do with him. It is here that in my view the United States has made some errors in recent years. Perhaps influenced by business elements, who prefer stability to democracy and reform when their financial interests are at stake, the United States has too often seemed to befriend the strong man and the dictatorial regime. Ex-President Pérez Jiménez of Venezuela, now living near Washington, is one example. Others include General Fulgencio Batista of Cuba, who is thought by many to have retained power only because of United States help, and General Trujillo, dictator of the Dominican Republic, whose son rates headlines in the popular press when he lavishes expensive motor-cars on his notoriously beautiful actress friends or when he fails to pass out of the United States military academy he has attended. In this respect no British errors have been registered recently, but this may be, for all we know, not so much because they have not been made as because they have not been noticed; it is whispered, for example, that we were far too friendly to Castillo Armas, who held a short-lived term of office after the fall of President Arbenz of Guatemala in 1954. And as long ago as 1946 it was freely rumoured in Buenos Aires when I was there during the first Perón election that we were supporting Perón against the United States-sponsored democratic candidate Tamborini; it is fair to add that many efforts were made to dispel this idea.

The mention of Guatemala reminds me of something else that Latin

Americans resent: foreign intervention. I am not now referring to the Anglo-German blockade of Venezuela in 1901 and 1902. Nor am I referring to the United States policy of the big stick, the famous Theodore Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe doctrine. Let me first remind you about them. 'Lack of order in any country,' said President Roosevelt in his message to Congress in 1904, 'may call for the intervention of civilized States, and in the Western Hemisphere, in virtue of and in duty to the Monroe doctrine . . . may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of wrong-doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.' It must be said that the Monroe doctrine has never been popular in Latin America. But for John Quincy Adams, it might have been jointly declared by Britain and the United States. In point of fact, for the first seventy years after it was declared it had no meaning but for the British fleet. Even less popular was the Roosevelt corollary and the occupation by American armed forces—as often as not Marines—of several Caribbean countries, including, at various times during the first quarter of this century, Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. But these are now matters of history; they are handicaps that have to be overcome. The sort of intervention that is now resented lies in the supply of arms to undemocratic regimes, the more subtle and unpublicized approaches of big business to not-over-scrupulous politicians, and the cruder sort of diplomatic intervention of which the latest example is that of Guatemala.

You will recall that when, in 1954, the Government of President Arbenz was tottering and the Guatemalan Foreign Minister discussed the situation with United States Ambassador Peurifoy—and I quote now from J. D. Martz in his *Communist Infiltration in Guatemala* [1]—'The Ambassador calmly suggested a clean sweep of the Arbenz administration'. It has been said, and indeed up to a point must be true, that Arbenz enjoyed Communist support and even that he had some Communist sympathies; but if United States intervention in Guatemala led to hostile demonstrations as far south as Chile, they were not pro-Communist but against foreign intervention.

It is sometimes difficult to understand what guides the State Department in its Latin American policy. I remember, for example, the publication of Spruille Braden's anti-Perón blue book [2] at the height of the first Perón election campaign. Could anything have been more ham-fisted? It enabled Perón to go to the polls with the slogan: 'Braden or Perón is the choice before the Argentine people.' Even recently, when the anti-Nixon riots reached their worst, the United States could think of nothing better

[1] New York, Vantage Press, 1956, p. 109.
[2] *Consultation Among the American Republics with Respect to the Argentine Situation* (Washington, U.S. Department of State, 1946).

to do than to send troops, including Marines, to the Caribbean: 'a precautionary measure', explained President Eisenhower, in case the Venezuelan Government required assistance, and he added that no offer of assistance had been made and no request received. This is the sort of clumsiness that destroys much of the good done by the policy of the 'good neighbour' and by the very considerable economic aid which the United States has given to Latin America.

Let me here put right a possible misconception. I am not for one moment suggesting that Latin Americans were always right in their criticism of the British nor that they are always right in their condemnation of the United States. I am well aware of the fact that they are often wrong, but I am trying today to explain their point of view; because the Americans and ourselves must ensure we understand it before we can hope to persuade Latin America to understand us. We in Britain are in no position to give economic aid to Latin America, but in the United States there is a very real understanding of this aspect of their relations with their twenty southern neighbours. In a press conference given by President Eisenhower during the Nixon tour, when the State Department was still groping for an explanation of the explosion he so unwittingly provoked, the President said[1]: 'There are economic causes and that is one reason why the United States is so certain that these developing countries, and many others dependent on raw materials for their living, have to have aid and trade.'

Whatever the rights and wrongs of the matter, many Latin American statesmen and economists must have smiled wryly when they read those words and recalled how little of that aid has come their way in comparison with what they consider to have been the excessive favours lavished upon Europe and the Middle East. And in these matters the good is too easily forgotten and the bad lingers in the memory. Chileans cannot forget the United States administration's invitation to Congress to raise the duties on copper; Bolivians and Peruvians recall the moves to increase the tariffs on lead and zinc; Uruguayans remember the high wool tariff which they consider was the main cause of a fall of 90 per cent in their exports to the United States between 1950 and 1957. Venezuelans whisper rumours of attempts to restrict United States imports of oil, Argentinians never forget the anti-foot-and-mouth sanitation regulations which prevent the sale of Argentina's meat in the United States; and Brazil and Colombia are only too conscious of the catastrophic fall in the price of coffee, hastened by United States importers who have turned to Africa for competitive prices. Nor can any politically and economically conscious Latin Americans forget the extent to which they are dependent on the United States for their foreign trade and for their general economic stability. There is no doubt

[1] Quoted in the *Manchester Guardian*, 16 May 1958.

that Latin Americans need aid and trade; they actively want more of it, but they wish that so much of it were not dependent on a single source. That is why when, for example, the steel plant at Paz Del Rio in Colombia is financed not by the World Bank or the Import-Export Bank or by any private United States investment, but by the Banque de France, it looms larger in the minds of Colombians than, for example, the much larger investments of American and Anglo-Dutch oil companies along the Magdalena River.

As I said before, it is probably true that Britain is not in a position to do much about aid, though capital investment is another matter to which I would like to come back briefly later. But I think perhaps we should do a little more about trade. In this matter we are also a long way behind the United States. Something like half the imports into Latin America come from the United States, and something like a twentieth from the United Kingdom. When we bear in mind our desperate need for dollars the position is even worse, because the United States sells about 70 per cent of the imports into the dollar countries of Latin America and about 30 per cent of the imports into non-dollar countries. We on our side sell a slightly higher proportion to the non-dollar countries. I cannot quite understand why this should be so, and I find it difficult to believe that American goods are either so much better or cheaper than ours. It is possible that our marketing methods are not as good, and it has been encouraging to see the present President of the Board of Trade taking so keen an interest.

It is, I think, fair to say that there has been no real increase in our exports to Latin America since 1950. In value there has been an increase of about 7 per cent, but as prices have risen this represents a relative fall; in fact our relative position as a supplier has declined; we were the second largest suppliers, a long way behind the United States. We have now slipped to third place and have been substantially outstripped by Germany. This, too, is difficult to understand unless our exporters are making mistakes; it may be that we are still concentrating on an out-dated pattern of trade. It is conceivable that we have not sufficiently taken into account the radical change in the trading needs of Latin America. This springs from two reasons. First, the standards of living have risen and the population has risen; this means that the consumption of agricultural products is much greater and the growth of that consumption exceeds the increase in agricultural production. In other words, Latin America has less food and less pastoral and agricultural produce to sell. Secondly, the rise in living standards and in population has meant that it has become increasingly possible and profitable to manufacture goods on the spot; there is now in very many countries a worthwhile market for the local industrialist. In other words, Latin America has a lower need for consumer goods.

This, even less than twenty years ago, was the subject of rather querul-

ous complaint by eminent chairmen of important firms in the United Kingdom; and the truth is that there is no point in complaining about the facts of life. A degree of industrialization was inevitable and a continued development inescapable. Latin Americans are better off as a result; their well-being is less at the mercy of economic and political development elsewhere. It might be said that if they are to export less and import less the outlook for trade is bad, and that it would be waste of time and money to scramble for our share of a declining market. But the facts do not bear this out. Both imports into and exports from Latin America in real terms, as well as currency values, are much higher than they used to be. For, if it is true that agricultural exports are down, it is also true that mineral exports are very much up. And though it is a fact that the import of consumer goods is down, that of capital goods is up.

There is a bright spot from the British point of view, and that is that our exports to Latin America in 1957 were 22 per cent higher than in 1956 and that our exports during the first five months of this year have continued that increase in the principal countries. I have looked around for a reason for this and I have come to the conclusion that it is not altogether unrelated to the Suez crisis; it would seem that some of our manufacturers and exporters felt the need for an insurance in the Western hemisphere.

These strategic implications lead me to the matter of capital investment. I know that our record of capital investment abroad since the end of the war is exceptionally good—particularly in the Commonwealth. But I cannot help wondering whether this field of activity is not another in which Latin America could provide an insurance. There can be little doubt that it is right that we should invest heavily in the Commonwealth, but it may be questioned whether investments made in the uncommitted countries of the Commonwealth should have quite so overwhelming a priority over Latin America. Relative figures are notoriously difficult to obtain, but the statistics published by the Economic Commission for Latin America show that in the last three years United States investment in Latin America is some four times as large as that of the whole of Western Europe.

Let me give you some sample figures in this connexion. In Chile, for instance, the total foreign investment applications from March 1954 to July 1957 showed 25 per cent from the United States, 18 per cent from Italy, 15 per cent from Panama (I suspect that this would be from firms controlled and financed in the United States), and only 10·5 per cent from the United Kingdom. These, I should stress, are percentages of *applications*, which does not mean that the money was actually invested; but the figures are indicative. Similar figures in Brazil for the last three years up to the end of 1957 show 49·2 per cent for the United States and only 4·6 per cent for the United Kingdom. In Brazil we are well behind Germany and

Switzerland—and Brazil, I need hardly add, is today a much more important country than Chile.

It will, I know, be said that British investors have lost their money in Latin America before and have no desire to do so again. It is pointed out that exchange regulations often prevent the remittance to foreign investors of their legitimately earned dividends. A great deal of this is true; but the fact is that it is not only in Latin America, and by no means only because of governmental action, that British investors have lost money. And I cannot believe that one-third of the United States' private investment abroad is in Latin America for purely philanthropic reasons.

There is one further subject about which a word is necessary: cultural exchange. There is in Latin America a high respect for our cultural activity, but very little knowledge of it. The British Council and the B.B.C. have done and are doing their best. But it is an extravagant understatement to say that they are not over-plentifully supplied with facilities and funds. I believe their work could be fruitfully and profitably expanded. But this is only one aspect; our knowledge here of Latin American cultural manifestations is restricted to a very narrow circle. There are not, I believe, any official contacts between the universities of Latin America and those of this country; I would ask whether this is a legitimate state of affairs. At any one moment there are over 10,000 Latin American students at United States universities; in this country there are a bare handful. Except for occasional ventures by such groups as the Anglo-Brazilian Society, hardly a single British university student goes to Latin America as part of his education. And all this is as true in the field of technology as in the humanities. I would limit myself today to asking whether this is as it should be.

If there is a great deal more to say—and believe me there is—there is not today the time to say it. I must ask you to forgive me for my omissions —and to forgive me too for any missionary zeal I may have betrayed. Because I must confess that this talk has, as it were, a moral: a moral which I will put in the form of a question. Are we in this country doing enough to ensure that we understand and are understood: are we doing enough to ensure that we secure a fair share of trade and make a reasonable proportion of capital investment in this area of twenty countries, which in less than twenty years will constitute the largest human group within the Western family? I am not perhaps a sufficiently impartial observer to answer that question myself.

Address at Chatham House,
15 July 1958

CHURCH AND STATE IN ITALY

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES[1]

GUIDO CALOGERO

'CHURCH and State in Italy' is not only a highly controversial subject but also a very complex one. There are many aspects of the problem, and many sides of the picture: each of them might require a lecture for itself. I do not want to give you merely a vague general idea of the whole question, and I think, too, that it may be more useful here to consider some precise juridical and constitutional situations rather than political events, whose choice and interpretation is always more controversial. So I shall confine myself to explaining the main constitutional aspects of the situation, which is characterized by the coexistence of the Lateran Agreements, concluded between the Holy See and Italy in 1929, and the new Italian Constitution, adopted in 1947.

First of all let us briefly recall the origin of these two documents. Italy was unified in 1861 as a Kingdom under the House of Savoy. The Constitution was the so-called *Statuto*, granted to Piedmont by Carlo Alberto of Savoy in 1848. After 1861, the capital of Italy was Turin, and later Florence. The Pope, protected by France, was still sovereign in Rome and in a part of the old *Stato Pontificio*. After the defeat of Napoleon III by the Prussians in 1870, the unification of Italy extended also to the last remains of the old *Stato Pontificio*, and Rome became the capital. The Pope stayed on in the Vatican, refusing to accept the *Legge delle Guarentigie*, that is, the Law of Guarantees, which the Italian Parliament had passed in order to ensure to the Holy See and to the Catholic Church the widest freedom to carry on their religious activities.

This situation lasted for more than half a century, until Mussolini, on 11 February 1929, signed with Cardinal Gasparri, the Secretary of State of Pope Pius the Eleventh, the Patti Lateranensi, or Lateran Pacts (so called from the Palazzo Laterano, near San Giovanni, an old residence of the Popes). They included the Treaty, whereby Italy agreed to recognize the 'State of the City of the Vatican', formed by the Vatican buildings around the Church of St Peter, and the Concordat, which was to regulate the activities of the Catholic Church in Italy. Attached was a *Convenzione finanziaria*, that is, a financial agreement, according to which Italy paid to the Holy See 750 million lire cash and one billion lire in State bonds (a total sum corresponding more or less to one hundred billion Italian lire of

[1] Address given at Chatham House on 7 October 1958, i.e. two days before the death of Pope Pius XII.

today, that is, to £60 million) as compensation for the ecclesiastical estates which had been seized after the unification of Italy, and for the annual sum which Italy had offered to the Holy See under the *Legge delle Guarentigie*, and which the Holy See had never accepted.

After the collapse of Fascism, which began in mid-1943 and came to its sordid end in April 1945, Italy elected a Constituent Assembly in order to adopt a new Constitution, as the old one had proved unable to prevent the advent of Fascism, or at least to impose upon the Monarchy the duty of opposing it. The new Constitution was a republican one, as the Italians voted in favour of a republic in the referendum on the monarchy in June 1946, held at the same time as the General Election for the Constituent Assembly. The new Constitution was finally adopted in 1947, and it recognizes the validity of the Lateran Agreements in Article 7, whose formulation we shall examine later on.

The problem is therefore the following. There are certain rules, stated in the Constitution, which refer to religious and confessional questions, and therefore to the relations between State and Church. And there are other rules, more or less on the same subjects, which are stated in the Lateran Agreements. Before analysing the situation which arises when there is a contrast between the two sets of rules, let us see where, and to what extent, such contrasts in fact subsist.

We had better begin with the Italian Constitution, and with a survey of the essential points concerning religious liberty, and the lay character of the State, which occur in it, since in that document the statements are more explicit and comprehensive, having the form of declarations of principles. Here we can read all the traditional affirmations concerning the religious freedom of the citizen, and no rule contravenes the point that in order to ensure equal religious freedom to all citizens the State must avoid any declaration of allegiance to a particular faith or church. Article 3 states that 'all citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, without any distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinions, or personal and social conditions'. This means that the Italian State does not adopt any special position towards any religion. Article 8 states, even more clearly, that 'all religious confessions are equally free before the law'. And this general principle is certainly not denied by what follows in the same article: 'The religious confessions other than the Catholic are entitled to organize themselves according to their own statutes, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the Italian juridical system' (*'in quanto non contrastino con l'ordinamento giuridico italiano'*).

These last words are a little obscure, and it is quite understandable that, following this vague wording, the Italian Home Office may sometimes delay for a while the authorization to open a Protestant church by objecting, for instance, that its location on a particular site might create a

traffic jam. Fundamentally, however, even here no real differentiation is made between Catholic and non-Catholic confessions, because all the manifestations of the Catholic Church, too, are equally obliged not to infringe any law or bylaw of the Italian State or local authorities. The fact that in Article 8 only the non-Catholic churches are mentioned is simply because the relations between the Catholic Church and the State are mentioned elsewhere, in Article 7, referring to the Lateran Agreements. We may therefore say that the lay and non-confessional character of the Italian State is clearly laid down both in Article 3 and in Article 8 of the Constitution.

Just the same rules are reaffirmed and underlined when the Italian Constitution, after having solemnly stated what we have already mentioned under its first heading, 'Fundamental Principles', goes on to define the 'Rights and Duties of the Citizen'. Here we find, again, the principle of religious freedom, stated in Article 19: 'Everybody has the right to profess freely his own religious faith, in any form, individual or collective, to make propaganda for it, and to worship privately or publicly, according to its rites, provided that those rites do not offend against normal good behaviour' (*'purché non si tratti di riti contrari al buon costume'*). Here, too, one might complain of the vagueness of this idea of the 'buon costume'; but here, too, such a limitation is meant to apply also to Catholic rites. Moreover, this freedom of conscience and worship in religious matters appears to be only a special case of the freedom of thought and of its expression, stated in Article 21. On the other hand, as Article 18 establishes the freedom of association (with the sole exception of those associations which are secret, and of those which 'pursue political ends by means of organizations of a military character'), so Article 20 underlines that no limitation of this freedom can be applied to a society because of its religious or ecclesiastical character.

Finally, the principle of religious freedom is implicitly reaffirmed in Article 33, which states that 'art and science are free, and the teaching of them is free too'. Here, again, the wording—'art and science'—sounds a little strange, but no commentator of the Constitution has ever maintained that it is intended to exclude other possible subjects of teaching, such as, for instance, philosophy and religion. The formula is obviously supposed to include any possible subject of teaching. It therefore includes the freedom to teach about religion, or even against religion, according to one's own conscience. In other words, according to its Constitution the Italian State does not favour any one particular kind of religious teaching more than another. Following the same principle, the Constitution does not make any distinction amongst citizens from a religious point of view as to their right to obtain public appointments. It does not offer any privilege to Christians rather than Jews, or to Catholics rather than

Protestants. This is what is stated in Article 51. In other words, the Italian Constitution ignores the religion of the citizen, regarding his religion as his own private concern. Which is, again, the typical point of view of a lay State.

In the text of the Constitution there is no other article concerning religion or related matters, nor is there any indication of a State religion, or even of a religion whose rites the State may choose when it has to provide for special ceremonies including religious rites. There is only Article 7, recognizing, as we have said, the validity of the Lateran Agreements. But, before analysing this Article—the Article governing the situation arising from the coexistence of the Italian Constitution and the Lateran Agreements—let us now see what is the position of these Agreements concerning the aspects of the religious freedom which we have seen guaranteed by the Constitution.

Article 1 of the Treaty between Italy and the Holy See [1] says bluntly: 'Italy recognizes and reaffirms the principle embodied in article 1 of the Statute of the Kingdom dated the 4th March, 1848, according to which the Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion is the sole religion of the State.' Now this principle had been tacitly recognized as no longer valid throughout the whole history of liberal Italy after the unification, from 1861 until 1929. It was, in any case, the principle of the Statute of the Kingdom: it is no longer the principle of the Constitution of the Republic. Nothing could underline more sharply the contrast between the principle of State religion, conceded to the Catholic Church by Mussolini in the Lateran Agreements, and the opposite principle of religious freedom, stated in the new republican Constitution of Italy.

This signifies also a certain survival of the old conception of the State as the 'braccio secolare', the 'secular arm', that is, as a sort of policeman of the Church, which could be called upon to enforce the sentences of the ecclesiastical courts. Article 23 of the Treaty says:

> The rules of international law shall apply as regards the execution in Italy of judgments of the courts of the Vatican City. On the other hand, judgments and orders of the ecclesiastical authorities in spiritual or disciplinary matters regarding ecclesiastical or religious persons which are officially communicated to the civil authorities shall without further formality have full juridical effect for all civil purposes.

The fact that criminal law is not mentioned [2] may have satisfied Mussolini that he was not letting himself in for having to burn another Giordano Bruno if the Church had sentenced or recommended him to

[1] Text in *Gazzetta Ufficiale*, 5 June 1929; English text in *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1929, Part I, Vol. CXXX, pp. 791 ff.

[2] The phrase in the Italian text, translated above as 'for all civil purposes', reads '*anche agli effetti civili*'—in other words, it does not exclude any other '*effetto*'; and *civile* is meant here as the counterpart of *ecclesiastico*, not of *penale*.

be burnt. However, civil sanctions may be serious too. Here is the famous Article 5 of the Concordat: [1]

> No ecclesiastic may be engaged or remain in an employment or office of the Italian State or of public bodies subordinate thereto without the consent of the diocesan ordinary.
>
> The withdrawal of such consent shall deprive the ecclesiastic of the right to continue in such employment or office.
>
> In any case priests who are apostates or under censure may not be employed or continue in a post as teacher, or in an office or employment in which they come into direct contact with the public.

It is a well-known fact that this article was adopted in order to give the Church the possibility of asking the Italian State to oust Professor Ernesto Buonaiuti, a priest who had been excommunicated for his 'modernistic' views, from his Chair of History of Christendom at Rome University. This was done, and Buonaiuti lost his Chair: but Mussolini was terrified when he found out that very many teachers and professors in Italy were actually defrocked priests, that is, 'apostates', who, according to Article 5 of the Concordat, would have to be ousted from their posts. So he resorted to the old juridical principle that laws should never have retroactive effect, and refused to apply the article to all those people who already held teaching posts when the Concordat was signed (with the exception, of course, of Buonaiuti). Such an interpretation was, in this case, simply ridiculous, because Article 5 clearly stated that the apostates should be denied not only employment but also continuation in their offices. Anyway, when a law is bad it may be better to be illegal. And so the apostates of pre-1929 retained their Chairs—excepting Buonaiuti!—and some of them are still there. But thousands of other defrocked priests who abandoned the Church after 1929 were refused any possibility of teaching either in State or in public schools, and were thus put in a very difficult position, as teaching is generally the only activity by which a defrocked priest may earn a living in Italy. Moreover, some people maintain that several thousand more priests would abandon the Church in Italy should the State cease to give this disciplinary help to the Church.

We may now be able better to understand the possible dangers of the second paragraph of the first Article of the Concordat, which reads:

> Having regard to the sacred character of the Eternal City, the Episcopal See of the Supreme Pontiff, the centre of the Catholic world and the goal of pilgrimages, the Italian Government shall adopt measures to prevent in Rome all that may conflict with that character.

For the moment, this Article is mainly applied in order to cause the film stars who are advertised on the walls of Rome to be a little more adequately dressed than in other towns of Italy (in one such town a very

[1] *Op. cit.*

pious Prefect not so long ago ordered a poster showing the Venus of Botticelli to be seized, supposing her to be an improperly dressed film star). But what is the exact extent of 'all that may conflict with the sacred character of the Eternal City'? It all depends on how this formula is interpreted, both by the Church and by the Italian Government. What about a law forbidding, for instance, that the University of Rome may offer any teaching which may be in conflict with the character of the Eternal City, the centre of the Catholic world and therefore also of the Catholic philosophy? I am not concerned about my own case: I was already ousted from my chair by the Fascist Government, and I have therefore acquired some training in this connexion. But certainly this situation is vaguely disturbing for many other people, especially for all those who have not yet reached the stage of placid indifference towards any possible improvement in their academic career. And no law should ever cause teachers to lose their spontaneity in their teaching.

Another awkward point in this connexion is what the Concordat says about the teaching of religion in the schools. We have seen that, according to the Constitution, there is no State religion in Italy. But the Concordat establishes that the Italian State must provide for the teaching of the Catholic religion. Here is Article 36:

> Instruction in Christian doctrine according to the form accepted by Catholic tradition is regarded by Italy as the foundation and crown of public instruction. She therefore agrees that the religious teaching now given in the public elementary schools shall be further developed in the secondary schools according to a programme to be settled between the Holy See and the State.
>
> This instruction shall be given by means of teachers and professors, priests or members of religious orders, approved by the ecclesiastical authorities, with assistance from lay teachers and professors, who shall, for that purpose, be furnished with a certificate of qualification issued by the ordinary of the diocese.
>
> The revocation of this certificate by the ordinary shall forthwith deprive the teacher of the capacity to teach.
>
> Only text-books approved by the ecclesiastical authorities shall be used for such religious teaching in the public schools.

The wording of this article is indicative of the tension which arose during the negotiations between the Holy See and Mussolini, who was, after all, an old and boisterous anticlerical and who felt, in a way, ashamed about this sort of surrender to the power of the Church. On the one hand, therefore, he agreed that the teaching of the Catholic doctrine should be considered as 'the foundation and crown of public instruction' (*'fondamento e coronamento dell'istruzione pubblica'*); on the other hand, he reluctantly accepted that religious teaching might be extended from the elementary to the secondary schools—though not to the universities. In any case, the principle in itself is now inconsistent with what is stated in the new Italian Constitution. A State cannot say that it makes no religious discrimination, because all citizens are equal irrespective of their

religion, and at the same time provide in its schools for the teaching of the Catholic religion alone. In this way the only possibility open to pupils of different denominations, or of no denomination, is to be exempted from any such teaching at all; but in that case they may well experience a sort of inferiority complex because of this exclusion from the life of the community.

We will leave aside the question of the marriage laws, which is a very intricate one, although it affords another example of the way in which Mussolini surrendered the point of view of the State to the point of view of the Church, thus rendering impossible any civil legislation about divorce even in the most tragic and inhuman cases. It is of greater interest, I believe, to note that it was easier for an authoritarian regime to abandon certain principles which characterize a liberal State. As a matter of fact, Mussolini was also forcing upon the Church his own authoritarianism; he maintained that the State ought to be able to interfere in questions which should have been the prerogative of the Church alone. According to Article 19 of the Concordat, the Church cannot appoint a bishop or an archbishop without previously asking for the agreement of the State; according to Article 20, bishops, before taking over their dioceses, must take an oath of allegiance to the Head of the State; and according to Article 21, even the bestowal of ecclesiastical benefices is something which the Church cannot do without previous agreement with the State. All these are, in my opinion, conditions which no Church should ever accept from a State, and no State should ever force upon a Church. As a matter of fact, they represent the other side of the picture: they are the price paid by the Church to the authoritarianism of the Fascist State. But now we no longer have a Fascist State in Italy. We have a free Constitution: and this should free the citizen from the remnants of ecclesiastical authoritarianism, just as it should free the Catholic Church from the remnants of State authoritarianism.

Even the question which is most delicate from the political point of view, and on which controversy rages most fiercely, especially during general elections, namely, the rule which forbids the clergy to interfere in party politics, is fundamentally a product of the desire of an authoritarian State not to be interfered with by the Church in its political domination of the country. Let us look at the awkward wording of Article 43 of the Concordat:

> The Italian State recognises the organisations subordinate to the 'Azione Cattolica Italiana' in so far as these, as laid down by the Holy See, pursue their activity outside any political party and in the direct subordination to the hierarchy of the Church for the dissemination and practice of Catholic principles.
>
> The Holy See takes the opportunity afforded by the present Concordat to renew the prohibition against Italian ecclesiastics and members of religious orders becoming members contending in favour of any political party whatever.

All this, after all, is very naïve, as everyone knows, after some general elections in which the Italian bishops have very clearly told the voters how they had to vote. But why should they not tell them how to vote, if they are entitled to tell them how to marry, how to live, how to die? Nobody can be denied the freedom of giving his advice to others: why should it be denied to the priests? A liberal and modern State should never impose such a prohibition on a Church, all the more so since no clergyman will respect it in practice. The Italian Constitution, which is liberal and non-confessional, as we have seen, should amend the Lateran Agreements by purging them not only of the rules infringing the equal freedom of the citizen, but also of those infringing the equal freedom of the clergy.

Now, how is it possible, given this strong conflict between the Lateran Agreements and the new Italian Constitution, that Article 7 of this Constitution refers to the Lateran Agreements and recognizes them?

Let us look, first of all, at the text of the Article:

> The State and the Catholic Church are, each in its own sphere, independent and sovereign.
>
> Their relations are regulated by the Lateran Agreements. Modifications of these Agreements, if accepted by both parties, do not require the procedure necessary for amending the Constitution.

The last sentence has been considered by some interpreters on the Catholic side as the proof that, according to the Constitution, the Lateran Agreements have the same constitutional weight as the Constitution itself. If there is some conflict, therefore, the rule included in the Lateran Agreements should be considered as an exception to the general rule stated in the Constitution: that is, as a rule valid notwithstanding the fact that it is in contrast to the general constitutional rule. But this interpretation is wrong, for many reasons.

First, it was denied even by the most influential members of the Christian Democrat party in the Constituent Assembly (by Professor Dossetti, for instance). They clearly stressed the point that the Lateran Agreements were not 'constitutionalized' (*'costituzionalizzati'*) by what is said in Article 7; and it was only by this means that they persuaded some of the non-Christian Democrat members of the Constituent Assembly to vote for that unfortunate Article. Incidentally, the major part of those non-Christian Democrat votes consisted of votes from the Communists, who decided to vote in favour, both because they had no real interest in the lay and liberal character of the Constitution, and also because they wanted to show that they were good Catholics. On the other hand, even the Nenni Socialists voted against; and this was one of the very rare occasions on which, in that period, they did not follow the lead of the Communist Party.

Secondly, that interpretation is wrong because it could lead to quite absurd conclusions in cases where amendments to the Agreements might tend, not towards a liberalization of their rules, but in the opposite direction. Suppose that a Pope strongly believing in the present value of the Syllabus[1] should come to an agreement with an Italian Catholic Government of the Franco brand to the effect that all democratic liberties, guaranteed in the Constitution, should no longer be considered valid. Would this be 'a change not requiring the procedure of constitutional amendment'? This is simply ridiculous: it would imply that the Italian Constitution has no value at all, as any Italian Government might easily destroy it, provided that an agreement to this effect was reached between it and the Vatican, i.e., between it and a foreign Government. The fact is that the final sentence of Article 7 came to be worded in that way because everyone was thinking only of the possibility and necessity of correcting the illiberal rules of the Lateran Agreements in accordance with the new liberal Constitution, and not *vice versa*. Which is a telling sign of what was expected at that time, and also of the fact that the new Constitution was regarded by everyone as the more authoritative text, which was to correct the Agreements, not to be interpreted according to them.

Finally, this is what actually happened in many cases, because there were many points in the Lateran Agreements which were tacitly or explicitly accepted as being modified by the new constitutional situation. For example, Article 12 of the Concordat provided for special prayers on Sundays for the prosperity of the King, and Article 15 reserved to the King special privileges concerning the Church of the Pantheon; but all that did not prevent the Church from recognizing the Italian Republic. Article 37 made special provisions concerning the Fascist Youth organizations: but this did not prevent the Church from acknowledging the fact that the Fascist regime no longer existed. In all such cases, the new situation, legally expressed in the new Constitution, has modified the Lateran Agreements, and these modifications have in practice been accepted by the Holy See.

It therefore seems not improper to express the hope that such a development might also take place in connexion with those residual provisions of the Lateran Agreements which are more openly incompatible with the new liberal character of the Italian Constitution. Obviously, this is only a part of the picture, and it is possible to enjoy a very liberal way of life under an obsolete Constitution, just as it was possible to collapse into Fascism under the nominal rule of a liberal *Statuto del Regno*. But seeing that the present rulers of Italy, both in the Church and in the

[1] i.e. the list or catalogue (*Syllabus*) of eighty condemned propositions, addressed by order of Pope Pius IX to all the Catholic episcopate, under the date of 8 December 1864. The list includes a condemnation of the principle that liberalism and democracy shall be the foundations of modern states.

State, do not seem to desire that our country should follow the lead of a Franco or a Salazar, the fact that they might prefer either to interpret the Constitution according to the Lateran Agreements, or to correct the Agreements according to the Constitution, might make a great difference to an understanding of the direction of their policy. I believe that all the best Catholics in Italy would enthusiastically welcome the second course of action: that is, the liberalization of the Lateran Agreements according to the Constitution. In that case, it would be strongly advisable, in my opinion, that the Catholic Church should not appear as the braking force. On the contrary, it should itself take the lead, and show that nothing in history is irrevocable, and that Catholicism is not necessarily condemned to resist materialistic authoritarianism only by means of another kind of authoritarianism, or to prefer the Syllabus to the liberal Constitutions of the modern world.

THE NAME AND NATURE OF FOREIGN AID

HUGH TINKER

ALMOST unconsciously, diplomacy and international relations have acquired a new and powerful component: foreign economic aid. From the days of Britain's subsidies to her Continental allies against Napoleon, wartime aid has been an element in policy. Peacetime aid was born, virtually, with the Marshall Plan, a decade ago. Yet it has certainly come to stay as a permanent feature of foreign policy. It is time that its significance was studied on a level other than that of day-to-day requirements. This paper makes no attempt to comment on aid in its strictly economic aspects. It does attempt to discuss the psychology of aid, some problems of administration, the kind of service that is desirable, and the long-term effects that aid may help to produce in the world. Throughout, emphasis is placed upon posing questions rather than on providing solutions, which the writer cannot make any pretence of supplying.

Very little attention has been paid to the psychological stresses which surround the provision of aid in Asia.[1] The newly independent nations still find it difficult to take for granted that they are free, that European domination has gone for ever. An invisible Union Jack still floats over the Red Fort at Delhi. Any suspicion that vestiges of colonialism remain, in the economic or even the cultural sphere, can immediately arouse a wave of feeling in political and official circles, and to a lesser extent among the general public. Yet, at a deeper level, there remains a need for a substitute for the now departed Imperial authority. A hundred years of foreign rule does not equip a people for assuming all the heavy burdens of statehood and national development. The term 'slave mentality' which many Asians invoke to describe their state of mind under Western dominance may be crude; but it is clear that when another nation withholds responsibility for all decisions of policy—foreign relations, defence, even execution of most of the important details of routine administration—this does not contribute to the promotion of a spirit of self-reliance.[2] 'I cannot take the responsibility . . .'—that phrase will awake echoes in the memories of former administrators. And so, while independence was demanded and fought for by Asian leaders, its attainment makes a process of adjustment necessary. Learning to assume responsibility comes automatically only to the most out-

[1] A notable assessment was made in a *Times* leader, 'Tomorrow's Aid', cf. *The Times*, 19 July 1956; cf. also 'Combating the Russian Threat in Asia', *The Times*, 27 June 1956.

[2] For a discussion of 'the slave mentality', see chapters by the present writer, 'The Impact of Western Democracy on Asia' and 'Democratic Institutions in India and China', in *Democratic Institutions in the World Today*, ed. W. Burmeister (London, 1958).

standing of the new nations' statesmen and senior officials. There is a longing for some substitute for the former Imperial umbrella: yet this longing is repudiated, despised, if ever it enters into the levels of conscious thought.

Aid has a straightforward job to do in providing technicians and equipment which are scarce in under-developed countries, but nowhere is its application straightforward—always there are tensions. If it appears to be a cloak for the return of political control or influence in however indirect form, then its benefits will be submerged by emotional cross-currents. So much of American aid has been suspect because it is believed that the United States wishes the recipient to identify himself unquestioningly with American foreign policy. The nomenclature of some American programmes, such as the Mutual Security Administration, has appeared to emphasize this commitment. Therefore, assistance available under the various U.N. agencies, or even under the Colombo Plan, is more acceptable, because it does not suffer from this stigma of identification with foreign policy. The endless disclaimers which are put out by the apologists of certain Governments about American aid only being accepted 'without strings' underline these preoccupations. Indeed, in some Asian countries most heavily in receipt of American aid, it has become a matter of routine to display hostility to the United States in the press and elsewhere in order to demonstrate spiritual independence. The aid programme has backfired upon the donor in unrequited ill will.

The foreign expert also has an unenviable part to play in providing an unacknowledged substitute for the Imperial decision-taker of a former day. All the new States have subscribed to the belief that economic development must proceed on the basis of State planning. Probably only in India has the actual drafting of the framework of the plan been the work of nationals. In half a dozen other lands, from Persia to the Philippines, the blueprint has been drawn by foreign experts, mainly Americans. In these circumstances, responsibility for setting up the target (and hence, to a great extent, for hitting it) does not fall squarely upon the shoulders of the national leaders. Moreover, foreign experts have been utilized to evade responsibility for failures in specific cases. Let us suppose that a newly nationalized enterprise reveals, after the first few years, certain grave defects which reflect upon the politicians and officials in charge. One solution to this embarrassment is to call in foreign experts to inquire and report. This clearly demonstrates that the Government is doing something constructive. The experts investigate, make recommendations, and fly away. The Government is now free to carry out the experts' proposals, or to shelve them, as it wishes. Honour is satisfied. It would be quite false to describe such a technique as general, or even perhaps predominant; but the foreign expert is no stranger to the role of stalking-horse or scapegoat in Asia today.

Another legacy from the colonial period is the conviction that the poverty of Asia is the consequence of exploitation by the West. Hence the belief, shared by many, that the West owes a debt to Asia which can only be repaid by copious material assistance today. The West is 'richer by Asia': a reciprocal movement is now overdue. Most countries have come to regard foreign aid as something which should be provided as an automatic service, as water is drawn from a tap. The availability of aid is taken for granted, and the solution for every financial crisis is sought in additional aid.[1] These demands, ever growing in volume, have been met to a large extent; and mainly by the United States. As aid has increased, upon consciousness of being in debt has been piled the frustrating belief that this indebtedness must continue indefinitely. The goal of prosperity seems to be as distant as ever. Aid on the medical front may even have worsened things; in part owing to elimination of disease, the population is increasing faster than the resources in many lands. Aid from the West seems to offer no short-term solutions; perhaps Communist aid has some magic formula that will ensure success? The conducted tours of the U.S.S.R. which are so lavishly arranged for Asians of any standing seem to provide corroboration. Communist aid, therefore, is invited; but Western aid goes on, despite its tarnish, because Asia just cannot do without it.

These are some of the irrational elements which infuse the Asian attitude to aid. On the Western side also there are illusions or delusions. Any belief that the tendering of assistance should be conditional on taking sides with the donor in the cold war has long been discarded from the thinking of the civil servants and technicians who operate the programmes. But it has not vanished from the minds of Western politicians and publicists. Somewhat illogically, those who imagine that the provision of aid should be conditional on taking sides against world Communism frequently expect the recipient to exhibit expressions of gratitude also. But if a price is demanded, then gratitude has no place in the transaction: economic aid is exchanged for a military understanding. Another illusion which is more widely shared is that the provision of technical aid is an automatic, self-adjusting process. Ceylon requires an expert on chicken-rearing, and (let us suppose) Australia is willing to supply one: hey presto, the problem is solved. But the chicken expert must first turn himself into an expert on natural conditions in Ceylon before his prior expertise will be of the slightest value. Neglect of this simple precaution has ruined more aid

[1] The writer has attempted to analyse the impact of aid on one country; see *The Union of Burma* (London, 1957), pp. 97–125. One statement, 'American aid was received without sense of obligation' in Burma (p. 124), was criticized by a Burmese scholar who suggested that, under Buddhism, acceptance of aid piled up an enormous spiritual debt of gratitude, quite incommensurate with the actual material value of the aid, which in certain aspects (the instance of a dredger is often cited) was defective. So the material aid was not appreciated and the incurrence of a debt of gratitude was resented.

ventures than any other factor. Another Western illusion, not far removed from the above, is that aid is indirectly a vehicle for the transmission of a 'way of life'. Any measure that seeks to impose a Western pattern on an Asian situation will be both unsuccessful and harmful. If a foreign planner attempts to transpose the national dynamic of his Western country into a plan for Asia, then the subsequent failure will have far-reaching consequences. A good expert is, of course, a good ambassador for his own country: but he should remember that the ambassador's function is not the transformation of the country of his appointment into the likeness of his native land.

One effect of national feeling creeping into aid has been an unspoken but unmistakable tone of antagonism between some British and some American experts and advisers. Some Englishmen (by no means of the old regime only) find it hard to accept the advent of Americans into Southern Asia, which is still regarded as 'our' area. This resentment is expressed in criticism of American experts in the field as brash, uninformed, and doctrinaire. Some Americans, in the 'anti-colonial' tradition, arrive in Asia with a bias against most things connected with the colonial period. In advising on future developments, they find it necessary to reject or overthrow the solutions propounded by British officials in former days. As the American experts outnumber the British overwhelmingly, their influence is quantitatively much greater. There is no virtue in keeping to old ways merely because people understand them; but equally there is no infallible virtue in change.

Ten years of Western aid in Asia have yielded a crop thick with thorns: frustrations in the actual operation of the programmes, expensive lack of success in many sectors, the palpable absence of improved relations. Many have asked, is it worth it? Mr George Kennan spoke for a growing body of opinion in a Reith Lecture [1] when he called for a much more discriminating implementation of aid. Failures must, however, be treated as a challenge. Vast and sometimes wasteful expenditure, repercussions in terms of international ill will, and unpredictability in results are accepted by the United States and Britain as part of the price to be paid in the development of nuclear and space weapons. These are accorded the highest priority as the great deterrent against a victory by Soviet Communism through war, though it appears decreasingly likely that a world war forms part of Communist strategy. The stakes in the political and economic struggle between the free society and totalitarianism are equally high. In this struggle, aid is the West's only 'deterrent'. It should be accorded a priority in expenditure and planning equal to, or perhaps taking precedence of, nuclear and missile development. The Communist

[1] George F. Kennan, *Russia, The Atom, and the West: The BBC Reith Lectures, 1957* (London, 1958).

advance by 'constitutional' means is already proceeding, and Communist parliamentary groups have achieved positive successes in parts of Asia—successes that may be repeated in Africa and South America. Against these Fabian tactics of Communism the West can do little directly. The leadership of democratic statesmen in South and South-East Asia is the only barrier. Unless the economic planning of the democratic Governments in the area manifestly yields results in terms of general economic betterment, it is difficult to take an optimistic view of the future.

This analysis is a deliberate over-simplification of the purpose of aid in Asia, but probably only in such terms can its expansion be made acceptable to the Western statesmen and electorates.

Western aid must be made to succeed on two levels. First, in the purely material sense. If x number of engineers, y quantity of equipment, and z financial contribution is put into a scheme, the result should at least be equivalent to $x + y + z$. Up till now this has seldom been the case. Aid must also succeed in the deeper sense of helping to promote Asian confidence, confidence among the ordinary people; in helping Asians to liberate themselves from the shackles of the past, and in creating a healthier relationship between the ex-Imperial Powers and the anti-colonial Afro-Asian nations. It may be fruitful in this brief review to concentrate upon two topics: the form in which aid is deployed and the problem of personnel.

Aid appears to be most objectionable, emotionally, when it is proffered by a large, wealthy donor-nation to a small, poor recipient. When the operation is channelled through a regional organization, such as the Colombo Plan, much of the emotion evaporates. The consultative machinery of the Plan, and the fact that its secretariat is international, help to promote a spirit of co-operation. Moreover, a country may be both a contributor and a recipient: India, as well as receiving aid, has made financial contributions to Burma under the Plan. The more that a 'donor–debtor' relationship can be replaced by a spirit of co-operation, the better. Ideally, perhaps, all aid should be handed over to United Nations agencies. But the U.N. has now accumulated a vast bureaucracy, and its officials have become very like the plutocrats of the aid world. This means that U.N. aid is expensive. The under-developed nations are required to contribute a considerable part of the costs of the experts posted to them; this part will represent a sum considerably higher than the salary of a comparable national expert. Then, if U.N. aid is to be available on a much larger scale, those countries providing the bulk of the contributions would wish to have some control over their commitments. In 1957 the Unesco budget was doubled, without prior warning, as the result of a snap proposal by certain members. The major contributors could only protest and pay. (The undoubted achievements of U.N. agencies, such as Unicef, in

many distressing situations should not exempt the activities of these organizations from examination and comment.)

The process of procuring aid frequently needs to be less rigid. 'Help given promptly is help twice given': this is true not only of individuals. Often, assistance will be required on a long-term basis in accordance with long-term planning. But some needs arise unexpectedly, a need for a man or a machine in a particular place at a particular time. The response is often too tardy to meet such a need. The Principal of a college in Swat, in the remote north-west of Pakistan, told the writer that he badly needed an English lecturer to teach in his college. When asked whether he had considered the Colombo Plan Organization as a possible source of supply, he wryly quoted a Persian proverb, 'While waiting for the medicine, the sick man died.' Colombo Plan officials, when told this story, stressed that delay in this kind of instance is by no means all on their side. The machinery for obtaining aid badly requires streamlining in many Asian countries. A request for a malaria expert by the Health Ministry of a state in the Indian Union, for example, will have to ascend through half a dozen ministries and departments before it is finally cleared to a foreign aid body. Amongst other complications, there are those arising from the determination of many in authority to apply orthodox principles of book-keeping to aid. The delivery of United States aid is conditional on the payment by the recipient of equivalent sums into a Counterpart Fund. Although it is laid down that the Counterpart Fund shall be spent within the recipient country, its disbursement often occasions bitterness. Among the recipients, in at least one Asian Commonwealth country, the Government auditors ignore the purpose of aid in their book-keeping rules. An aid-financed cement factory was erected by two other Commonwealth partners. In determining the price at which the cement was to be sold, the product was costed as if the factory had been paid for out of the recipient country's budget. The resulting high prices at which the cement was marketed brought only odium upon the two outside Commonwealth helpers.

In the present inchoate phase, there is room for aid of varying types at different levels. One of the healthy features of American aid is the activity of non-governmental agencies, the Foundations. Some of these (such as the Ford Foundation) operate on a massive scale in broad projects, although within selected fields. Others (such as the Asia Foundation) are prepared to assist with small-scale ventures. In this manner a proper infra-structure of aid is created. There is need for fresh experiment in the techniques of aid. This would have to be the subject of study, but, as a possible example, surely there could be a place for the participation of British industrial firms in some programme in which they could provide skills and technical information? A model exists, to some extent, in the

'joint ventures' which have been set up in Burma on the basis of a partnership between the Union Government and British oil, mining, and other enterprises.[1] There is much talk of the intercourse between Commonwealth universities; yet at the universities of India and Pakistan today a British professor is hardly ever seen, although their presence is sought and welcomed. The flow could be resumed, if the requisite conditions were created.

While experiment and imagination are needed in evolving the best means for co-ordinating and administering aid, any improvement will only be as good as the men who come out to do the actual work: the experts. Methods of recruiting experts are roughly similar under all the Western aid programmes. A man is recruited to fill a particular vacancy for a limited period, usually two years. Such a system fits American society well enough, for conditions are fluid and it is quite normal for an American professional man to move around in his career: first, he may spend a period in academic research; then in government service; a spell in business or industry; then, it may be, in politics or diplomacy; and back again into academic life. Within this scheme of things, a sojourn in an Asian country fits quite smoothly—though the recruitment of Americans has its own problems too. The dedicated American is, unjustly, regarded as a subject for satire; but it must be acknowledged that American willingness to take up overseas posts is somewhat offset by a lack of flexibility in adapting to an Asian environment. The shock of change is hard to overcome, and a United States foreign service official has observed that an expert proceeding on an eighteen-months' assignment takes six months to adapt himself, gives six months' effective work, and then requires six months in which to reorientate for his return to America.

The British professional man, on the other hand, chooses one sphere of work at the outset, and normally remains there all his days. The late war changed the pattern for some: dons became civil servants, diplomats became parachutists; but, with the war over, the pattern was accepted again, though for some it was a new pattern. For most British professional men, therefore, it is unthinkable to throw over a settled career for the doubtful glamour of a few years overseas, with no clear prospects afterwards. And so recruitment of British experts is unsatisfactory. Those who are attracted are largely young men at the start of their careers: whereas men with experience will largely be required. If the latter are persuaded to go, it is often because of the prospect of an inflated salary and tax concessions which will permit them to save money much more rapidly than in Britain. Of course, there must be Englishmen who regard this work as a form of service, but one does not often meet them.

The confinement of the expert's contribution to one brief tour of duty

[1] See Tinker, *Union of Burma*, pp. 114–18.

is the weakest feature of almost every aid programme. An ancillary weakness is the lavish standard of living provided as an inducement to brave the 'hardships' of life in the tropics. The air-conditioning, refrigerators, canned foods, large cars, and other comforts do a great deal to mask the personal goodwill and technical know-how which the expert may bring. Is there no prospect of overcoming these drawbacks by creating conditions whereby men may make a lifetime career in service to underdeveloped countries? A Commonwealth public service has often been canvassed within recent years: this is a parallel idea.[1] Conditions would be various. In Burma or Pakistan, it may be that there is room for service by doctors, agriculturalists, and engineers in remote, rugged areas under conditions partially reminiscent of the life of a settlement officer in the old Indian Civil Service or of a pioneer Christian missionary. In India or Ceylon the demand would probably be mainly for 'back-room' experts. But, in all cases, the expert would require to identify himself wholeheartedly with his adopted country, to spend long years getting to know its languages and peoples. He would have to be paid a fair salary, comparable to that of the I.C.S., but, unlike the short-term expert, his life would not be cramped by the foreignness of everything. Within a few years he would cast free from the artificial, sealed-off world of the local Western community, and enter into the life of Asia. The refrigerator and the air-conditioning would fall into the background, and real work would be done. Is this a mirage? Its attainment would depend completely upon the agreement of Asian politicians and officials, who may well discern more disadvantages than advantages in such a service. Yet, even if the idea is impracticable, the present system certainly demands drastic revision.

The manners of some other contenders in the aid tournament should be glanced at. Technicians working on Soviet projects appear to be drafted to India or Burma without regard to personal considerations. On the job, they and their families live in communal messes, as much withdrawn from the Asia around them as the Imperial Englishman was alleged to be. The austerity of their conditions may impress, but in the realm of human association little is achieved. The Japanese technician is once again a familiar figure in South-East Asia. Along with his bowl of rice, simple living conditions, and modest salary he combines efficient and well-adjusted work. He is a welcome reminder that Asia can bring off an industrial revolution based not on natural wealth but on inventiveness. Perhaps the most sympathetic figure among these rival experts is the Israeli. Sunburnt, stripped for action, he too comes from a poor land which is making itself richer by sweat and ingenuity. Many in Asia and Africa would prefer to go into partnership with Israel, whose problems are more

[1] Cf. Sir Charles Jeffries, 'Staffing Oversea Public Services', *The Times*, 23 June 1958.

nearly related, and who therefore sees solutions in more realistic terms. But Israel's ability to assist other nations is obviously limited.

Britain is perhaps best qualified to promote assistance in the field of training and research. Britain was the pioneer in exporting to the world not only plant and machines but services and techniques, from the early nineteenth century onwards. Britain's capacity to provide aid is limited by many factors, including her obligations as banker to the sterling area. Therefore, Britain's contribution must not be thrown about in penny packets, but concentrated where it will produce the maximum effect. Many considerations suggest that Britain should concentrate the bulk of her activities within one country—India. Most Asian nations are prevented from utilizing foreign aid fully by a lack of potential 'managers' and persons educationally fitted to adapt themselves to new techniques. In these respects, India is better off than most. There is one valuable facility which Britain could consider extending at once. Because of foreign exchange difficulties, the number of young Indians coming to this country for further education and training has been severely restricted. Britain could help. Moreover, this aspect of aid, the training of Asians abroad, probably yields the biggest dividends in greater national efficiency and produces the minimum of 'side reactions' in unexpected emotion.

Why concentrate upon India? In part because of the historical ties which the past has bequeathed in the shape of common institutions and ideas, but much more because of India's importance in the future. India, along with China, is likely to be a world leader in the twenty-first century. Is this an essay in divination? Not entirely. Modern history appears to demonstrate that, in the long run, numbers are the deciding factor. Power goes with numbers. Power is related to other factors, such as wealth, organization, national unity. The advance of Russia to primacy in Europe was delayed by 150 years. Since the eighteenth century Russia has been the most populous nation in Europe, yet from 1772 to 1917 Russian attempts at European domination were checked. However, by 1957, the year of the sputnik, Russia dominated not Europe only but a wide arc throughout the world. It may be unwise to make direct comparison between Russia, and India and China. Besides a vast population Russia possessed empty lands into which she could expand, and vast natural resources for exploitation. India and China do not have these advantages. But the 600 million people of China and the 380 million of India cannot be ignored; sooner rather than later these numbers will be felt. Unless there is an unforeseen transformation of Chinese society, that country will stand forth as the protagonist of Communism. An India Communist as well would surely mean a totally Communist Asia. Perhaps only North America and North-West Europe would eventually remain outside the Communist order. But an India in which parliamentary

government and democracy are cherished would provide a stabilizing influence in Asia that would help to strengthen democracy throughout the world.

This theme verges upon speculation. But perhaps it is permissible occasionally to attempt to discern the shape of distant events; shaping them, to the limited extent that we may, in advance. This paper has traversed much ground in a short space. It has not attempted to draft rules for the operation of aid as a fundamental quantity in foreign policy, but a proper assessment by our policy-makers is overdue. It was faulty handling of a question of foreign aid which triggered off the biggest crisis in British foreign policy since 1945: the Suez affair. The announcement by Mr Dulles in July 1956, precipitately withdrawing previous offers of American aid for the Aswan High Dam project, led to Colonel Nasser's riposte: nationalization of the Canal. The tortuous negotiations towards financing the dam have been given a spectacular twist by the decision in Moscow, released on 23 October 1958, to provide a credit of 400 million rubles for constructional equipment, together with the services of Russian technicians. The need for imaginative thinking on aid now becomes even greater. If the United States and Britain are moved to retaliate, either by means of a campaign of denigration, or by means of counter-measures whose motive is the sabotage of the Soviet-U.A.R. scheme, then there will be a complete loss of confidence in the purpose of Western aid elsewhere in Asia. Alternatively, if in panic the United States attempts to outbid the Soviet Union in financial offers to the U.A.R., this will provide ammunition to those cynics who assert that the West is not really interested in building up a new Asia but only in fighting Communism. Rather, increasing Russian participation should be welcomed. It is certain that, even if the Russians' move is entirely disinterested, they will encounter every kind of difficulty, technical, physical, and human, before the new dam is completed. And if the more sinister interpretations of Russian motives prove true, then a wave of disillusionment will follow, more damaging to Communist prestige in Asia than was the Hungarian rising.

The lesson of the Aswan Dam is not the need for retaliatory action but the need for an effective re-appraisal of the West's own activities in the field. Foreign aid does not, perhaps, demand the same urgent reflection as the hydrogen bomb; yet, in the long run, it may prove equally far-reaching in its consequences.

October 1958

SOME THOUGHTS ON SOVIET STATISTICS

AN EVALUATION

NAUM JASNY

A GREAT deal of confusion exists about Soviet statistics. The fact is that the most important official general indices of economic development—those of national income, industrial output, real incomes of wage-earners and peasants, labour productivity, and production costs in industry—have, over long periods of time, including much of the most crucial stage of Soviet economic growth, nothing in common with reality. But, at the same time, a great many of the statistics issued show no sign of being other than correct. This discrepancy has given rise to two different attitudes about Soviet statistics. On the one hand, it is common practice (for example, in American universities offering courses on the Soviet economy) to stress the idea that Soviet statistics are not deliberately falsified, although such an assumption makes it difficult to explain, for example, the official claim that real wages more than doubled in one year (1948). On the other hand, the assertion is frequently made that all Soviet statistics are falsified, although nobody has hitherto shown really important defects in, for example, Soviet transport statistics. With only relatively minor exceptions, data on industrial output in physical terms also seem to be correct.

When the contention that Soviet statistics are not deliberately falsified is carried to the length of dismissing falsifications as merely 'methodological deficiencies', the idea practically amounts to pro-Soviet propaganda. The opposite contention that all Soviet statistics are falsified is similarly detrimental, as it makes it virtually impossible for one to get at the facts. Any analysis of the Soviet economy must be based on the use of statistics that are known to be correct. Only with their help can the falsifications in other Soviet statistics be detected and exposed. If it were true that all Soviet statistics are falsified, research into the Soviet economy would be virtually condemned in advance to fruitlessness.

The first step to successful analysis of the Soviet economy, then, is to realize that Soviet statistics are a conglomeration of (*a*) highly distorted, practically unusable statistics, such as the indices enumerated above so far as they pertain to the period 1928–50; (*b*) less distorted and incorrect statistics, some of which may be used with corrections; and (*c*) correct statistics which can be used as they are or with minor adjustments to allow, for instance, for unannounced changes in definition or territory covered.

Even the fairly simple idea that the reliability of Soviet statistics varies according to *subject* does not seem to be generally recognized. It is, therefore, not surprising that little attention has been paid to the fact that their reliability varies also in *time*, or, rather, according to the Soviet *economic situation*. In a period of favourable economic conditions, when the economy is growing rapidly, most statistics relating specifically to that period are reliable or nearly so. The Soviet authorities know as well as we do that correct statistics carry much more weight than falsifications because, sooner or later, falsifications will be exposed. But when the economy is in poor shape, especially when astronomical promises have been made (as, for example, in the first Five-Year Plan, which in fact ended with a severe famine in the winter of 1932–33), they see no way out but concealment and even large-scale falsification of the evidence.

The index of industrial production is a case in point. From 1928 to 1950 this index was computed in terms of the 1926–7 prices, which, although called 'unchangeable', actually were rising prices. But it is wrong to assume that the degree of exaggeration of this index was uniform throughout the whole period, or that it increased in strict proportion with the rise of inflation. The three years 1934–6 and the five years 1946–50 were very favourable for the Soviet economy. Thus the growth of industrial output in 1934–6 was only moderately exaggerated by the official index, while its growth in 1946–50 was apparently not inflated at all. On the other hand, the disastrous years 1937–40 (those were the years of the great purges) produced the fantastically exaggerated index of industrial production of 161 (1936 = 100), whereas the real increase did not exceed 15 per cent. In the same way, exaggerations helped to reduce to almost negligible proportions the great decline in industrial output during the second World War. The industrial index for 1930–3 is likewise remote from the truth.

The behaviour of the index of national income, calculated for 1928–50 at the same 'unchangeable 1926–7 prices', was similar to that of the index for industrial production, so there is no need to go into this here.

The indices at 'unchangeable 1926–7 prices' were ultimately abolished at the end of 1950 because they had become an unmanageable mess. Even so, it may be doubted whether, in spite of the great defects in those prices and in the indices calculated in them, the decision to discontinue their use in constructing the indices would have been made if the situation on the Soviet economic front had been unfavourable.

THE NEW OFFICIAL INDICES

The new index of gross industrial production, calculated at 1952 prices, showed an increase of 85 per cent in the five years 1950–5. When writing

my *Commentary*[1] I believed, as I said (p. 59), that the one shortcoming of this index was 'that the State wholesale prices on which the index is based are taken with the turnover taxes deducted'. This seems to have been an error. When the industrial production index was published one component in it at once appeared dubious. This was machinery output, which was shown to have increased in 1950–5 by no less than 143 per cent; for the engineering industry including metal processing the claimed rise was 120 per cent.[2] Kondrashev, a well-known Soviet expert on U.S.S.R. prices, provided a clue to the riddle by expressing doubts about the reliability of the Soviet indices of machinery prices,[3] on which the indices of machinery output are based. Kondrashev's statement led me to make an examination of all data relevant to the case (labour productivity in the engineering industry, the provision of electric-power machinery to the industry, and—last but not least—utilization of the output of this branch). This examination indicated that the increase in output of machinery (including metal processing) in 1950–5 is likely to have been of the order of magnitude of 70–80 per cent rather than 120 per cent.

D. Shimkin and F. Leedy, of the U.S. Bureau of the Census, arrived at a similar result in their extensive examination of output figures in physical terms: they calculated that Soviet output of machinery (presumably including other metal processing) rose in 1950–5 by 71·6 per cent.[4] When the official index for machinery output in 1950–5 is scaled down in the proportion indicated, the index for total industrial production (1950 = 100) becomes equal to about 165 rather than the official index of 185. This is the figure obtained also by Shimkin and Leedy, and it seems a reasonable one. It implies an annual rate of growth of almost exactly 11 per cent.

This finding also implies that the official indices for the output of industrial goods other than machinery during the period analysed may be roughly correct. More important is another implication. The Soviet authorities never fail to emphasize the priority of producer goods; official Soviet statistics for recent years show only a relatively small excess in the rate of growth in the output of these goods over the rate of growth in output of consumer goods. If the assumption that only machinery output is exaggerated in the official index of industrial production in 1950–5 is correct, this implies that during those five years the rate of expansion in the output of consumer goods was no less than the output of producer goods. Indeed, this probably applies since 1948.

[1] Naum Jasny, *The Soviet 1956 Statistical Handbook—A Commentary* (Michigan State University Press, 1957).

[2] This and all other official data are taken from the recently published official Soviet statistical handbooks.

[3] D. D. Kondrashev, *Price Formation in Industry of the U.S.S.R.* (Moscow, 1956), p. 145.

[4] *Automotive Industries* (New York), 1958, No. 1, p. 51.

Detailed analysis, which cannot be reproduced here, suggests a rate of growth of national income in 1950–5 of about 50 per cent, or close to 9 per cent per annum, as against the officially calculated increase of 71 per cent in five years, or a little over 11 per cent per annum.

The presence of falsifications in Soviet statistics and, specifically, the immense exaggerations in the indices at 'unchangeable 1926–7 prices' naturally brought about the habit of disregarding these indices in the analysis. But this habit has persisted, even after the indices based on 'unchangeable 1926–7 prices' were replaced by much more reasonable ones, and this leaves the door open to a lot of wishful thinking. The average growth in national income in 1950–5 was, for example, estimated by Professor Gregory Grossman (University of California) at 6–7 per cent per annum.[1] The National Bureau of Economic Research (New York) estimated the growth in industrial output (1955 weights) at only 48 per cent in five years, or 8 per cent per annum.[2] A noteworthy feature of this index is an estimate of only 25 per cent for the growth in output of civilian machinery during 1950–5, as against the official estimate of 120 per cent for the growth in output of all machinery including other metal processing.[3] Neither of the authors mentioned paid any attention to the fact that their own estimates bear so little relation to the much higher official estimates, nor did they make any attempt to explain the reasons for the differences.

OFFICIAL REVISION OF EARLIER SOVIET STATISTICS

Thus, there seems to be no doubt that at least some change in the direction of more accurate statistics has occurred inside the U.S.S.R. since, say, 1949, when the obviously absurd claim was made that real wages had more than doubled in the single year 1948. This change is also revealed in an even more startling fashion by the unique phenomenon that, for the first time in the history of post-1928 statistics, attempts have recently been made to cleanse earlier statistics of some of the too obvious falsifications. These attempts have been extremely timid. So far the Soviet authorities continue to cling tenaciously to such strongholds as the alleged 19-fold increase in national income in 1913–56, the 30-fold growth in industrial production in the same years, and so forth; in the main the revisions involve items which are not part of everyday propaganda; moreover, only some of the previous drastic distortions are removed, and not fully at that.

[1] Testimony before the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United States. See *Hearings* (Washington, 1957), pp. 29–32.

[2] Paper by Professor Warren Nutter, read before the meeting of the American Economic Association in Philadelphia in December 1957.

[3] Output of armaments, included in the official statistics, presumably increased in 1940–50 less than the output of all machinery.

The index for real wages in post-war years in terms of 1940 is one of the items which have recently been partly improved. This was done by dropping the so-called 'social wage', i.e. the part of the real-wage index representing the social services, although for almost thirty years it had been declared an inseparable part of the real-wage index. A real-wage index which does not consider social payments had been condemned for years in the U.S.S.R. as the capitalist method of calculating the index, yet the index of real wages appearing in *recent* statistical handbooks, and based on the year 1940, is strictly in terms of goods and services purchaseable for the paid-out wage. The social wage happens to have been that part of the real-wage index in which the greatest part of the total exaggeration of the official real-wage index was involved. In practice this means that instead of claiming a 'real' wage in 1955 (1940 = 100) of 204, as would be consistent with previously published data, an increase of 'only' 75 per cent over 1940 is now advertised. But even a 75 per cent increase in the real paid-out wage in 1940–55 is an exaggeration.

No similar cleansing process was believed possible in the case of the statistics on real income of peasants in post-war years, so the calculation of these incomes in terms of 1940 was simply relegated to oblivion, together with such gems as the one already mentioned, that real wages more than doubled in the single year 1948, whereas the actual increase did not exceed 15 per cent.[1]

After insisting for more than a dozen years that the State and co-operative trade turnover increased at constant prices 4·6-fold in 1928–40, this figure was sliced by half without any comment.[2] The slashing of a claim from an increase of 360 per cent to the relatively small rise of 130 per cent is perhaps more in the nature of a confession than a revision. A year or two later it was decided to make the revised figure more presentable by a division into five-year periods.[3] The revision, however, did not completely eliminate the incorrectness of the index. Indeed, of the three latest percentage figures given, one (a 34 per cent increase during the first Five-Year Plan) is certainly exaggerated, while another (a rise of 17 per cent in 1937–40) is dubious.

This 'improvement' of statistics on domestic trade was published on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Revolution. But the principal enrichments of statistics on that occasion are to be found in *Forty Years of Soviet Achievements in Figures* (Moscow, 1957). This contains an interesting innovation in the revision of the fantastic claims for growth of real wages and real incomes of the peasants since 1913. Previously the rises in these were estimated at 6-fold and 6·8-fold respectively in the period from

[1] On the handling of real wages and the real incomes of the peasants in official sources see Jasny, *Commentary*, op. cit., pp. 36–45.
[2] Ibid., pp. 189–90.
[3] *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, 1957, No. 10, p. 131.

1913 to 1953.[1] Now these indices are given with three modifications for both the real wage and the real incomes of the peasants. For the real wages the modifications are as follows: (*a*) paid-out and social wage (3·4-fold rise in 1913–56); (*b*), as under (*a*) with the elimination of unemployment considered (3·7-fold rise); and (*c*), as under (*b*) with consideration of the reduction in working hours (4·0-fold rise).[2]

Even the highest of the new indices for real wages is no less than 40 per cent lower than the previous official estimate.[3] But, of course, even the new indices in *Forty Years of Soviet Achievements in Figures* are wild exaggerations. At constant prices the paid-out wage hardly increased at all from 1913 to 1956.[4] The revision of the previous claims with reference to the real incomes of the peasants [5] was made in the same vein.

A real masterpiece occurs on p. 55 of the fortieth-anniversary publication. It gives the production costs in industry as follows:

1st F.Y.P. period	Increase of 2·3 per cent
2nd F.Y.P. period	Decline by 10·3 per cent
1937–40	Decline by 0·1 per cent
1945–50	Decline by 17·0 per cent
1950–55	Decline by 23·3 per cent

The figure for the first Five-Year Plan period contains the acknowledgement of a former falsification in the following footnote:

> Previously other estimates were published in the press on the reduction of production costs during the first Five-Year Plan period. These previously published data were calculated without consideration of increases in the wages tariffs in the basic sectors of heavy industry.

In other words, the index of production costs was calculated earlier without regard for wage increases, which on the average amounted to about 70 per cent in 1928–32 (official data).

The footnote cited here seemed worth closer scrutiny. For 'data previously published in the press' and now withdrawn, one naturally turns to the *Results of Fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan* (Leningrad–Moscow, 1934). On p. 27 this states that the target of the Five-Year Plan (which called for a reduction in industrial production costs of 35 per cent) was somewhat under-fulfilled. Further search revealed a pamphlet by one

[1] See, for example, editorial in *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, November 1954, p. 1.

[2] *Forty Years of Soviet Achievements in Figures*, Chart 29 and p. 329.

[3] There was an increase in real wages of 11·1 per cent in 1953–6, according to official calculations.

[4] According to calculations by the present writer, the real paid-out wage was equal in 1957 to 80 per cent of that in 1928 (there was no increase in 1913–28). The calculations of Mrs Janet Chapman, with 1928 = 100 (1928 weights), indicate for 1952 an index of 63 (after taxes and bond purchases): see *Review of Economics and Statistics* (Harvard University), May 1954, p. 145. With a small adjustment, Mrs Chapman's index is part of the present writer's index. Practically the same results were obtained in a rather comprehensive study published in *Études et Conjoncture* (Paris, Institut National de la Statistique et d'Études Économiques), April 1955.

[5] *Forty Years of Soviet Achievements*, *op. cit.*, Chart 30 and p. 330.

M. Sakov (*Production Costs and Ways to Reduce Them*, Moscow, 1957), published only a few months before *Forty Years*. . . . There, on p. 53, it is claimed that production costs in industry during the first Five-Year Plan declined by 9·2 per cent. Thus we have (1) the claim of a decline of somewhat less than 35 per cent in the *Results of the Fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan*, (2) the modified claim of a 9·2 per cent decline by Sakov, and (3) the further modification in *Forty Years* . . . citing an increase of 2·3 per cent. The first two sources offered no qualifications or reservations. *Forty Years* . . ., on the other hand, acknowledged one falsifying feature of the earlier claims, probably in the hope of inspiring trust in the new figure or figures.

But the new estimates, which imply a decline of about 8 per cent in production costs in industry during 1928–40, represent simply a somewhat less gross falsification than that given in Sakov's pamphlet. The behaviour claimed for the index of production costs in industry in 1928–40 cannot be accepted in view of the great inflationary progress during that period. Prices of producers' goods more than doubled during that time. Nominal wages, an important component of production costs, quadrupled. The cost of railway transport (per ton-kilometre or passenger-kilometre) increased at current prices by 99 per cent in those years (official calculation). There is not the smallest reason to suppose that the production costs in industry should have behaved differently.

Sakov must have calculated the index of production costs in industry with the effect of changes in prices of raw materials and fuel in all periods eliminated, and, in addition, with wages kept constant. Yet none of these adjustments were specified by him. *Forty Years* . . . rebuked Sakov for keeping *wages* constant but, like Sakov, it eliminated the effect of changes in the *prices of raw materials and fuel*—again without mentioning this fact. Nor is this likely to have been the only defect of the estimates in *Forty Years* . . . covering the first and second Five-Year Plans and 1937–40.

Another recent official source throws some light on the claim in *Forty Years* . . . of a 17 per cent decline in industrial production costs in 1945–50. This source [1] puts the decline at about 20 per cent but states clearly that the calculation was made with prices kept stable; whereas, with price changes considered, production costs in industry are stated to have *risen* during that period by 14 per cent.

It seems clear that in the U.S.S.R. itself the unacknowledged use of constant raw material and fuel prices is recognized as a falsification. This view is substantiated by the fact that the official Soviet calculation of the cost of railway transport is always and fully carried out at current prices. Can an inexperienced student of Soviet economics be expected to surmount this, as so many other existing pitfalls?

[1] *Industry of the U.S.S.R.*, 1957, p. 29.

CONCLUSION

Viewed broadly, all the recent official revisions do not amount to much more than a sign that those in charge are, as much as Western analysts, aware of the nature of Soviet 'statistics'. Those statistics continue to be a means of propaganda rather than a means of establishing facts. They must continue to be treated with the utmost discretion. But this very requirement makes it necessary, in dealing with the indices of national income, industrial output, labour productivity in industry, and some others, to distinguish between those for periods which cover the years 1928–50 wholly or in part, and those indices applying strictly to the years since 1951. The 19-fold rise in national income and the 30-fold increase in industrial output during 1913–56 are deliberate falsifications and may be safely dismissed.

But the corresponding indices for the years since 1951 are another matter. It is hardly advisable to act as if they did not exist. We should probably hesitate to accept the unsupported word of Professor Grossman [1] (even though he is among the best Western experts on the Soviet economy) that the average annual rate of growth of the national income in the U.S.S.R. in 1951–5 was 6–7 per cent, just as we hesitate to accept the likewise unsupported official claim that it was more than 11 per cent. The main fault of the new official indices of national income and industrial production would seem to lie in the calculation of the increase in machinery output. Once this is allowed for there remain some other discernible errors and exaggerations in the index of national income, such as the officially recognized doubt about the official valuation of agricultural production, or the, albeit mild, exaggerating tendency in the official method of calculating the value added by transport. It may not be possible exactly to account for the whole difference between one's own estimates and the official ones, but at least some check on one's calculations is available. Such comparisons help to explain the not too wide discrepancy between the official claim of an 11 per cent average annual increase in the national income in 1950–5 and the present writer's own estimate of almost 9 per cent.

September 1958

[1] *Hearings, op. cit.* (Washington, 1957), pp. 29—32.

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Survey of International Affairs 1939–1946. The Initial Triumph of the Axis. Ed. by Arnold and Veronica M. Toynbee. London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1958. xvii + 742 pp. Maps. Index. 84s.

The *Surveys of International Affairs* for 1939 to 1946, which the appearance of this volume completes, have followed what may be called the Cambridge co-operative method. The result in this case has met the demands of the arrangement well. On the terms set by the material and by the scheme itself, the editors have again provided a useful guide and work of reference; and this is surely the occasion on which to compliment them on the series as a whole.

The course of the war from September 1939 to December 1941 falls into three parts: the 'phony war' to May 1940; the fall of France and its aftermath; and the important period from the autumn of 1940 to the second half of 1941, when the survival of Britain paved the way for the Grand Alliance. These events divided the nations affected into three main groups, a fact which sets the pattern for this volume. After a summary of military operations, the affairs of the Continent, moulded by Germany's initiative, are discussed in four parts, covering North-East Europe to August 1940, Western Europe to the fall of France, South-East Europe from mid-1940 to mid-1941, and—an interesting chapter—the development of Russo-German relations. The Anglo-Saxon world is dealt with in two separate parts, and Mr F. C. Jones provides an excellent survey of Japan.

The treatment throughout is much the same, with one notable exception—the section by Professor Arnold Toynbee on 'The Home Front in the United Kingdom'. This is certainly an interesting essay, but one which is not entirely convincing or, I think, suited to its context. Professor Toynbee's theme is the history of the British nation's attitude to war, from 1918 to 1939 and then under the stress of war itself until December 1941. It is, as he observes, a subject which the historian of the second World War should not ignore. But it is one which he will tackle with caution, well aware of the fallibility of his tools for such a purpose in all but the most skilled hands. Studies of national psychology are apt—though admittedly not bound—to raise more questions than they answer; while, whatever the results, the treatment must be at a deeper level than that required elsewhere in a Survey of this kind, so that Professor Toynbee's section appears to rest somewhat awkwardly within its frame. John Ehrman

DIE INTERNATIONALE POLITIK 1955: Eine Einführung in das Geschehen der Gegenwart. Ed. by Arnold Bergsträsser, Wilhelm Corrides, and others. Munich, Oldenbourg for the Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, 1958. xvi + 1055 pp. Maps. *DM* 64.

THIS massive volume, issued under the auspices of the German Society for Foreign Policy in Frankfurt, adds still another to the growing number of annual surveys or yearbooks of international affairs produced in different countries; and readers of the present journal will wish to compare it in the first place with the series published since 1923 by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Comparison is rendered difficult, in the present instance, by the fact that the German volume falls into two distinct halves. Although the volume starts in the autumn of 1954 with the collapse of E.D.C. in Europe and the establishment of parity between the Soviet Union and China in Asia, the first part reaches back in a broad sweep over the whole post-war period in order to clarify the factors and problems which determined the situation at the close of 1954. It is thus far more than a year-book; and the second section, under the title 'Transformations of World Policy in 1955', is comparatively slight. The balance of the volume is, therefore, different from that of the Chatham House series; and a closer comparison will have to await the publication of further volumes in the German series. Nevertheless, it may immediately be said that the plan and execution of the present book show many advantages. Less tied than the Chatham House publications to a detailed chronological sequence, it succeeds better in establishing the broad underlying currents in international affairs, and in relating them to the social, economic, and cultural factors influencing policy. It is also more scholarly in approach, placing less reliance upon ephemeral newspaper reporting and more upon the specialized studies of experts. All in all this is the most impressive volume of its class which I have seen so far, and the authors and contributors are to be congratulated on the successful launching of what promises to be a series of the highest quality. The substantial appendix (150 pp.) of literature, notes, and documents adds to the value of the work.

GEOFFREY BARRACLOUGH

NATO AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE. By Ben T. Moore. Foreword by William C. Foster. New York, Harper for the Council on Foreign Relations; London, Oxford University Press, 1958. xviii + 263 pp. Map endpapers. Index. $4.50. 36*s*.

THIS book is the fruit of a Study Group established by the American Council on Foreign Relations in 1955. In writing the report Mr Moore has been given a very free hand and the result is a lesson to all who would try to resolve disagreement by compromise and thus make group reports dull. Much of Mr Moore's book is a well-written and useful account of the development of European and Atlantic institutions since the war, but there is plenty of sting in the tail when he looks to the future.

Perhaps his most important proposal is that N.A.T.O. should be turned from an alliance into a much closer Atlantic Defence Union. Since the achievement of Soviet nuclear parity with the West, he recognizes that many Europeans have a not unjustified fear that America might use its full strategic power in retaliation against Russia only if American territory were itself attacked with nuclear weapons. Consideration of this possibility has already reduced the value of the deterrent and in the process has eroded the sense of unity in N.A.T.O. To counter this trend, he considers, requires acceptance of the theory of limited atomic war even in Europe, and new pledges by the United States to its N.A.T.O. allies that tactical atomic weapons would be used 'to the degree required' irrespective of any action that might or might not be taken on the long-range strategic front. N.A.T.O., in fact, must henceforth be coupled with 'graduated deterrence'. Mr Moore's challenge is penetrating and worthwhile, particularly coming from America.

RICHARD GOOLD-ADAMS

POWER AND DIPLOMACY. The William L. Clayton Lectures on International Economic Affairs and Foreign Policy. By Dean Acheson. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1958. x+137 pp. $3. 17s. 6d.

IN these four lectures, delivered in October 1957, Mr Dean Acheson examines the central issues of contemporary international politics, particularly the relation between the present military decisions of the Western coalition and the degree of choice that will be available to it at the moment of possible future need. He criticizes with great cogency both the strategy of 'massive retaliation' and the alternative strategy of limited nuclear war, and argues persuasively the case for substantial conventional N.A.T.O. forces in Europe. He points out that the failure of the Western Powers to build alternative defences that would enable them to extricate themselves from their nuclear difficulties arises from a deficiency in political resolution, not in economic resources or manpower. It is noteworthy that his position on the question of negotiations with the U.S.S.R. does not much differ from Mr Dulles's: 'the only agreements which are possible now would be disadvantageous to us and would not diminish the danger of nuclear war' (p. 39). Mr Acheson writes with lucidity and elegance. This would be an important book even if he were not potentially one of the framers of American foreign policy. CORAL BELL

NATO: A Twentieth-Century Community of Nations. By Massimo Salvadori. Princeton, N.J., Toronto, New York, London, D. Van Nostrand, 1957. 192 pp. Index. (An Anvil Original, No. 26, under the general editorship of Louis L. Snyder.) $1.25. 8s. 6d.

MOST of this book is devoted to extracts from an assortment of historical documents, ranging from the Habeas Corpus Act, the Bill of Rights, and the American Constitution to the Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty. These are prefaced by an essay chiefly concerned with the thesis that a community has existed between the nations of the North Atlantic for the past three hundred years. The genesis and development of N.A.T.O. itself are cursorily and inadequately treated. CORAL BELL

INDIA AND AMERICA: A Study of their Relations. By Phillips Talbot and S. L. Poplai. Preface by A. Appadorai, Arthur H. Dean, Henry M. Wriston. New York, Harper for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1958. xviii+200 pp. Index. $3.75.

INDIA and the United States have much in common in their common dedication to freedom and democracy and respect for the individual; yet there are also many significant points of difference between the two countries. The past ten years have seen both countries playing an increasingly important role in international affairs, and in this volume two authors, an Indian and an American, assisted by study groups in the two countries, have set out to analyse the relations that have developed between them—their points of contact and those on which differences have arisen. Some of the differences are merely the result of ignorance or misunderstanding, others the result of different appraisals of the problems they face, while a few reflect real conflicts of interest.

These differences, which range from Communism and Pakistan to 'colonialism' and human rights in South Africa, have not prevented the two countries from co-operating closely in many worthwhile causes. American policy on Suez won more respect for the United States in India than any other American action in recent years, while there has been a substantial flow of American aid in the carrying out of India's plans of economic development. As this very objective study shows, with all their differences, the mutual interests of the two countries are so great that the interests of both demand effective co-operation on important world problems. BERNARD FONSECA

PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS

CHRISTIANITY AMONG THE RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD. By Arnold Toynbee. London, Oxford University Press, 1958. xii + 116 pp. Index. 8*s.* 6*d.*

FIFTY years ago the subject of this book, the relations of the great religions to each other, would have concerned few but missionaries; today it is of supreme spiritual, and political, importance to the Western and Eastern worlds. Dr Toynbee's thesis is that two views are contending for the future of civilization. One is purely secular human welfare, or the worship of Leviathan, 'some aggregation of collective human power'. The other is the belief in a spiritual force higher than man, in whose will is our peace. All the great religions hold the second view; so far, in spite of their differences, they are natural allies; therefore they should regard each other with tolerance and charity. This does not mean abandonment of convictions or syncretism. But their attitude to each other should be like the relations of the different Christian Churches—*dissentire sine odio*. Finally the full truth will prevail, because when prejudice and bitterness are absent, Reason's voice begins to be heard.

Many Christians will feel that Dr Toynbee's definition of Christianity (pp. 106 f.) attenuates it. And a missionary or parish priest might see dangers for the weaker members of his flock in all-inclusive toleration. But Dr Toynbee's main contention is unanswerable.

Two minor criticisms. Is it right to attribute exclusiveness and intolerance to Judaism and the religions which developed from it (p. 97), rather than to a vice endemic in human nature? Russia and China persecute non-Marxian ideology more cruelly than the Inquisition ever persecuted heresy, and China at least did not learn this attitude from Christianity or Islam. And surely Dr Toynbee is one-sided in his attitude to nationalism. There is a bad nationalism, but there is also the nationalism of Mazzini and the reasonable nationalism of any patriot. And is it true that 'the idolatrous attitude to one's own country' is the mark of the Greek city state, or that 'these states were the true gods of the Ancient Greek World' (p. 69)? That is not suggested by fifth- and fourth-century Greek literature, or by the fact that the Greeks were the parents of the cosmopolitan idea. It was a Greek who wrote: 'Let us look on all men as fellow countrymen, and let there be unity in our life, like that of a flock feeding in a common pasture.'

However, these are details and do not affect Dr Toynbee's main contention. A brief review can give no idea of the wealth of thought in this deeply religious book, which should be widely read. RICHARD LIVINGSTONE

THE STATE AND THE CHURCH IN A FREE SOCIETY. The Hibbert Lectures, 1957. By A. Victor Murray. Cambridge at the University Press, 1958. xiii + 191 pp. Index. 22*s.* 6*d.*

A MAJOR difficulty in defining the relations between Church and State is that different people mean different things by the terms. Dr Murray, who is President of Cheshunt College, Cambridge, writes from a Protestant point of view, and for him the word 'Church' has two helpful meanings in his present inquiry. The Church may mean a corporate institution owning property, and in this sense there may be many 'Churches'; or it may mean an ideal society including members from all denominations but not necessarily all of them. Similarly the State may be identified with the Government, but there is an invisible ideal State regulative of the State on earth, and its name is Natural Law.

The allocation of offices whereby the Church exercises authority in spiritual things and the State in things temporal is, in Dr Murray's view, unworkable because we are dealing with the same people all the time and their personalities cannot be so divided. Likewise, in the framing of a Christian sociology, as in the consideration of relations between Church and State, the whole of society is

concerned. The practical consequences of this theory are worked out by Dr Murray in relation to the great trinity of the French Revolution—liberty, equality, fraternity—and he intersperses some observations on the establishment of religion. It is significant of the changed temper in the Free Churches that he shows no enthusiasm for disestablishing the Church of England. Whether a reader agrees with Dr Murray's conclusions will depend on whether he starts from his premisses; but Dr Murray is not likely to get any agreement for his startling assertion that the Parliament which rejected the revised Prayer Book in 1928 was 'headed by a Prime Minister who was a Welsh Baptist' (p. 95).

IVOR BULMER-THOMAS

THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL THOUGHT. By C. Northcote Parkinson. University of London Press, 1958. 327 pp. Index. 18s.

PROFESSOR PARKINSON is not unreasonably exasperated at the fashionable defeatism and incoherence which, in many quarters, has infected political thought through a misguided application of semantic philosophical analysis to political terms. He is also obviously right in believing that only by the application of scientific method, and by treating political ideas as an aspect of man's endeavour to adapt himself to man-made changes of environment, as well as to the unchanging imperatives of nature and the human condition, can political theorists make the contribution to public affairs that the dangers of the modern world demand.

Unfortunately he spoils a good case. He is clearly ill-equipped to dogmatize about a subject which demands long study, and although the brash vigour of his style scores many debating points, and his bluff and hearty breeziness brings air into some fusty corners, he makes so many errors in matters of fact that the confidence of well-disposed readers is all too swiftly undermined. It is, for example, grossly naïve to state that Marx got the concept of the dialectic from Darwin: he got it from Hegel, and such an *a priori* dogma would have horrified the great biologist. Over Professor Parkinson's sketch of feudal political theory it is best to draw a veil, and his attempt to render the political wisdom of Imperial China convincing does not amount to much, since all we see at the end of it are the familiar lineaments of arbitrary power. And what is one to make of the astonishing statement on p. 155 that we have 'evidence of civilizations rising and falling over a period of some 30,000 years'? At most 6,000 years is the time-span indicated by the evidence. This is a pity, for Professor Parkinson means well, his discoveries in other fields have won him deserved reputation, and his contention that political thought should be related to anthropology and sociology is just.

JOHN BOWLE

FORCED TO BE FREE: The Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan. By John D. Montgomery. University of Chicago Press, 1957: London, Cambridge University Press, 1958. xiii+210 pp. 34s.

CAN democratic forms of government be successfully established where they do not evolve naturally? After the war, Germany and Japan had such governments imposed upon them. The procedures employed had many defects (though Mr Montgomery, in describing these, sometimes seems a trifle uncritical in his acceptance of the complaints of people hostile to the whole idea). Nevertheless, although 'the achievement was less than a revolutionary could have hoped for' (p. 181), some of the results seem reasonably durable. Does the episode provide an alternative to the 'permanent' revolution of Communism which can be of value in forwarding the present aims of Western policy in underdeveloped countries?

This is an interesting thesis about which Mr Montgomery says a number of sensible things. His book, based in part on field studies, suffers, however, from two defects. While describing aspects of the process of 'democratization', it never attempts a continuous account of that process; as a result, the historical

context gets too little attention, and some of the criticisms acquire an academic air. Secondly, the author never really faces the basic problem how far it is possible to change a political system without changing the underlying environment and how far it is even necessary to bother about the politics if the environment can be changed. The argument that 'government is only a superstructure resting on an economic basis' contains too much truth to be discounted on the mere ground that it is 'Marxist' (p. 95). How far would democratization have got if the economic conditions of 1923–33 had been repeated in Germany and Japan between 1948 and 1958?

MICHAEL BALFOUR

ATLANTIC DEMOCRACY: A Comparison of the Constitutions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Member States. By Charles d'Olivier Farran. Foreword by General the Lord Ismay. Edinburgh, W. Green, 1957. ix + 203 pp. Index. 25s.

COMPARATIVE studies of the institutions and constitutions of democratic countries are always to be welcomed. Not infrequently they illuminate the reader as much by the dissimilarities as by the similarities they reveal. The N.A.T.O. Council was therefore well advised to make provision for research fellowships to undertake this type of study.

In *Atlantic Democracy* Dr Farran analyses the Constitutions, written and unwritten, of countries in the North Atlantic alliance. He deals consecutively with the institutions of government, the electoral systems, the houses of parliament, the legislative process, the headship of the State, and the powers of ministers. In a second part he discusses the question of the liberties of the subject, which he rightly sees as one of the cornerstones of Western democracy.

Within its compass this is a useful book. The principal criticism is that, outside Britain and the United States, the material used is entirely formal, drawn from legal texts without that instinct for the important which only comes from personal acquaintance with the countries concerned. This failing makes certain chapters arid because they are entirely descriptive. But if this is regarded primarily as a short book of reference it is certainly a very useful tool for students.

BRIAN CHAPMAN

RURAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN SWEDEN, ITALY AND INDIA: A Comparative Study. By Harold Zink and others. London, Stevens for the International Political Science Association, 1957. xiii + 142 pp. Bibliog. Index. 21s.

IN 1954 Unesco commissioned the International Political Science Association to prepare a study of rural local government in different countries. There is in fact a great shortage of genuinely comparative studies of local government, and particularly in so far as rural areas are concerned. The three countries chosen were Italy, Sweden, and India, and a national reporter was appointed for each country to produce a draft on broad lines laid down by the general editor, Professor Zink. The national studies were brought together and co-ordinated by the editor, who welded them together into a unified whole with an introduction and conclusion to each chapter to bring out the salient points. The material has blended remarkably well, and the book gives the impression of a single entity rather than a number of isolated studies.

The book includes some account of the historical development of rural local government; differences in legal status where rural communities have a different status from urban authorities; the machinery, activities, and financial affairs of local bodies; the relations of local authorities with the central Government and with the public; and finally a brief account of the intervention of political parties and pressure groups in rural affairs. Unesco should be congratulated on sponsoring, and the four authors on producing, this useful book.

BRIAN CHAPMAN

POLITIQUE ET TECHNIQUE. Vol. 3. By G. Berger and others. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France for the Université d'Aix-Marseille, Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Économiques d'Aix and Centre de Sciences Politiques de l'Institut d'Études Juridiques de Nice, 1958. 385 pp. *Frs.* 1,600.

THE lectures reprinted here were presented at the third session of the Centre de Sciences Politiques de l'Institut d'Études Juridiques at Nice in 1956. The course lasted one month, during which it was addressed by some twenty-two distinguished academics and administrators on various topics connected with the interrelation of politics and technology in the modern world. Not surprisingly, such a broad theme produced a rather mixed bag of contributions from which the reader is left to make his choice according to his special interests. Among the principal contributors are: André Siegfried (Le problème de l'État au XX siècle), J. V. Nef of the University of Chicago (Le problème de la guerre), M. M. E. Blamont (Techniques parlementaires), M. R. Grégoire (L'Agence européenne de productivité), M. P. Le Brun, Secretary of the C.G.T. (Point de vue d'un syndicaliste), M. P. Reuter (Techniciens et politiques dans l'organisation internationale), M. A. Sauvy (Lobbys et groupes de pression), M. Bertrand de Jouvenel (La fonction sociale de l'autorité publique), M. F. Meyer (Techniques cybernétiques), M. C. A. Colliard (Facteurs techniques et organisations internationales), M. J. Djordjevic of Belgrade (Politique et technique sociale en démocratie socialiste), and M. P.-P. Schweitzer, director of the Treasury (Méthodes et techniques du Trésor public). M. Sauvy produces perhaps the most memorable statement of the whole course: 'Personne ne dira, même en plaisantant, qu'il est "technocrate".'

RICHARD BAILEY

NEW ERA IN THE NON-WESTERN WORLD. By Vera Micheles Dean and others. Ed. by Warren S. Hunsberger. Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1957; London, Oxford University Press, 1958. xi+152 pp. $3. 24s.

THESE essays by various hands are based on a course of lectures given at the University of Rochester primarily for American high-school teachers. As an attempt to provide an introductory view of the 'non-Western' world—'those regions and peoples that are psychologically and culturally furthest from North America and Northwest Europe' (p. v)—this book is interesting more for the indirect light it sheds on the simplicity of public opinion in this field than for any contribution it makes to the subject. It is written by authors convinced of the need for a liberal United States attitude to world economic and political affairs, for an audience which has yet to be persuaded of the importance of 'affirmative involvement' in the world. The aim is unexceptionable, but it has imposed an over-simplification upon the content and upon the nature of the solutions suggested for world problems. Professor Noyes' essay on science contains this astonishing passage: 'We may not have well-defined goals, but we are accumulating statistics so that if disaster ever does overtake us, we should certainly know why and be able to show with figures how badly off we are' (p. 110). Statistics allied to optimism are surely not enough.

GEOFFREY CHANDLER

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: The Western State System and the World Community. 6th ed. By Frederick L. Schuman. New York, Toronto, London, McGraw-Hill, 1958. xx + 745 pp. Maps. Index. $7. 58s.

THIS sixth edition of Professor Schuman's useful text-book has new chapters on the crises of 1956-8 in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, and on the problems created by disparities of wealth among nations, and is generally a good deal revised.

CORAL BELL

HISTORY

GERMANY AND THE REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA 1915–1918: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry. Ed. by Z. A. B. Zeman. London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1958. xxiii + 157 pp. 25s.

WHEN the Bolsheviks in 1917 preached, and eventually practised, the policy of a separate peace with Germany, they were, from the point of view of the Allies, letting down the side in its most critical hour. Almost inevitably the cry was raised that Lenin was a 'German agent'; and it was later supported by a collection of forged documents designed to reveal the Bolshevik leaders taking orders from the German General Staff. Historians have never taken the charge very seriously (except of course in the sense that the Germans and the Bolsheviks shared the common immediate aim of bringing the sagging Russian war effort to a final standstill). But it has been revived from time to time—most recently when the captured documents of the Auswärtiges Amt became available and a report of Kühlmann of December 1917 was discovered boasting that German funds had played an essential part in financing Bolshevik propaganda. Kühlmann's reputation being what it is, this was slender evidence. But it was obviously necessary to ascertain what else the archives might contain.

This is the importance of the collection of documents now published in translation by Dr Zeman. He has combed the captured archives, and we must assume that everything bearing directly or indirectly on the subject has been made available. The results are inconclusive and mainly negative. What clearly emerges is that from an early stage in the war the German Government was prepared to spend substantial sums from secret funds to promote revolutionary and anti-war activities in Russia. Since one of the agents to whom payments were intermittently made was the notorious Helphand or Parvus, a renegade Russian social-democrat, a former contributor to *Iskra* and at one time a close associate of Trotsky, and since Helphand was in touch with some of the lesser Bolshevik leaders (Lenin refused to meet him) in Stockholm in 1917, it is a reasonable guess (though precise evidence fails) that some of the funds entrusted to him reached the Bolshevik party chest.

Helphand, however, was clear from the outset that any payments made to Russian revolutionary groups must be made indirectly and surreptitiously, without divulging the source to the recipients. It is clear that no question of a bargain, or of directives to the recipients, ever arose. Indeed, Helphand's German paymasters complained, during the preparations for Brest-Litovsk, that he was manifestly without influence on the Bolsheviks in Stockholm. What funds eventually passed, which, if any, of the Bolsheviks knew or guessed their origin, are questions to which the documents provide no answer. There the issue will probably remain. This collection, together with Mr Kennan's recent exposure of the probable source of the fabrication of the 'Sisson documents',[1] may be regarded as completing the dossier. E. H. C.

SOVIET–AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1917–1920. Vol. 2. The Decision to Intervene. By George F. Kennan. London, Faber & Faber, 1958. xii + 513 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. 50s.

ONLY untruths are simple; the truth is always complex. How complex can be seen in this second volume of Mr Kennan's history of Soviet–American relations,[2] which is to cover the period 1917–20, and which has now been brought up to July 1918, when President Wilson agreed to the despatch of United States forces to Russia and to the subsequent withdrawal of American representatives.

The usual Soviet version of the affair—at times a muted obbligato in the background, at others a high-pitched theme presented by massed trumpets—is

[1] *Journal of Modern History* (Chicago), vol. xxviii, No. 2, June 1956, pp. 130–154.

[2] Vol. 1, *Russia Leaves the War* (1956), was reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1957, p. 211, by the same reviewer.

an abstract construction based on a simplified view of capitalist hostility to the triumphant revolution. Even the more serious Soviet works adhere in essentials to this *a priori* interpretation.

Mr Kennan arrives at no conclusion, only at a series of tentative judgements. Not for him the ordained course of history, the irresistible and irreversible march of anonymous forces. Rather, his narrative is built up of densely interwoven threads of the unforeseen, the fortuitous, the personal, contingent, and unpredictable. Even so it falls short of the entire complexity of the picture, for the considerations which moved the British and French to exert such heavy pressure on the President (with which, of course, Mr Kennan is not primarily concerned) are only lightly sketched in, while Russia herself provides little more than a heaving and chaotic background. The immense quantities of material, published and unpublished, which have been used to document the course of American policy have no counterpart on the Soviet side.

Among the Americans in Russia at the time there were two chief currents of thought, one which regarded the Bolsheviks as the captives, if not the agents, of Germany, the other which believed it possible that they could be won as allies. That both were mistaken did not make them less incompatible as a guide to United States policy; ignorance, muddle, confusion, and fear on the one side were matched on the other by an almost total inability to understand the Allies' preoccupation with the still dominant issues of the war. The French and British missions that urged intervention were staffed by 'men convinced that Soviet power was practically a thing of the past and that its fall could not fail to be followed by further German penetration . . . it was primarily the re-creation of resistance to Germany on which they set their eyes' (p. 438). This was undoubtedly the origin of American intervention. When United States forces first landed in Russia on 11 June 1918, Washington 'had no idea that it was authorizing anything other than a defensive action against the Germans at a remote but strategic point where the Soviet Government was quite powerless to prevent German encroachment on Allied military interests and where the local Soviet authority had, thus far, taken a benevolent attitude toward Allied military operations' (p. 276). Events might have turned out otherwise, Mr Kennan writes, 'if this had not been the final year of a long and fearfully exhausting war; if people all along the line had not been desperately tired; if the entire machinery for coordinating Allied policies and actions had not been coming badly apart at the seams; if there had existed clear channels of command and a rapid, effective system of communication; if intelligence on German movements had been authoritative and correct' (p. 319). To these drawbacks were added the—in a sense irrelevant—factors of the Allied military stores at Archangel, the misunderstandings (on both sides) of the position of the Czech Legion, and the equivocal position of the Finns; the personality of President Wilson himself, and the political dilettantism characteristic of Washington, provoke a note of exasperation otherwise absent from a strikingly balanced and sober study. Wilson, intent on 'helping the Russians', never asked (much less answered) the question, which Russians? 'To make any answer to this question meant precisely to intervene in Russian domestic affairs, which Wilson was determined, for his part, not to do' (p. 419).

Nobody saw more clearly the course and consequences of intervention than the young American Vice-Consul in Archangel, Mr Felix Cole. His memorandum on the subject did not reach the President until after the decision had been taken. The American Government had, almost unwittingly, committed itself to a course of action 'which could not, in the circumstances, have been more confused, more futile, or more misleading'. The 'Soviet official personality', Mr Kennan agrees, might well have bedevilled the most enlightened efforts of American policy, but the possibility was sacrificed to the 'slender and evanescent baubles of the military intervention' (pp. 470–1).

JANE DEGRAS

EUROPAS WEG NACH POTSDAM: Schuld und Schicksal im Donauraum. By Wenzel Jaksch. Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1958. 522 pp. Illus. Maps.

'SINCE then [i.e. since the Austrian peace treaty of 1919] fate has made us socialists from the linguistic borderland alternately apostles of peace and enemies of the State, faithfully accompanied by the hatred of our own and foreign nationalists' (p. 14). As a matter of fact the author is currently doing rather better with German nationalists, but basically the statement remains true and is the key of his life and of this book.

Wenzel Jaksch was born in Bohemia at the turn of the century, christened with the name of the national saint, brought up bilingual; like many Bohemian villagers he went to Vienna as a building labourer, became a trade unionist and social democrat, served in the first World War and after it became a leader of the Sudeten German socialists, put up a staunch fight against Henlein, fled to Britain after Munich, and is now a Socialist member of the Bundestag in Bonn.

This odyssey has left its marks; the book has the advantage—and some disadvantages—of being based on personal involvement and first-hand experience. It is a memorial to the multi-nationalism of the Habsburg Empire, the internationalism of the Socialist movement, and an expression of the passionate belief that without a reawakening and reincarnation of supra-national traditions there is no hope for the Danubian area and none for Europe.

A hundred years before the Communist *coup* in Prague Palacky prophesied that the dissolution of Austria would be the foundation of a universal Russian empire. Jaksch deals with the history of Austro-Slavism and Pan-Slavism and traces later developments from St Germain and Trianon via Munich to Potsdam and beyond. He feels deeply about it all and is not the man to recollect the more recent experiences and emotions in tranquillity. He is convinced that 'the division of Europe after 1945 was not decided by the power of arms, but by the power of the Soviet ideology and the seduction of panslavism' (p. 410), and that 'in the hands of Beneš and his collaborators lay the democratic alternative to the decision of Potsdam' (p. 350). The last part of an otherwise most interesting book is spoilt somewhat by the polemical element. B. RUHM VON OPPEN

AMERICAN STUDIES IN EUROPE: Their History and Present Organization. 2 vols. By Sigmund Skard. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press; London, Oxford University Press; Oslo, Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1958. Vol. 1. 357 pp. Vol. 2. pp. 363–735. $10.

THIS thorough and scholarly publication of the American Institute, University of Oslo, is 'an attempt to write the History of American Studies in Europe from the American Revolution to the present day as one part of the interrelations between the Old World and the New' (p. 7), in order to provide much-needed co-ordination of the work on this subject which the author has found to be going on independently in many European institutions.

The first volume, following a general background chapter, surveys the field of American studies in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. The second volume covers Ireland and the rest of Europe, including Turkey, Israel, Russia, and the East European countries. In his survey of the U.S.S.R., having explained that his sources were nowhere near as complete as for the other countries covered, Professor Skard concludes, not surprisingly, that 'like German University teaching under Nazism, the bulk of Russian academic teaching on America is subservient to the propaganda system or, at best, tries to avoid all demonstrative deviations from its demands' (p. 575).

The appendices include a long list of scholars specializing in American studies residing in all the countries covered with the exception of the U.S.S.R.

ELIZABETH COSSTICK

CONTEMPORARY EUROPE SINCE 1870. Rev. ed. By Carlton J. H. Hayes. New York, London, The Macmillan Company, 1958. xiv+835 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. $6.25. 44s.

THE purpose of this revised edition is to amplify the section on the post-war period which the author feels has 'assumed such crucial character as to merit fuller treatment' (p. viii). Hence Part V, consisting of three chapters and seven new maps, covering the years 1945 to early 1958, replaces the single chapter 'Uncertain Peace', which concluded the 1953 edition.

Although this edition provides a lucid *aide-mémoire* to post-war history, it contains some misleading assessments and surprising omissions. For example the emergency of former British colonies as autonomous nations is represented as a loss to the British Empire instead of a gain to the Commonwealth. In Europe, Turkey (p. 759) is depicted as a thriving democracy; no mention is made of her economic strains nor of the Democratic Party's autocratic legislation. Similarly no indication is given (p. 714) of the gravity of the French situation. But it does portray a picture of contemporary Europe in an international setting and not merely a series of national histories. MARION GAIN

STRATEGY AND DISARMAMENT

INSPECTION FOR DISARMAMENT. Ed. by Seymour Melman. Foreword by William T. R. Fox. New York, Columbia University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1958. xii+291 pp. 48s.

THIS is an important and a fascinating book. The arms race has become the dominating fact in international affairs, and all who desire to see it ended owe a debt of gratitude to Dr Seymour Melman, of the Department of Industrial and Management Engineering, Columbia University. Dr Melman conceived the idea of the book; collected the eminent contributors who have written the technical papers of which it mainly consists; and himself drew up the 'General Report', in which their findings are summarized.

All its authors write with a high degree of scientific and technical authority, and they have marshalled their facts and their conclusions in an admirably lucid and objective way. They have considered the problem of general multilateral disarmament at what is widely regarded as its most difficult, but its decisively important, point, namely, whether a violation of a disarmament treaty by a disloyal nation could be detected by an international inspectorate. They have rightly assumed that police weapons and allied small arms present no problem, and that the illicit production of 'heavy weapons of a "conventional" type like tanks, artillery and vehicles of all kinds' and of surface warships and submarines could certainly be detected; this has been generally agreed by those who have studied the matter since the Disarmament Conference of 1932. They have, therefore, confined their attention to the more recent 'modern' weapons, and have discussed whether fissile material could be secretly diverted to warlike use, whether the production of missiles could be prevented, whether the clandestine preparation of biological warfare is possible, and other similar questions.

It would be invidious to select special chapters for praise, but the study of 'The Detection of Nuclear Weapon Testing' by Professor Jay Orear, and of 'The Detection of High Altitude Missile Tests' by Mr D. G. Brennan would alone make the book worth while. Many readers will find most stimulating Mr Brennan's imaginative proposal for scientific control posts around the world (including the Polar caps), to detect nuclear and missile tests, to provide meteorological and seismic services, and to control the fast developing international traffic of civil aircraft. A short but excellent chapter on Biological Weapons by Dr V. Groupé reaches the conclusion, with surprising firmness, that inspection teams 'could probably sufficiently cripple any such effort (at the

illicit preparation of biological warfare) as to render it ineffective as an offensive weapon' (p. 189).

The general conclusion drawn by Dr Melman is that 'the total strength of an inspection system would necessarily depend upon a many-sided approach to the Inspection objective . . . Each method of Inspection has its limitations', but a many-sided approach has 'a cumulative strength' (p. 36). To many readers what Dr Melman calls 'Inspection by the People' will seem the most original, and perhaps important, of his methods. His Gallup polls reveal an unexpectedly widespread willingness in six different countries (U.S., Britain, France, West Germany, India, and Japan) to give individual support to a controlled disarmament system. In Japan and West Germany 83 per cent and 73 per cent respectively were ready to report violations of a treaty by their own nationals to the international Inspectorate; in the U.S., 80 per cent. This section of the book is a significant new contribution to thought about disarmament control.

The evidence in the book strongly supports the conclusion that a system of disarmament inspection could be made to work; one of Dr Melman's 'Evasion Teams' disposes of the fear that, if an agreement to abolish nuclear weapons and the means of delivery (military aircraft and missiles) were made, civil aircraft could be used to deliver a secret stock of bombs, illicitly retained by a disloyal nation. This is an important finding. So is the view that, if the race in missiles is allowed to go on, and perfected missiles are emplaced in underground launching sites, detection will become extremely difficult. This, and the danger of 'the development of ultimate weapons of a type which are explicitly designed to be uninspectable, and which would therefore doom the world to eternal anxiety and hatred' (p. 280), are strong reasons for pushing forward with disarmament negotiations.

PHILIP NOEL-BAKER

THE GREAT ARMS RACE: A Comparison of U.S. and Soviet Power Today. By Hanson W. Baldwin. New York, Praeger; London, Atlantic Books distributed by Stevens, 1958. 116 pp. Map. Charts. $2.95. 15s.

THE basic strategic fact about the nuclear deterrent to major war is a simple one. It is, as President Eisenhower has said, that 'enough is plenty'. But the problem of how much is enough is a complicated one which depends upon the possession of enough bombs to inflict mortal injury on the other side, the provision of an efficient delivery system, and also on the national will to use and to suffer the consequences of using the ultimate weapons. The nuclear stalemate is, therefore, not a static condition which, once achieved, will necessarily always persist. It may be unhinged by weapon developments or by changes in national psychologies and it is the consideration of such possibilities which leads to the arms race which is now going on between the Soviet Union and the United States.

In the uncertain strategic and technological conditions of the age, and no less in the persistently embittered international relations which exist, it is, perhaps, inevitable that there should be considerable over-insurance on both sides. In fact, the knowledge that the possession of more than is enough can be no more effective than the possession of what is enough appears to be a far less important factor than the nagging fear that the other side will suddenly produce the absolute weapon which will tip the balance of power. The result is that the arms race is getting out of hand and is in danger of producing a rationale of its own which may ultimately be as calamitous as an unhinging of the stalemate would be.

Mr Baldwin, however, is not concerned with such a possibility. Nor is he concerned with any systematic attempt to define what really is enough. The general inference to be obtained from his book, which imparts a note of extreme urgency, is that enough is no less than everything. There is scarcely any type of military expenditure which he does not want to be substantially increased. There are hardly any kinds of major weapons which he does not want to be

produced in substantially greater quantities. There is no limit to his programme of military research.

So urgent does Mr Baldwin evidently believe his advice to be that he scarcely pauses to consider the implications of it nor to relate its various aspects to each other. He estimates that the United States now has 'the theoretical capability of wiping out each prime target in Soviet Russia forty to fifty times' (p. 42) and he admits that, in contributing to this potential, the Strategic Air Command has become dangerously congested on its not inconsiderable number of bases. His solution is to build more landing strips for Strategic Air Command.

Mr Baldwin states that 'we cannot expect, and do not need, to overmatch Russia in all fields of military strength, but we must retain qualitative superiority in key fields' (p. 101). But by his definitions it is hard to detect anything significant which is not in a key field. The consequences of his advice are frightening and it is greatly to be hoped that some masterpiece of scientific or technological achievement in the United States will presently restore to that country some of the self-confidence which the Russian sputniks seem to have cost it. NOBLE FRANKLAND

STRATEGIC SURRENDER: The Politics of Victory and Defeat. By Paul Kecskemeti. Stanford University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1958. ix+287 pp. Bibliog. Index. 40s.

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illicit preparation of biological warfare) as to render it ineffective as an offensive weapon' (p. 189).

The general conclusion drawn by Dr Melman is that 'the total strength of an inspection system would necessarily depend upon a many-sided approach to the Inspection objective . . . Each method of Inspection has its limitations', but a many-sided approach has 'a cumulative strength' (p. 36). To many readers what Dr Melman calls 'Inspection by the People' will seem the most original, and perhaps important, of his methods. His Gallup polls reveal an unexpectedly widespread willingness in six different countries (U.S., Britain, France, West Germany, India, and Japan) to give individual support to a controlled disarmament system. In Japan and West Germany 83 per cent and 73 per cent respectively were ready to report violations of a treaty by their own nationals to the international Inspectorate; in the U.S., 80 per cent. This section of the book is a significant new contribution to thought about disarmament control.

The evidence in the book strongly supports the conclusion that a system of disarmament inspection could be made to work; one of Dr Melman's 'Evasion Teams' disposes of the fear that, if an agreement to abolish nuclear weapons and the means of delivery (military aircraft and missiles) were made, civil aircraft could be used to deliver a secret stock of bombs, illicitly retained by a disloyal nation. This is an important finding. So is the view that, if the race in missiles is allowed to go on, and perfected missiles are emplaced in underground launching sites, detection will become extremely difficult. This, and the danger of 'the development of ultimate weapons of a type which are explicitly designed to be uninspectable, and which would therefore doom the world to eternal anxiety and hatred' (p. 280), are strong reasons for pushing forward with disarmament negotiations.

PHILIP NOEL-BAKER

THE GREAT ARMS RACE: A Comparison of U.S. and Soviet Power Today. By Hanson W. Baldwin. New York, Praeger; London, Atlantic Books distributed by Stevens, 1958. 116 pp. Map. Charts. $2.95. 15s.

THE basic strategic fact about the nuclear deterrent to major war is a simple one. It is, as President Eisenhower has said, that 'enough is plenty'. But the problem of how much is enough is a complicated one which depends upon the possession of enough bombs to inflict mortal injury on the other side, the provision of an efficient delivery system, and also on the national will to use and to suffer the consequences of using the ultimate weapons. The nuclear stalemate is, therefore, not a static condition which, once achieved, will necessarily always persist. It may be unhinged by weapon developments or by changes in national psychologies and it is the consideration of such possibilities which leads to the arms race which is now going on between the Soviet Union and the United States.

In the uncertain strategic and technological conditions of the age, and no less in the persistently embittered international relations which exist, it is, perhaps, inevitable that there should be considerable over-insurance on both sides. In fact, the knowledge that the possession of more than is enough can be no more effective than the possession of what is enough appears to be a far less important factor than the nagging fear that the other side will suddenly produce the absolute weapon which will tip the balance of power. The result is that the arms race is getting out of hand and is in danger of producing a rationale of its own which may ultimately be as calamitous as an unhinging of the stalemate would be.

Mr Baldwin, however, is not concerned with such a possibility. Nor is he concerned with any systematic attempt to define what really is enough. The general inference to be obtained from his book, which imparts a note of extreme urgency, is that enough is no less than everything. There is scarcely any type of military expenditure which he does not want to be substantially increased. There are hardly any kinds of major weapons which he does not want to be

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So urgent does Mr Baldwin evidently believe his advice to be that he scarcely pauses to consider the implications of it nor to relate its various aspects to each other. He estimates that the United States now has 'the theoretical capability of wiping out each prime target in Soviet Russia forty to fifty times' (p. 42) and he admits that, in contributing to this potential, the Strategic Air Command has become dangerously congested on its not inconsiderable number of bases. His solution is to build more landing strips for Strategic Air Command.

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optimist who believed that the military spirit and industrial society were incompatible.

After the first half of the twentieth century we, of course, know better. We have not only observed the basic compatibility of the military spirit and industrial society but we have also become almost incapable of distinguishing the soldier from the worker. Such, at any rate, is the most obvious reason for the much less confident note struck by M. Aron in this Auguste Comte Memorial Lecture. 'Industrialism contributes', M. Aron says, 'both to the impossibility of agreement and to the refusal to make the supreme test' (p. 37).

Thus, M. Aron is prepared to predict neither peace nor war, but he betrays his real fears when he suggests that the best that can be expected in the immediate future is the limitation of war. This, he rightly points out, 'implies the resolve of the Great Powers to tolerate each other' (p. 40). As to the possibility he is not ultimately pessimistic. Soviet Communism and American capitalism are, he believes, only different aspects of the same thing: the new industrial society. Neither country basically threatens the other. Both have had occasions for major war but neither has resorted to it.

It is clear, however, that in the period of time which will be required for Communism and capitalism to recognise their compatibility M. Aron is relying heavily upon the deterrent value of the nuclear stalemate. In a sense, indeed, his closely and penetratingly argued thesis is a modern version of Comte's optimism.

NOBLE FRANKLAND

SECOND WORLD WAR AND ITS ORIGINS

DAS MÜNCHENER ABKOMMEN VON 1938. By Boris Celovsky. Preface by Paul Kluke. Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1958. 518 pp. *DM* 26.

HERE, twenty years after, is a masterly study of the crisis of 1938. The author has had his full share of tragic experiences. He was a boy at the Czech gymnasium at Oderberg in 1938, when the Poles took over. Five months later he saw the SS come marching in. In the War he was a forced worker in Germany. In 1948 he was among the students of Prague who opposed the Communists, and again he was an exile. But he continued his studies, apparently at Munich, where Czechs and Sudeten Germans have done much to get together, and Heidelberg, and finally in Canada. He has achieved a remarkable work of scholarship, balanced judgement, and devotion to truth. His industry has been great, his documentation all-embracing; and he has not answered questions as yet unanswerable, e.g., whether the *Sudetendeutsche Partei* was financed by the Reich before 1935.

He fully admits that the Czechs failed to make their State into the sort of Switzerland which Beneš persuaded the Entente it would be. So the Sudeten Germans were really in permanent opposition. And democracy is unworkable unless all parties are agreed on fundamentals.

Celovsky rightly treats his subject as a European tragedy: the menace of Russian policy, seeking always to undermine authority in the West; Hitler's skilful use of two principles—Germany as the champion of Europe against the Communist East, and Germany as the champion of nationalism, the basic principle proclaimed, but not impartially applied, in 1919. In 1938 nationalism was a somewhat tarnished, but still sacred, cause in Western minds; and not yet seen as the 'dynamite' that might blow up all the slowly constructed edifice of law and civilization. Both principles seemed to urge Europe to co-operate with Nazi Germany. Hence the rally of dissatisfied States to Hitler, and Chamberlain's policy of appeasement. But the Western Powers had learned neither *parcere subjectis* nor *debellare superbos* till too late. French and British public opinions were swayed by Liberal political slogans and love of comfort rather than by basic moral principles. They, especially the British, did not recoil from

the Nazi blackguards and demand the application of force to them while there was time. Their calm acceptance of the Nazi conquest of Austria, by when, it is true, their Governments could do nothing about it, showed their indifference and false values. The process which led to Munich was above all a moral failure.

R. G. D. LAFFAN

LES ACCORDS SECRETS FRANCO-BRITANNIQUES DE NOVEMBRE-DÉCEMBRE 1940. Histoire ou Mystification. Ouvrage publié avec le Concours du Comité d'Action de la Résistance. By Général G. Schmitt. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1957. 216 pp. (Esprit de la Résistance. La Guerre—l'Occupation—La Libération—La Déportation.) *Frs.* 700.

THE theory that the Vichy Government was patriotic at heart has eased many consciences in France since 1945. Attempts, like that of M. Rougier,[1] to show that Pétain was following a secret personal policy of friendship with Britain in the margin of his official policy have found many readers in France and abroad. The belief was held by many, including the author of this recent study, that in the closing months of 1940 a secret agreement was made between an emissary of the Vichy regime and the British Government. Confirmation of this belief was sought in the so-called approval of the Allied landing in North Africa in November 1942.

General Schmitt has now written an exposure of the whole theory and the Comité d'Action de la Résistance, under whose auspices the book has been published, has thus dealt yet another blow at the white-washers of the Vichy Government. It is a painstaking, chronological study of the origins of the theory and is based largely on statements made under oath before the High Court, and certain other written documents. It reads like a case presented by an unusually industrious barrister, trained never to lose an opportunity of scoring a point, and directed, it would seem, at a jury whose acuity is not as obviously apparent as their plain common sense. General Schmitt draws attention to the paucity of evidence to support the theory, the highly suspect character of the principal documents on which it is based, the interested motives of the theory's chief protagonists, and to the persistent denials of the British Government that any such agreement had been made. In the absence of proof he resorts to circumstantial evidence.

The result is a book which will win over such a jury and persuade the general reader. The professional historian, however, will possibly be less than fully satisfied by the writer's standards of proof and by his somewhat heavy-handed use of his sources. He contrasts at times the tone of Pétain's speeches with the agreements he was supposed to be negotiating secretly with Great Britain. Such speeches, even though made on the very day of the alleged agreements and to audiences of, for example, French naval officers, are clearly not admissible as evidence against his following at that very moment a private personal policy.

PATRICK SCOTT IRVING

SVENSK KRIGSHANDELSPOLITIK UNDER ANDRA VÄRLDSKRIGET. By Gunnar Hägglöf. Stockholm, Norstedt & Söners Förlag, 1958. 317 pp. Illus. Paper bound *Kr.* 28.50. Cloth bound *Kr.* 34.

WHEN judging Sweden's policy of neutrality, or near neutrality, during the second World War, world attention in general has been almost entirely focused on its political aspect, and the difficulties of keeping the country supplied with essential goods have not received sufficient consideration. It is, therefore, to be welcomed that Mr Gunnar Hägglöf, at present Swedish Ambassador to the Court of St James, who during the war played a leading part in all negotiations affecting

[1] Louis Rougier, *Les accords secrets franco-britanniques de l'automne 1940. Histoire et imposture* (Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1954).

the supply situation, should have decided to publish a report on Sweden's trade policy during that time.

Mr Hägglöf emphasizes in his introduction that Sweden's commercial policy during the war formed an integral part of her policy of neutrality. But the two policies were at times conducted separately from each other. Because Sweden's foreign policy was based on neutrality it inevitably had to be a passive policy except when a positive attitude had to be adopted in reply to a definite request from outside; but at the same time Sweden's trade policy had to be active because it was based on long-term plans to keep her people alive. Consequently the foreign policy and the trade policy had to be implemented by different methods. This difference became increasingly marked as the war developed.

As soon as Sweden became aware of the threat of another world war, she changed her trade policy to provide for Government regulation, and at times even direction, of foreign trade. The experience gathered during this pre-war period helped the Government during the actual war itself. All through the war the question of Swedish iron ore supplies to Nazi Germany constituted the major problem which the country had to face, the Germans insisting that these deliveries should be increased, while the Allies attempted to reduce them. As head of the Swedish Foreign Ministry's Commercial Department at that time, the author is naturally in a position to give a most interesting picture of the way in which the Swedes 'walked the tightrope' during these difficult times, for as long as possible trying to act in such a way that the Allies had the opportunity of making their wishes known first. Thus, when war broke out the Swedes held the Germans at bay, delaying trade negotiations until they had met the British negotiators. Sweden then accepted the general basis suggested by Great Britain, while both the Norwegian and the Danish Governments made reservations in regard to their agreements with Germany. Sweden's greatest difficulty throughout was that she had to consider the consequences of any concession made to one of the negotiating parties on her negotiations with the other.

In his brilliant exposé the author divides Swedish–German trade negotiations into three phases: the first when Sweden played a defensive role, the second a long-drawn-out battle for position, and the third when Sweden resumed the initiative. During that third period, however, Sweden's position became difficult owing to increased Allied, especially American, impatience with her reluctance to break off trade relations with Germany before she herself considered it safe to do so. As late as 10 January 1944 another Swedish–German trade agreement was signed, but while Germany delivered maximum quantities of, for instance, coal and coke, chemicals, etc., Sweden restricted her exports more and more and by the end of that year all trade with Nazi Germany had ceased. In Mr Hägglöf's view, however, American threats had before then, i.e. by the spring of 1944, led to the breakdown of Sweden's war trade policy.

At different times during the war attempts were made to come to some workable agreement with Soviet Russia but they all foundered on the rock of Russia's intransigence. Thus, for example, in 1940, she asked for the delivery of 200,000 pairs of railway wagon wheels per annum, a demand which would have satisfied the needs of the whole world and which compared with 50,000 pairs actually produced annually by Sweden at that time.

AGNES H. HICKS

ALLIED WARTIME DIPLOMACY: A Pattern in Poland. By Edward J. Rozek. Foreword by William Y. Elliott. New York, John Wiley; London, Chapman & Hall, 1958. xvii+481 pp. Maps. Charts. Bibliog. Index. $6.95. 56s.

THIS laborious symposium from 'Official Government Documents', Mikolajczyk's private files, and other Polish sources is a grand indictment of Soviet policy towards Poland, and of the Western Allies' leniency towards Stalin.

While providing much information—though little that is new—Dr Rozek is less than just to Britain. The Foreign Office was neither so naïve nor so ignorant as to accept Russian policy towards Poland for what it professed to be: on the other hand the history of Eastern Galicia under Polish rule was such as to make a case for its cession to the Russian Ukraine. For Dr Rozek, however, no anti-Polish argument is valid. Indeed, he expresses the characteristically Polish view that the British and Americans, unlike his own fantastically gallant countrymen, were afraid to die. In some ways the most eloquent document he quotes is the reply of Ksawery Pruszynski when asked why he had decided to return to Poland at the end of the war. The pith of this declaration is to be found in the sentence: 'Churchill and Roosevelt wanted to buy peace for their nations by selling the small Eastern European nations to Communism' (p. 413). Hence, it is argued, the Poles will do better to be on Russia's side the next time. ELIZABETH WISKEMANN

ADVOCATE FOR THE DEAD: The Story of Joel Brand. By Alex Weissberg. Trans. from the German by Constantine Fitzgibbon and Andrew Foster-Melliar. London, André Deutsch, 1958. 255 pp. Index. 15s.

THIS book gives a personal record of an amazing incident of the second World War, when the Nazis were exterminating the Jews of Central and Eastern Europe. In 1944, Eichmann, who directed the mass murders, made to a group of Zionists in Hungary an offer to save a million Jews if they would procure from the Western Allies 10,000 army lorries for the German forces. We have here the story of Joel Brand's talks with the Nazi officials, his flight to Istanbul, his efforts to convince the officials of the Jewish Agency in Turkey and Palestine, and the British Intelligence Officers in Cairo, of the genuineness of the offer, and to get their co-operation. It was in vain. He was kept in suspense and for a time in detention. Meanwhile Jews in Hungary proceeded to the death camps; only a few thousands were allowed to leave for a neutral country. It is a fantastic story which taxes the credulity of the reader, and in Israel it has caused violent agitation, because the leader of the Zionist group was attacked there for collaboration with the Nazis and the betrayal of his people. Though translated from the German, the narrative runs easily. NORMAN BENTWICH

AIR WAR AGAINST JAPAN 1943–1945. By George Odgers. Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1957; London, Angus & Robertson, 1958. xiii+533 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. (Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Series 3. Air. Vol. II.) 25s.

THIS volume, which forms part of the series of Australian Official Military Histories, is mainly concerned with the campaigns in the South and South-West Pacific Areas during the period 1943–5, where the Royal Australian Air Force finally deployed a fully integrated force of some thirty-one or more Squadrons, under its own commander, as part of the Allied Air Forces. Though separate chapters are devoted to the operations of the R.A.A.F. in Burma, in Bougainville, in the Darwin area, and in the anti-submarine campaign along the coasts of Australia, the main part of the book is devoted to the part they played in MacArthur's campaign in and along the northern seaboard of New Guinea.

This story starts with the recapture of the Buna area in Papua by the Australians in January 1943 and leaves them deflected towards Borneo, whilst the Americans pressed the main thrust through the Philippines to Japan. During 1943, the Japanese were unable to stem the steady advance of the Allies northwards and many of their army formations were destroyed, whilst at sea and in the air they suffered such crippling losses as to cause their withdrawal westwards. By the spring of 1944, the Bismarcks Barrier had been forced and the huge Japanese base at Rabaul isolated. From that date Allied air-supremacy remained almost unchallenged, though this did not mean that the task

then facing the R.A.A.F. was in any way lessened. With no aircraft industry of their own in 1940, they had been forced to expand, reorganize, and re-equip as the campaign developed so as to play their part in MacArthur's advance to Morotai. His policy of bypassing the enemy bases situated along the northern coastline of New Guinea entailed not only the establishment of new Allied bases, often against strong air opposition, but led to prolonged mopping-up operations, which at times proved quite costly. In October 1944, the Americans invaded the Philippines. The Japanese launched their 'decisive' Sho-Go Operation and when this failed withdrew the remnants of their Air Forces northwards for the defence of their home islands. The R.A.A.F. played little part in any of these operations and this fact seems to have unsettled the pilots and aircrews, who felt they were no longer being given a worthwhile task.

The history of these widespread air operations contains more examples of the handling of air forces, both strategically and tactically, than is to be found in other theatres of war, and the lessons are of the greatest interest to us all. This book is, however, written primarily for the Australian reader, and the author is chiefly concerned with the tactical side of the operations he describes. The story is well told and the expansion on the technical side moves hand in hand with the operational. The system of command evolved under both political and American stresses is clearly traced and the whole work forms a worthy tribute to all the personnel of the R.A.A.F. engaged. H. B. L.

THE KNIGHTS OF BUSHIDO: A Short History of Japanese War Crimes. By Lord Russell of Liverpool. London, Cassell, 1958. xiv+335 pp. Illus. Index. 18s.

THIS work, which is described as a companion volume to the author's *The Scourge of the Swastika*, is a compilation of Japanese war crimes, selected from the records of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other trials of Japanese war criminals. It is amply illustrated by gruesome photographs. There is an opening chapter on the pre-history of the Pacific War, in which the author accepts unquestioningly the majority verdict of the I.M.T.F.E. The following thirteen chapters recount Japanese atrocities towards P.o.W.s and civilians in the occupied territories. Those who care to sup on horrors will find ample fare in them. The last chapter describes the trial and punishment of Japan's leaders and of lesser war criminals.

The war crimes trials were reported in the newspapers at the time they took place; moreover, since then quite a number of books have appeared, written by people who, unlike Lord Russell, had themselves suffered at Japanese hands. Anyone speaking about Japan to a British audience is quite likely to meet an ex-P.o.W. of the Japanese who, not unnaturally, is antagonistic to the whole nation. Lord Russell's book can only deepen the prejudice against a people who suffered heavily, innocent and guilty alike, for the adventure into which their leaders plunged them, and only a small minority of whom committed these crimes. Those who did were punished by the victors, judging by their own standards, but no punishment was ever meted out for crimes against the Japanese, some 200,000 of whom perished while in Russian hands. The reason is obvious, and the Japanese may well conclude that their worst crime was to be defeated. F. C. JONES

BIOGRAPHY

ALFRED LORD MILNER: The Man of No Illusions 1854–1925. By John Evelyn Wrench. London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1958. 398 pp. Index. 42s.

THREE years ago, Mr Douglas Jerrold said to the author of this book, 'I don't like to think of that wonderful collection of the Milner Papers, at New College, lying there practically unused. Why don't you write the Life of Milner?' Hence this book, which is an authentic portrait of Lord Milner. At the time, we already had *The Milner Papers, 1897–1905*, by Cecil Headlam; *The Forsaken*

Idea, by Edward Crankshaw; and Dr Halperin's book *Lord Milner and the Empire*; but the whole story had yet to be written. And now, Sir Evelyn Wrench has written it. Be it said he has achieved his purpose; and so, the man whom Mr Philip Kerr, i.e., Lord Lothian, described as 'the dominant personality among that great company of administrators that Lloyd George collected about him in 1916' comes to his own.

In some respects, Sir Evelyn fails to show how and why Milner never played that great role in home politics that he had already played in Egypt and South Africa; nor does he reveal to the reader the causes of Milner's failure to understand all that had happened in England to change the British political scene after the Boer War. Milner was never at home in that new political world after 1906; and his famous 'damn the consequences' speech in November 1909—see pp. 273–4—is more to be read as his own epitaph than as a true comment on the Lloyd George Budget or the campaign against the House of Lords. Some of the best pages in the book give us his lively correspondence with Margot Tennant before she became Mrs Asquith.

A. F. WHYTE

CHAIM WEIZMANN. By Isaiah Berlin. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1958. 60 pp. 3*s*. 6*d*.

IT is an event of compelling interest when one distinguished man (Sir Isaiah Berlin) talks about another very distinguished man (Dr Weizmann, the first President of Israel) in the presence of a third (Viscount Samuel). This booklet of sixty pages is the reprint of the second Herbert Samuel lecture delivered to a large and appreciative audience in London in November 1957, under the auspices of the British Friends of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The author is not only one of the most brilliant men of his generation but was a close personal friend of the late Dr Weizmann, who tried hard, but in vain, to persuade Isaiah Berlin to give up his tutorship at New College to become Dr Weizmann's *Chef de Cabinet* on the creation of the State of Israel.

In his lecture, Sir Isaiah analyses the struggle between Jewish nationalism and Jewish assimilation over the past seventy years. He goes on to explain why Jewish nationalism flourished best in Russia and why a Russian Jew—Dr Weizmann—should have become its natural leader. The author then describes Dr Weizmann's life, character, and political approach. He says (p. 27):

> Like the other great leaders of democracies in our time, like Lloyd George and the two Roosevelts, Weizmann had an unconquerable belief that whatever the future brought could be made grist to his, and his people's, mill. He never abandoned hope, he remained balanced, confident, representative. He never disappeared from the view of his followers into private fantasies or egomaniacal dreams. He was a man of immense natural authority, dignity and strength. He was calm, paternal, imperturbable, certain of himself. He never drifted with the current. He was always in control. He accepted full responsibility.

Dr Weizmann placed all his hopes and faith in Great Britain as sponsor of the Jewish National Home. But his excellent relations established earlier with Balfour and Lloyd George were—like the British Mandate itself—eventually undone by Bevin's heavy-handed Palestine policy. Dr Weizmann, already hurt at Britain's failure to exploit to the full during the second World War his scientific genius proven in the first World War, withdrew to place his gifts—both as President and scientist—at the disposal of his own people.

EDWIN SAMUEL

SISU: 'Even Through a Stone Wall'. The Autobiography of Oskari Tokoi. Introduction by John I. Kolehmainen. New York, Robert Speller, 1957. 252 pp. Illus. Index. (Makers of History Series.) $6.

THE autobiography of Oskari Tokoi, first Premier of Finland, is the history of Finland herself from the time of her subservience to Imperial Russia to the

period when she fought for and gained her independence. But it is also the story of the life of one of Finland's greatest sons, who, born on a small farm, with only an elementary school education, rose to lead his country in her struggle for independence. In his youth he emigrated to the United States and worked there as a miner in the American West during the 'nineties. In 1900 he returned to Finland with eighty twenty-dollar gold pieces in a money belt around his waist, a fortune in Finland and one which enabled him to buy a small farm. But he not only earned his small capital in the States; he also acquired American ideas, and soon after his return he began to try to infuse them into his Finnish countrymen. In 1906 he was appointed to represent the Kaunus labour society; in the first elections he was the only Social Democrat to be elected. From then onwards his rise to high office was rapid and in 1912 he became Chairman of the Federation of Labour Unions. In a wholly detached manner—he frequently refers to himself in the third person—Tokoi gives a clear picture of the Russian revolution and its repercussions on Finland as seen by a man who was on the spot and played a leading part in the Finnish events. He became Finland's first Premier, but he was also among those members of the Revolutionary Government who had to flee to Russia. In 1920 he reached London, and shortly afterwards Canada, where he worked as a lumberjack. In 1921 he returned to the United States, there to establish his permanent home. It was only after the second World War that the Finnish Diet recognized his services to his country by amending the Constitution in such a way as to enable the President to exonerate Tokoi of those charges which might have been brought against him as a result of the events of 1918.

This book is simply and rather racily written. It would be helpful in the understanding of events if dates were more frequently mentioned.

AGNES H. HICKS

LAW

LES RÉSERVES DANS LES TRAITÉS INTERNATIONAUX. By Dietrich Kappeler. Basle, Verlag für Recht und Gesellschaft S.A., 1958. xvi + 101 pp. *Sw. frs.* 15.

FEW things have been so symptomatic of the modern ferment in the field of international law—itself a reflection of the corresponding ferment in international relations—as the problem of unilateral reservations to international treaties and conventions. Formerly, this problem scarcely existed. According to the classical doctrine there could be no reservations at all unless the treaty itself allowed for them: States must accept the treaty integrally as it stood, or not accept it at all. Alternatively if, in circumstances not provided for by the treaty, one of the parties, or would-be parties, purported to enter a unilateral reservation, such reservation had no validity unless it received the unanimous assent of all the other parties. Failing that, the State entering the reservation had the choice either of withdrawing it or of not being admitted as a party to the treaty.

Since the second World War a combination of three or four factors has operated to undermine this position, which was still broadly intact as recently as twenty years ago. The problem arises principally if not solely in connexion with the general multilateral convention, and this type of international instrument has now greatly increased in range and frequency. Next, whereas at one time a preponderating number of treaties were of a political or semi-political character, not raising questions affecting the application of the domestic law or administrative practices of the participating countries, there are now many technical, economic, and sociological conventions, participation in which may raise difficult problems of this character for particular States. Again, the number of sovereign independent States has virtually doubled; nationalistic

fervour is strong; and many of the newer States have, or profess to have, difficulty in adapting themselves to the classical doctrines of international law. Finally, there is the tendency of States to act in many matters on a group basis, governed by considerations of a regional, economic, or ideological character.

In these circumstances the practical solution must lie in some relaxation of the classical position, so as to allow States, within limits, to participate in general multilateral conventions while entering unilateral reservations designed to meet their particular difficulties or local conditions. At the same time it is clear that unless strictly circumscribed, such a right, or faculty, may be open to serious abuse, and may undermine the whole basis of the treaty or convention concerned, and, more widely, may strike at the very root of the treaty obligation in general.

In his excellent monograph, Mr Kappeler reviews the history and present position of the question in a manner which will interest the student of international relations as well as the international lawyer. For the latter, he gives a valuable analysis of the juridical nature of reservations in all its aspects, and makes out a good case for the view that the unilateral reservation is a hybrid and anomalous act, which does not fall squarely into any one of the recognized juridical categories. Nevertheless, in his view, reservations must, within limits, be admitted as a '*pis-aller*'—in order to avoid something worse. But he utters a useful warning against trying to lay down in advance a ready-made juridical basis for institutions or practices that find their justification largely in the fact that international law and relations are going through a period of transition.

However, Mr Kappeler's final solution for the problem of reservations is a very conservative one, and it may be doubted whether it goes far enough to achieve its purpose. It consists basically in the application—with certain procedural modifications designed to secure the maximum of easy and automatic operation—of the classical doctrine as set out in the generally accepted formulation of it contained in the draft Harvard Convention on Treaties (*Harvard Research Volumes, American Journal of International Law, 1935*, Supplementary vol. IV). The essence of this formulation lies in the requirement of unanimity, i.e., that any unilateral reservation not provided for by the relevant treaty or convention itself must, in order to be valid, receive the acceptance (express or tacit) of *all* the other parties. But it is precisely this which, under present-day conditions, gives rise to difficulty. Mr Kappeler does not believe that the objection founded on the veto-creating tendencies of the unanimity rule is sound, and in a sense he is right. In practice, however, it is necessary, in devising an appropriate system, to take into account the fact that on the unanimity basis a single recalcitrant State can prevent the participation in the treaty of a State whose participation is desirable and perhaps important, by objecting to a reservation entered by that State which all the other parties are prepared to accept. That this is relatively unlikely to occur does not wholly dispose of the problem, which is partly psychological.

To obviate such a possibility, some solution of a majority type seems called for, of the kind for instance which was propounded by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht in his Report on the Law of Treaties for the International Law Commission of the United Nations,[1] or by the present reviewer in his article on the subject in the *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* for January 1953. The details may differ, but the essence of all majority systems is the same, namely, to make the validity of any unilateral reservation dependent on acceptance by a sufficiently large number of parties to render it impossible or highly unlikely that any group of States can, by pre-concerted action in accepting one another's reservations, impose these reservations on the other parties; but not so large that a small number of States could prevent the acceptance of reservations agreed to or not dissented from by the great majority, and with it the participation of the reserving State in the treaty.

G. G. FITZMAURICE

[1] U.N. Doct. A/CN.4/63 of 24 March 1953, pp. 101–142.

THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER PAPERS. By the late James Leslie Brierly. Selected and ed. by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht and C. H. M. Waldock. London, Oxford University Press, 1958. xxxvi+387 pp. Index. 50*s*.

NOTICEABLY, and by no means alone among the papers here assembled, the longest paper, which stands first and lends the book its title, has its focus—that title notwithstanding—on a matter less of specifically legal than of meta-legal concern. For what in fact it examines is the obligatory character of, rather than 'the basis of obligation in', international law. It is one of those questions in respect of which sociologists and philosophers might almost seem to have conceded a sort of monopoly to their legal brethren—questions, however, which few of these latter have proved so well qualified as Brierly was to investigate, albeit not perhaps, even so, to settle. As Professor Waldock rather indicates in his introduction, Brierly's was always an interest at least as immediate in the living relations of States as in the law. And, after all, was not his Chair in Oxford one, titularly, of law and (*sic*) diplomacy; and did he not, eventually, pass on from it to another, up north, of international relations as such? To those who found such profit in some of these papers when they were first presented, succumbing as much perhaps to their author's mood and manner as to his pellucid mind, the volume should be welcome indeed. Also here reproduced is a note by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, evidential of the frequency with which, though grounded in such different traditions, two authorities of such high renown were able, on a range of issues, to appear in broad agreement. A nicely selected portrait-photograph, as frontispiece, gives added acceptability to the book.

C. A. W. MANNING

PRAKTISCHE FRAGEN DES ENTSCHÄDIGUNGSRECHTS—Judenverfolgung im Ausland. Compiled by Hellmuth Hecker. Mimeographed. Forschungsstelle für Völkerrecht und ausländisches öffentliches Recht der Universität Hamburg, 1958. xiv+448 pp. *DM* 28.

THE lack of co-ordination between the Occupying Powers after the second World War and their indecision in laying down uniform rules for the compensation of victims of Nazi persecution have been largely responsible for frequent changes in the Compensation Laws of the German *Länder* and the German Federal Republic. Initially the duty to pay compensation was laid upon the *Länder*, and it was not until 1953 that the Federal Republic assumed responsibility in the matter. One of the problems not specifically dealt with in the earlier laws was the question of compensating victims whose persecution had been initiated, not by the authorities of the Reich, but by those of countries associated with or under the influence of Germany during the second World War. Some of these countries had what may be called an anti-Semitic tradition of their own, such as, in particular, Rumania, and the question frequently arose whether measures of persecution taken in such countries against Jews of native or foreign nationality could be laid at the door of the Reich. This question could be determined only in the light of the history of the countries concerned and the degree of their dependence upon the Reich, politically as well as militarily. The authorities of the *Länder* and the Federal Republic whose task it was (and still is) to deal with claims to compensation by Jews who had been subjected to persecution—or by the dependants of those who had been killed—in countries within the German orbit, and in particular in Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, found it advisable to consult the Research Institute of International Law of the University of Hamburg to seek guidance on the precise degree of dependence of those countries on the German Reich, so as to determine whether ultimate responsibility should be borne by the Federal Republic under the terms of the various Compensation Laws. The book under

review contains several opinions of the Research Institute on this difficult and important problem.

Besides containing a wealth of historical and legal information, it also makes accessible material largely unknown in this country. The most complete collection in the English language of the laws and ordinances enacted by the so-called Axis Powers before and during the second World War is the admirable publication by R. Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*.[1] It was published in 1944 and does not, therefore, contain material which came to light after that date. The final attempt at a 'solution of the Jewish question' was made by the German Government in the latter part of 1944 and the early part of 1945, and the authors of the various opinions contained in the present volume have done us an invaluable service by making available all the relevant source material covering this period as well as the earlier part of the war. This is not only a book for lawyers concerned with the specific problem of German compensation law but also for those who are interested in this tragic period of history from the purely human angle. The Compensation Law of 29 June 1956 deals with the problem of the countless victims of atrocities committed in countries other than Germany, but many doubtful questions remain. Their solution will be facilitated by a perusal of the scholarly and impartial opinions contained in this book.

F. HONIG

DIE KRIEGSRECHTLICHE BEDEUTUNG DER NÜRNBERGER URTEILE. By Erwin Trapp. Düsseldorf, Michael Triltsch Verlag, 1957. 152 pp. *DM* 9.80.

THIS is a doctorate thesis submitted to and accepted by the Faculty of Law of Marburg University. The author investigates critically the question what, if any, contribution the judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the decision of the Military Tribunals set up in Germany by the U.S.A. made to the law of war on four points: criminal responsibility for an aggressive war, relations between members of the armed forces of an occupying Power and the civil population, the law relating to hostages and reprisals, and finally the defence of superior orders. In the author's view the principal thesis of the International Military Tribunal, according to which it is a criminal offence for members of a Government or military leaders to start or wage an aggressive war, is untenable as such and its application by the Tribunal incompatible with the rule *nulla poena sine lege*, which forbids the infliction of punishment for an act which was committed before the rule rendering it punishable was enacted. That this is indeed correct will have to be admitted. Similar criticisms of the Nuremberg trials have been propounded in this country by, *inter alia*, Lord Macmillan and Lord Hankey, a fact which unfortunately has escaped the author. Dr Trapp, however, goes too far in his criticism of the decisions of the other Military Tribunals. A court does not violate the rule *nulla poena sine lege* by trying to develop or interpret written or unwritten law in a manner which has not been approved by the majority of authorities. International or military courts must in this respect be granted the same amount of freedom of interpretation which Continental criminal courts (including, of course, the German courts) have always claimed to possess. The extent to which the author is predisposed against the Nuremberg judgments may be gathered from the fact that he blames the International Military Tribunal for having found that Ribbentrop had read out his proposed note to Poland to Sir Nevile Henderson 'at top speed'. Such a finding was, in his view, unjustified because the German interpreter Schmidt had denied that Ribbentrop had used any speed in reading his proposals (p. 11). He forgets that Schmidt was not the only witness, that his denial is contained in a book published by him several years after the judgment of the Tribunal, and that the Tribunal was at liberty to prefer Sir Nevile's evidence to that of the man who, though he now claims to have been merely a mute player

[1] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944.

on the Nazi stage, had for a remarkably long time stood on its forefront. Notwithstanding these and other blemishes, such as the insufficient acquaintance with and use of non-German literature and decisions on his topic, the book can be recommended as an able, dispassionate, and attractively written summary of the principal German objections to the Nuremberg trials and undoubtedly deserves the recognition granted to the author by the Marburg Faculty.

E. J. COHN

LEGAL EFFECT OF WORLD WAR II ON TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES. By Stuart Hull McIntyre. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff; London, Batsford, 1958. ix+392 pp. Bibliog. Index. 57s.

DR MCINTYRE'S learned and well-documented book is a study of the practice of the United States Government. He sets out only briefly the doctrines of international lawyers—largely attempts to order past practice—but he refers to them frequently because practising lawyers did so. Doctrine, however, offers no clear guidance, and Dr McIntyre is well aware of how closely the interpretation of law is linked to policy. He is dealing with the activity of national officials, whether executive or judiciary. Their regard for justice and for the maintenance of an international legal structure may be high, but it is fortunate that often there is little conflict between the commitments of a treaty and the demands of national policy. Lawyers are properly wary of generalization and of needlessly raising awkward questions. In this respect those who deal with the status of treaties in time of war do not differ from their fellows, but when the national interest seriously requires it they can find legal grounds for abrogating or suspending a treaty. Dr McIntyre, though conscious of the difficulty of classification, distinguishes three types of treaty—political, humanitarian, and economic. Most of these deal with activities valuable even in wartime, or valuable again the moment hostilities end. What emerges from this study is the conclusion, surely less surprising than the publishers suggest, that treaties which neither belligerent has any interest in repudiating tend to remain in force or to revive. The detailed evidence and its analysis will be of interest mainly to lawyers.

A. E. CAMPBELL

THE JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. No. 2. 1958. Tokyo, Japan Branch of the International Law Association, 1958. iii + 220 pp. Yen 1,300. $4. Sales Agent: Maruzen Co., Ltd., Tokyo.

THIS volume includes articles on Fishery Problems between Soviet Russia and Japan, Foreign Armed Forces and Criminal Jurisdiction of Japan, Title Claim to Japanese Property in Korea, and shorter notes on the Legal Status of Okinawa and on Basic Principles of Japanese Foreign Policy. There are also a number of Japanese judicial decisions in cases involving foreigners, including the Girard affair of last year. Documentary material covers treaties and agreements concluded between Japan and foreign States over the period December 1956–September 1957, as well as the correspondence between Japan and the U.S.S.R. over Peter the Great Bay. This Annual, the second of its kind, should prove useful alike to international lawyers and students of contemporary affairs in the Far East.

F. C. JONES

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL

THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY. By John Kenneth Galbraith. London, Hamish Hamilton, 1958. xii + 288 pp. Index. 21s.

'IN one sense,' writes Professor Galbraith towards the close of this book (p. 218), 'the main task of this essay has been accomplished. Its concern has been with the thraldom of a myth—the myth that production, by its overpowering importance and its ineluctable difficulty, is the central problem of our lives.' By

the 'forties it had become clear that 'increasing productivity in agriculture was outdistancing consumer needs' (p. 220). But does he suggest that the policy of supporting the prices of farm products should be revised? Not a bit of it. In his view, this is just one manifestation of the fact that the problem of production has been solved and we should turn our energies to other goals. In the field of manufactures we are deluded by advertisements into buying goods we do not really need. What we need is more leisure and more public services.

There are echoes here of Wordsworth ('The world is too much with us') and of Thorstein Veblen's views on conspicuous consumption. But Professor Galbraith's ideal is not one of those communities of peasant farmers in the tropics, who do not go out in the heat of the sun, work for only twenty to thirty hours a week, are not misled by advertisements since they are illiterate, and suffer from malnutrition. He is writing about the United States, the affluent society. He does believe, however, that people would enjoy better lives if they behaved as he thinks they should rather than as they wish. Otherwise, his stress on the desirability of more public services, for example, should have been accompanied by some arguments or evidence to show that the machinery of democracy is inadequate to give taxpayers all the public services they are prepared to pay for.

Professor Galbraith writes well but in my view, not to put too fine a point on it, what he writes is sheer nonsense. Within the realm of economics, the major need is still for more output per worker-hour and the problems of poverty are still not solved, not even in those United States.

F. BENHAM

SCRIPTA HIEROSOLYMITANA. Vol. III. Studies in Economic and Social Sciences. Ed. by Roberto Bachi. Jerusalem at the Magnes Press, The Hebrew University; London, Oxford University Press, 1956. 396 pp. Charts. Tables. 30s.

ONE of the merits of the English publications of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem is to convince all those of us whose knowledge of Hebrew has unfortunately remained very rudimentary that this amazing revival and extension of an old language is not being used as a wall to enclose an esoteric or obscure pursuit of learning. The texts published so far show quite clearly that there is very little in the field of methods and results that remains unknown to the academic circles of Israel. A ready explanation may seem to be that a considerable number of these research workers came to Israel from outside, having their roots in the European past or having at least received their education in American or European centres of learning. But beyond these obvious facts it is evident that there is nothing parochial in the outlook of the younger generation either, and that the ideal of the *universitas litterarum* is to be kept alive by tradition.

Although there is no marked difference of quality among the fourteen contributions to the present volume, we should like to select five which by subject and method may be of particular interest to the readers of this periodical. First, there is Professor Bonné's essay on 'Population growth and economic development' with special reference to the Middle East, which has the rare merit of giving a clear definition of 'underdeveloped countries' (on p. 6). Similar praise must be given to Y. Talmon-Garber's instructive analysis of 'Differentiation in collective settlements' from which many readers will gather for the first time the 'main features' of the Kvuzot or Kibbutzim in which more than 70,000 Israelis find a satisfactory way of life (p. 153). The contribution by D. Arian on 'The first five years of the Israel Civil Service' tells the amazing struggle—so far not very successful—to create a civil service uncontaminated by the strife of political factions and groups. J. Ben-David investigates in an equally interesting and more sophisticated way the 'Professions and social structure in Israel', using as his theoretical background the 'general theory of action' as developed by Talcot Parsons and Edward A. Shils.[1] We mention finally the

[1] *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1951).

essay by J. Katz on 'The concept of social history', with its penetrating survey of the notional conceptions developed by such writers as G. M. Trevelyan, Max Weber, and others.

The whole volume, attractively printed and produced, is well suited to exemplify to students of all ages and interests the ways which lead from concrete facts and primordial observations to general conclusions.

E. ROSENBAUM

SOVIET PROGRESS *vs.* AMERICAN ENTERPRISE: Report of a Confidential Briefing Session held at the Fifteenth Anniversary Meeting of the Committee for Economic Development, on November 21, 1957, in Washington, D.C. Preface by Donald K. David. Foreword by Gardner Cowles. New York, London, Doubleday, 1958. 126 pp. $2. 14s.

MR CLARENCE B. RANDALL, President Eisenhower's Special Assistant and one of the distinguished authorities on 'U.S.–Soviet competition' whose addresses to the Committee for Economic Development are reprinted in this volume, suggests that the launching of the Soviet earth satellites 'will rank with the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and the attack on Pearl Harbour, in what it means in focusing and bringing into common purpose the understanding and objectives of the American people' (p. 30). The burden of his and other expert testimony is that, if the two main contestants in the great technological race are still not equally matched in all essentials, they are rapidly approaching a position in which the odds must be accounted even. Above all, Soviet achievements in the scientific and industrial fields have, by their very nature, had an immense impact upon the underdeveloped countries of the Middle East and Asia, thereby giving a fillip to Communist propaganda in those areas.

None of the contributors to the main 'briefing session' has much to say about the technological role of the other Western countries, although Mr William C. Foster, whose address on the same theme to the United States Military Academy is appended as a tailpiece, rightly points out (on pp. 118–19) the importance of the United States being able to 'count on substantial additive facilities from the balance of the free world'.

C. J. C.

TO PLOW WITH HOPE. By Donald K. Faris. London, Gollancz, 1958. 223 pp. Diagram. Tables. Index. 21s.

'VISUALIZE a line starting from your front door, made up of the hungry of the world—many ragged and disease-ravaged, with pinched faces. The line goes on out of sight over continent and ocean, around the world—25,000 miles—and returns to your front door. On and on it stretches, circling the globe not twice nor five times, but twenty-five, and there is no one in the line but hungry, suffering humanity' (p. 17). 'In New York, by the banks of the East River, a narrow finger of glass, steel and concrete points thirty-nine stories into the sky, reflecting city and cloud as in a mirror' (p. 108). Many authors and public relations departments believe that popular interest in the world's most urgent social and economic problems, and in the measures taken or planned for their solution, can be aroused only by this kind of writing. Yet Madison Avenue, they say, is becoming aware of increasing sales-resistance to its use even for the purpose of selling detergents. Anyway, here you have it in this book, in all its lushness. On and on it stretches, 223 pages of it; and one can only hope that it won't do more harm than good to the causes it advocates. DAVID BLELLOCH

INCREASING THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: The Quest for Economic Development. By Albert Lauterbach. Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1957. 40 pp. $1.

INTENDED for the layman as a first introduction to the subject, this pamphlet gives a brief matter-of-fact summary outlining the main issues involved in the

quest for economic development in the 'underdeveloped' areas of the world. It includes a well-balanced short list of suggestions for further reading. M. G.

FOREIGN CENTRAL BANKING: The Instruments of Monetary Policy. By Peter G. Fousek. Foreword by Alfred Hayes. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1957. 116 pp. Index. No charge.

BROUGHT up-to-date and with new sections added, articles from the Federal Reserve Bank's *Monthly Review of Credit and Business Conditions* are assembled in this brief descriptive survey of central banking techniques employed during the post-war years up to October 1957 in countries other than the United States. Evaluation, however, of the results of monetary policy in these countries is left entirely on one side. The first three chapters deal in turn with the principal monetary policy tools: the discount rate, open market operations—now 'recognized as ideally the most effective' (p. 10)—and the cash reserve requirements of commercial banks. A further two chapters are devoted to other techniques and describe the use that has been made in the various countries of special reserve requirements (liquidity ratios), selective credit controls, central bank directions to commercial banks, and direct controls over loans and investment. A final chapter describes the London money market and gives a summary view of developments of money markets in Canada, Continental Europe, and elsewhere. MARIANNE GELLNER

THE WORLD'S SUGAR: Progress and Policy. By Vladimir P. Timoshenko and Boris C. Swerling. Preface by M. K. Bennett and the authors. Stanford University Press, 1957; London, Oxford University Press, 1958. xii+364 pp. Indexes. $6.50. 52*s*.

ALTHOUGH this book is one of a series dealing with Food, Agriculture, and the second World War, it takes the story back to the nineteenth century and forward to the present day. It describes well the technological progress which has taken place, both for beet and cane, in the field and in the factory. The latter half of the book deals with the sugar policy of the leading countries and gives an account of the International Sugar Agreement of 1953.

The yields per acre, in terms of sugar, are so much higher for cane than for beet that one gets the impression, although the authors do not explicitly say so, that under complete free trade most of the world's sugar would be produced in Cuba and a few other tropical islands.

The authors do let themselves go, however, on the protective policy of the United States.

> Is the United States prepared to use its political power for the further expansion of domestic sugar production, at the direct expense of a weak Cuban economy, upon which the United States inevitably depends for wartime sugar supplies? Are the advantages of an expanding volume of international trade so trivial that the United States will be satisfied to pay a higher and higher subsidy for a larger and larger volume of domestic sugar? Can we continue to urge the reduction of trade barriers in other countries at the same time that the margin of protection afforded the domestic sugar industry increases? Is our concern for the economic development of less advanced countries consistent with our blocking appropriate industrial processing in exporting countries? Questions such as these dig deep to the roots of the foreign economic policy of the United States. By congressional action on measures like the Sugar Act, United States commercial intentions are judged and her international leadership is tested (p. 196).

The book is a mine of information, but the reader has to dig for it. There is a good subject index but there are no summaries to the various chapters and there is no index to the thirteen statistical tables. The book would have been improved by a table setting out, for a recent year, the world output by countries (distinguishing between cane and beet) and the major movements of international trade. F. BENHAM

THE DESIGN OF DEVELOPMENT. By Jan Tinbergen. Foreword by Michael Hoffman. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press for the Economic Development Institute, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; London, Oxford University Press, 1958. viii+99 pp. Index. 20s.

IN 1955 the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development set up the Economic Development Institute, to train senior Government officials of less developed countries in problems of economic development. The present book 'has been used extensively at the Institute as a basis for discussions of development policies and problems of programming and project appraisal' (p. vi) and is now made available 'to a wider audience'.

In so far as it is possible to make useful generalizations in this field, Professor Tinbergen gives good advice and draws attention to some leading considerations which should be borne in mind when deciding on development programmes.

F. B.

THE FALLING RATE OF PROFIT: Marx's Law and its Significance to Twentieth-Century Capitalism. By Joseph M. Gillman. London, Dennis Dobson, 1957. xi+172 pp. Tables. 25s.

MARX believed that the rate of profit would continuously tend to fall. This law is clearly false, like other generalizations of Marx, such as the law of the increasing misery of the working class. Nothing, however, deters a devout Marxist. Dr Gillman attempts to make the law plausible by reinterpreting it. There is a growing accumulation of surplus-value (countries short of capital will be astonished to learn) which finds its way into government consumption and other forms of 'unproductive' expenditure and must therefore ultimately result, as Marx predicted, in the transformation of capitalist into socialist societies.

F. B.

THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY. Rev. ed. By P. T. Ellsworth. New York, London, The Macmillan Company, 1958. xi+513 pp. Tables. Diagrams. Index. $6.75. 47s.

THIS well-known textbook has been completely revised. The theoretical parts have been strengthened and the historical and institutional parts have been brought up to date. There is a chapter on economic development which, however, does not even mention overpopulation.

F. B.

PROSPECTIVE: Publication du Centre Internationale de Prospective. Numéro 1 (mai 1958). By Gaston Berger and others. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1958. 93 pp. *Frs.* 450.

A SERIES of essays by a group formed to study factors bringing about changes in the rate of progress in the technical, scientific, economic, and social fields. The contributions in this first issue are: Objectives (Gaston Berger), Agriculture (Pierre Chouard), The Industrial Scene (Marcel Demonque), Transport (Louis Armand), Administration (Pierre Racine), Public Health (Jacques Parisot), and Economic Problems (François Bloch-Lainé).

For the most part the essays do not attempt to do more than indicate the main developments in each field. M. Armand is tantalizing in a very brief chapter.

RICHARD BAILEY

SLAVERY. By C. W. W. Greenidge. London, Allen & Unwin, 1958. 235 pp. Index. 25s.

THIS book is the first account of present-day slavery since the publication of Lady Simon's *Slavery* in 1929. It is a valuable summary, not only of what is known about contemporary slavery, but also of the international and national legislation that tries to destroy or at least to curb it.

The classic form of chattel slavery in which an individual is owned by another and performs involuntary labour for him exists still, and since the last war the trade in slaves of this sort, which was virtually wiped out by the exertions of the last century, has grown again between Africa and the Arabian peninsula. Mr Greenidge, who is Director of the Anti-Slavery Society, writes authoritatively about this trade and the other ancient forms of servitude in the world. There are chapters on debt bondage, whereby a debtor pledges himself or a member of his family to his creditor, on serfdom or peonage which is a kind of half-way house between slavery and liberty, on the sale of women into marriage, and the sham adoption of children. Mr Greenidge does not deal with the 'Katorzhniki' of the forced labour camps of the Soviet Union, who are sometimes called slaves, because their labour is exacted for a government and not for an individual.

The second part of the book deals with the slave charities which were endowed in the seventeenth century to redeem English captives from the Barbary corsairs, the growth of the anti-slavery movement, and the history of the Anti-Slavery Society. Not the least valuable parts of this informative and competently written book are the appendices which give the most important international documents on the repression of slavery. DONALD WOOD.

COLLOQUIUM ON OVERSEAS CHINESE. Ed. by Morton H. Fried. Mimeographed. Foreword by William L. Holland. New York, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958. vi+80 pp. $1.50.

PAPERS on the Chinese of Java, North Borneo, Singapore, Great Britain, the United States, Peru, and the British Caribbean were prepared by specialists for the meetings of the American Anthropological Association in December 1957. These, together with the record of the discussion that followed their presentation, have been edited by Professor Fried. The result is a most valuable addition to our knowledge of the Overseas Chinese.

As was to be expected, the approach is mainly socio-anthropological, and Professor Fried refers to the Overseas Chinese as a 'laboratory for the study of cultural change'. Space does not permit discussion of the many interesting points raised, but the observation of Mr Spector that religion for the Overseas Chinese is primarily an expression of nationalism may be singled out for mention. Mr Spector speaks of the syncretic Chinese temples abroad wherein one finds Buddhist idols, Taoist heroes and fairies, and Confucian maxims, but if you ask a Chinese what he is, the answer is never Confucianist, Taoist, or Buddhist but simply 'Chinese'. This is a phenomenon as old as Chinese history and an appreciation of it would have prevented many misapprehensions including that originated by Dr Toynbee, namely that the 'Sinic' civilization disappeared and was replaced by a new civilization (the 'Far Eastern') whose inspiration was the 'Buddhist Church'.

This colloquium was well worth while and this record of it will be of much assistance to the students of the Overseas Chinese. VICTOR PURCELL

DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1957. Ninth Issue. Special Topic: Mortality Statistics. (Also in French.) New York, United Nations; London, H.M.S.O., 1957. viii+656 pp. Tables. Cloth bound $8. Paper bound $6.50.

THIS annual publication is now in its tenth year. It has become well known as the central source of demographic information of all kinds. A rotation plan is followed: each volume gives special attention to a special topic. Mortality statistics, the theme of the third (1951) volume, are again taken up. The twenty years 1936–56 are covered by the two volumes, this one being specially concerned with the last quinquennium.

Five tables, not hitherto shown, here appear. They give: (1) deaths by (nosological) cause and by whether or not the death was medically certified (an abbreviated list of fifty causes of death is used and ambiguities in the expression

'medical certification' are explained); (2) deaths by cause, age, and sex; (3) deaths of males by occupation and age; (4) death rates specific for occupation, age, and sex; and (5) foetal deaths and ratios by period of gestation (1950–6).

The population of the world in mid-1956 is given as 2,737 million: a birth rate of 34 and a death rate of 18 per thousand averaged over the period 1952–6 yield an annual growth rate of 1·6 per cent. Between mid-1955 and mid-1956, the report declares, the population of the world has increased (in a manner without precedent) by 47 million inhabitants. This figure gives an increase of over an eighth of a million (128,000) a day. But there are varying regional patterns in birth rates: indeed, there is a range of 32 points from a low of 18 per thousand in Northern and Western Europe to a high of 50 in the tropical and southern region of Africa.

A now indispensable and (as usual) well-produced compendium.

C. P. BLACKER

THE COMMONWEALTH

PROBLEMS OF THE NEW COMMONWEALTH. By Sir Ivor Jennings. Foreword by R. Taylor Cole. Durham, N.C., Duke University Press; London, Cambridge University Press, 1958. xi+114 pp. Index. 19s.

THE previous publications in this series from Duke University have mostly been devoted to the older Commonwealth. Sir Ivor Jennings's lectures were designed to encourage a greater interest among the students in the Asian Commonwealth countries. No one can speak on this subject with greater authority and no one is likely to speak with a more biting wit. His irony occasionally overshoots its mark by assuming too much. 'The fact that Goa should be governed by Indians and not by Portuguese', he writes (p. 10), 'is so obvious that it does not need proof . . . There is accordingly nothing whatever to argue about.' Alas, the danger is that some who read this sentence out of context may take him at his word. The true purpose and keynote of his lectures is to insist that even Asian politics are none the worse for being regarded with good humour and a touch of scepticism.

'There are very few actions at a high political level which can be explained rationally. We are in the sphere in which emotions are strong and persuasive' (p. 10). 'The masses followed Gandhi because he was a saint, not because he was a nationalist' (p. 17). 'To suggest that they [the Government of India] need to save money before they spend it would be to ask them to adopt a principle with which most countries have already dispensed' (p. 67). This little book is full of such good things. The best part is his serious study of the conditions necessary for the peaceful and effective transference of power to a new country.

C. E. CARRINGTON

THE OFFICE OF LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR: A Study in Canadian Government and Politics. By John T. Saywell. Foreword by R. MacGregor Dawson. University of Toronto Press, 1957; London, Oxford University Press, 1958. xii + 302 pp. Bibliog. Index. $5.50. 45s.

THIS is a scholarly and thorough study of a neglected but important institution in Canadian government. The office of Lieutenant-Governor in each of the ten Canadian provinces lends itself to genuine comparative study in a way in which relatively few political institutions do. Dr Saywell examines carefully the different functions of the Lieutenant-Governor in turn—the selection of a provincial Premier, the exercise of the prerogatives of dismissal and of dissolution, his position as a federal officer with his powers to reserve provincial Bills for the pleasure of the Governor-General, and so on. It is not an easy subject to study, for the records are either inaccessible or non-existent or relatively unrewarding. But Dr Saywell has gathered together his information inde-

fatigably and the result is a most interesting and enlightening book, and an excellent addition to the already excellent Canadian Government Series edited by Professor R. MacG. Dawson. As Professor Dawson says in his foreword to the book: 'Many people with orderly minds tend to see in the office and functions of the Lieutenant-Governor simply a copy in essentials of what they profess to find at Westminster and Ottawa. The truth is that no very exact parallel between the two major governments can be drawn, and when the Lieutenant-Governor is brought into the comparison, the points in which he resembles the sovereign and the Governor-General are found to be almost as misleading as they are enlightening' (p. vii). Dr Saywell's book abounds in illustrations of this theme; it is full of interesting material upon the working of Cabinet government, constitutional monarchy, and federal government. There are a valuable bibliography and three useful appendices—a list of all the Lieutenant-Governors since 1867; a list of all the Bills reserved by Lieutenant-Governors, together with their reasons and the action taken; and a copy of the Lieutenant-Governor's Commission and Instructions. K. C. WHEARE

MONETARY AND FISCAL THOUGHT AND POLICY IN CANADA 1919–1939. By Irving Brecher. University of Toronto Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1957. xii + 337 pp. Charts. Tables. Index. $5.25. 42s.

IN this scientific survey of the Canadian economic scene between the wars, Mr Brecher reviews the nature of, and the relationship between, monetary and fiscal questions. He deals with the stabilization of inter-war problems, rather than with the economic fluctuations that took place during the period. His investigations lead him to the belief that had a policy of economic stabilization by fiscal techniques been pursued, an appreciable reduction in the violence of cyclical fluctuations could have been achieved, and that such a policy would have been particularly effective during the Great Depression, when purchasing power was inadequate and activity in the capital goods industries extremely low. He defines fiscal policy as 'revenue–expenditure–debt policy consciously pursued by government, with the objective of directly influencing aggregate demand and so maintaining economic stability at high levels of employment and income' (p. 8). Much of the work is devoted to the part played by the controversy over the establishment of a central bank in Canada, and to the ideas inspired by this controversy, together with their influence on stabilization theory and policy.

While the reader may well feel that more than passing comments on the follow-on period of the second World War and after would have been valuable, detailed description of these years does not lie within the scope of this book, and Mr Brecher's work provides a full and useful study of an important era in the history of economic analysis. ELSPETH K. WINTER

THE CANADIAN MARKETS. 1st ed. 1958. A descriptive and statistical survey of markets of over 16 million people. Compiled by J. Walter Thompson Company. New York, Toronto, London, McGraw-Hill, 1958. x + 178 pp. Maps. Tables. $18.

BRITISH companies who are interested in the Canadian market potential (and others who seek information on the Canadian economy) will find in this survey, under one cover, a wide selection of statistical and other basic data, in the main up to the year 1956. Beautifully produced, the book is divided into three parts. Part I deals with Canada as a whole, Part II analyses market conditions in each of the provinces, and Part III indicates future prospects on the basis of the Gordon Commission estimates and gives other supplementary information including comparative statistics and publication lists. Similar market surveys have appeared in this series on Western Europe (1957), Latin America (1956), and the United States (1951). M. G.

THE CULTURE OF CONTEMPORARY CANADA. Ed. by Julian Park. Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1957. xv + 404 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. $5.75. 45s.

AUSTRALIAN ACCENT. By John Douglas Pringle. Drawings by George Molnar. London, Chatto & Windus, 1958. 204 pp. 18s.

THE two senior British dominions which have matured to independent status in the last fifty years are quite remarkably unlike, and especially so in the tone of their national cultures, a field where the common factors in their historical origins might have been expected to produce similarity. The appearance of two books which differ profoundly in their treatment of the cultures of Canada and Australia will justify a notice in a journal devoted to international affairs. The volume edited by Professor Park is a collection of essays by eminent Canadians on the literature, music, painting, scholarship, and science of their native country. Every essay is rooted in tradition and the whole volume makes a comprehensive documented study, expressing the sobriety and conservatism of Canadianism. Mr Pringle's book is as different from Professor Park's as Sydney is from Toronto. His Australia is brash, romantic, and irreverent, like the drawings by Molnar which enliven the text. Caricature is the typical Australian art, as a rather sombre landscape-painting is the typical Canadian art. An understanding of these two great countries, so rapidly rising from the second to the first rank among the nations, is worth the acquiring. C. E. CARRINGTON

EUROPE

THE UNITING OF EUROPE: Political, Social and Economical Forces 1950–1957. By Ernst B. Haas. London, Stevens for the London Institute of World Affairs, 1958. xx + 552 pp. Bibliog. Index. 50s.

EUROPEAN unity is a subject which defies all attempts to make it exciting. Mr Haas's thorough study does not make light reading, but it tells with lucidity the complex story of the development of the supra-national idea in Europe since the launching of the Schuman Plan in 1950.

The European Coal and Steel Community has become the core of any study of European unity. It is the only supra-national body which has actually functioned and it has provided the pattern for the later schemes for a European Economic Community and Euratom. Mr Haas describes the constitution and history of E.C.S.C., and has an interesting chapter on the way in which it reaches its policy decisions, by a mixture of inter-governmental negotiation and supra-national intervention by the High Authority. The picture presented is that of a successful organisation moving cautiously and responsive to short-term practical needs more than to ideological concepts.

In view of the early hostility of most national employers and trade unions and the ambivalence of political parties, one marvels that E.C.S.C. ever came to birth at all. Mr Haas explains that the opposition was fragmented and incapable of concerted action. A determined group of Europeans, with powerful support at Schuman–Adenauer level, was thus able to get its way. Once the big decision had been taken, the hostile interests sought remedies for their grievances in the further development of supra-nationalism rather than in an attempt to undo what had already been achieved. This is especially true of the trade unions and the non-Communist Left, who see in supra-national authority a protection against large-scale *laissez-faire* capitalism. Mr Haas believes that the supra-national technique has proved itself more effective than the inter-governmental methods of O.E.E.C. and foresees for it an ever widening future in Europe. KENNETH YOUNGER

THE STRUGGLE TO UNITE EUROPE 1940–1958: An historical account of the development of the contemporary European Movement from its origin in the Pan-European Union to the drafting of the treaties for Euratom and the European Common Market. By Arnold J. Zurcher. New York University Press, 1958. xix+254 pp. Index. $5.

THIS is an uneven though useful book. Professor Zurcher, a disciple of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, early declares his belief in a federal solution for Europe and rejects the interpretation current in some European quarters that official American support for the Movement, especially at the time of E.D.C., was a form of pressure amounting to interference. But after this promising start he devotes the bulk of his attention to a somewhat parochial treatment of the development of the various European institutions from the Strasbourg Consultative Assembly to the supra-national communities of the Six, relying rather too heavily for this on the official information agencies concerned. Comment on Churchill's role before and after launching the crusade at The Hague is fair but insufficiently related to the larger issues; and in an otherwise meticulous sequence of events it is surprising to find 1951 virtually omitted, though it witnessed the joint debate between United States Congressmen and the European Parliamentarians at Strasbourg, and the subsequent drama of M. Spaak's resignation of the Presidency of the Assembly when it became clear that the incoming Conservative Government in Britain had no more to offer the federalists than had their predecessors. Included in the Appendices is a Draft Constitution of the United States of Europe, drawn up in 1944 by the Juridical Committee of the Pan-European Conference and a Research Seminar for European Federation sponsored by New York University (with the author's participation); an interesting comparison would have been to set beside it the text of the draft treaty for a European Political Community which shared the fate of E.D.C. in 1954. URSULA BRANSTON

GERMANY AND FREEDOM: A Personal Appraisal. By James Bryant Conant. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1958. xi + 117 pp. Bibliog. $3. 15s.

THE political miracle of Germany is perhaps even more striking than the economic miracle about which so much has been written. Some observers still fear that all this simply amounts to a change of outward political forms, and that we are merely observing a lot of smooth-faced men who look as if they have done very well out of democracy. But Dr Conant confirms that Western Germany has undergone a profound change of political character.

The Weimar Republic and the Federal Republic stand in marked contrast to one another. In 1925, seven years after the first World War, when Dr Conant spent some time in Germany as a young scientist, respectable people—professional men and industrialists—paid tribute (and, no doubt, subscriptions) to the assassins who were eliminating the 'November swine' responsible for establishing the republic. And Dr Conant wondered how a republic beset by assassination and despised by leading citizens could possibly endure. In 1953, Dr Conant returned as United States High Commissioner and found a nation which had repudiated the brutal and degrading spirit of the Nazi period. The self-pity, the militarism, and the irresponsibility of the Weimar period have found no place in the public life of the Federal Republic. A large share of the credit must go to the leadership of Dr Adenauer, but the electorate, too, has become more steadfast in supporting parliamentary government. Even that fearful chapter of German history between 1933 and 1945, at first resolutely shut off from consciousness, is now being examined with growing determination —not only by writers and historians but by ordinary citizens.

The lesson seems to have been learned. Will it be remembered by the generation now growing up? Political 'disengagement' is a characteristic which young

Germans today share with the youth of other nations. It might immunize them against the morbid enthusiasms of an earlier generation. But will they develop positive beliefs of their own? Dr Conant is convinced that, given political and economic stability, their enthusiasms will take care of themselves, and he may well be right. His lectures show once again how fortunate it was, both for Germany and the United States, that the first American Ambassador to the Federal Republic was a man not merely devoted to his diplomatic tasks but profoundly concerned with the mind of the nation to which he was accredited.

WERNER BURMEISTER

L'APPLICATION DU TRAITÉ INSTITUANT LA C.E.C.A. AU COURS DE LA PÉRIODE TRANSITOIRE. Preface by Robert Schuman. Luxembourg, Division études, information et documentation de l'Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne, 1958. 294 pp.

To the outside observer of the Continental coal and steel industries, one of the incidental virtues of their integration since 1952 has been the marked increase in the flow of information about them. This report by the Information Division of the European Parliamentary Assembly is a valuable addition to this flow.

After a brief description of the work involved in setting up the E.C.S.C. the book falls into three main parts. The first describes the measures taken to create a common market for coal, steel, and scrap and examines the special national problems of each of the six coal industries and of the Italian steel industry. The second considers some of the particular problems posed by the creation of a common market, especially in the fields of social policy, cartels, transport, investment, and external relations. The third discusses a group of organizational questions, including the financing of the Community, its personnel problems, the role of the Common Assembly, and the part played by the Assembly in furthering European integration.

While such an official report cannot, in its nature, attempt a critical assessment of the successes and failings of the E.C.S.C. in its first five years, it will be found a most useful source book by those attempting such an independent assessment.

JAMES DRISCOLL

DIE WELTMÄCHTE UND DEUTSCHLAND: Geschichte der jüngsten Vergangenheit 1945–1955. By Wilhelm Cornides. Epilogue by Peter Rassow. Tübingen, Rainer Wunderlich Verlag Hermann Leins; Stuttgart, J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1957. 323 pp.

HERR CORNIDES' book covers the history of Germany in international relations during the first ten years after the war: from the surrender in May 1945 to Chancellor Adenauer's visit to Moscow in September 1955. The story falls naturally into two phases: the four years up to the first federal elections in 1949, during which Germany was, in Herr Cornides' phrase, nothing but 'ein Objekt der Politik der Weltmächte'; and the following six years, in which Western Germany, if not Eastern, became increasingly responsible for her own policy. In the first period one would hardly expect a Western-oriented German scholar such as Herr Cornides to adopt a point of view that would seem controversial to English-speaking readers, nor does he do so. The second period presents a more exacting test of the objectivity of contemporary international history, and Herr Cornides surmounts it with distinction. Only occasionally might an English or French (and perhaps an American) eyebrow be raised. Herr Cornides is possibly a little too placid about the circumstances in which the Saarland returned to Germany in 1955; and he altogether fails to mention any of the names associated with the abortive revival of Nazism between 1949 and 1953—names which fortunately count for nothing today, but nevertheless belong to post-war German history. Such examples are rare. For the rest, his book is in all essentials the same book that might have been written on its

subject by an English contemporary historian in English, or a French one in French. It is in fact the work of a true European. C. M. WOODHOUSE

LA DÉMOCRATIE DE BONN 1949–1957. By Alfred Grosser. Paris, Librairie Armand Colin, 1958. 309 pp. Bibliog. Index. *Frs.* 1,300.

M. GROSSER is particularly interested in, and interesting about, German public opinion. He shows us what a tremendous number of newspapers speak for local or sectional interests in Western Germany. He points out a fact little known to foreigners, that the paper with by far the biggest circulation is the *Bild-Zeitung*, which sells 2½ million copies daily. Its proprietor is Axel Springer, who owns also *Die Welt* of Hamburg and a number of other dailies and weeklies. M. Grosser confesses a personal preference for the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* among the other organs of the West German press.

While deploring the 'come-back' of the Stahlhelm point of view and the unshaken position of Herr Globke as the Chancellor's right hand, M. Grosser is greatly encouraged by such episodes as the successful protest at Göttingen University in 1955 against the nomination of Herr Leonhard Schlüter as *Land* Minister of Education, Herr Schlüter having been closely associated with neo-Nazi publications. He has useful things to say about the West German trade unions and the perennial friction between Social Democratic and Catholic influences upon them. While emphasizing the extraordinary rise in the standard of living during the years with which he deals, M. Grosser points out that the West German population is still in numerical decline.

The reader may, however, feel some disappointment at discovering, without being forewarned by the author, that he has read a great deal of this book before in M. Grosser's earlier volume on the years 1945–52, which appeared in 1953 and an English translation of which was published here in 1955 under the title of *Western Germany from Defeat to Rearmament* (reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1956, p. 228). A few mistakes should be noted. Professor Röpke is German, not German-Swiss. And in my *Germany's Eastern Neighbours* I at no point asserted that the Oder–Neisse Line must remain unchanged.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN

ALS SEI NÜRNBERG NIE GEWESEN: Die Abkehr von den völkerrechtlichen Prinzipien der Nürnberger Urteile. By Jerzy Sawicki. Trans. from the Polish, ed., and rev. by Wolfgang Weiss. Berlin, Deutscher Zentralverlag, 1958. 457 pp. *DM* 14.80.

THIS is a German version of a book published in Poland in 1955. Its author is Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Warsaw. The publisher of the German edition is the official East German publishing house. Its editor, who states in his preface (p. 14) that he has altered the work in order to adapt it to the taste of German readers, is a high-ranking official of the German Democratic Republic. The book describes in great detail, but unfortunately quite unsystematically, the return of former Nazi leaders to positions of power in Western Germany, the literature which serves to whitewash war criminals, the criticism directed against the principles on which the judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was based, and the gradual restoration of many aspects of pre-1945 Germany, the abolition of which was a declared purpose of war-time and post-war Allied policy.

The author has collected a vast amount of material. Many of the excerpts which he has reprinted are of interest. But his work fails to provide reliable guidance. His aim is not to inform his readers of what is happening, to explain why it happens and to argue why it should not happen. He is content with arranging strings of quotations, sometimes torn from their context, and attacking those responsible for them as 'aggressors'. The principles of the Nuremberg judgments are to him sacred taboos. Those who, like Lord Hankey or

Lord Maugham, think that they were in advance of the actual state of international law are branded as 'legal nihilists' (p. 339). Those who advocate a more comprehensive system, such as the United Nations' Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, are 'imperialists' (p. 349). The book is full of glaring inaccuracies and absurdities. Among those authors whose works are said to be intended to 'contribute to the psychological preparation of a new war' appear works by the leading representatives of the German resistance against Hitler (p. 21 *et seq.*), including the diaries and letters of some who, like Moltke and Hassell, died as martyrs before 1945 (p. 22). Victor Gollancz is referred to as an 'English publisher of ill fame' (p. 184). Professor Trevor-Roper is simply described as a 'former intelligence officer' (p. 281). Major-General Remer is said to have gained a victory in elections in Lower Saxony under the protection of U.S. authorities (p. 31). 'Progressive public opinion' in Germany is said to have realized from the beginning that the revolt of 20 July 1944 had no other purpose than to save the honour, position, property, and influence of the German officers (p. 246). According to the author, the task of the detective story is to protect the power of the 'bourgeois' (p. 188) and the contemporary flood of war novels and memoirs in Western Europe is taking over this function (p. 197). Scholarly investigations whose results do not support the author's preconceived views, as, e.g., on the maintenance of the Oder–Neisse line, are described as 'kitchens of revisionism' and their authors are—without any attempt at argument or evidence—accused of 'forgery and deceit' (p. 426).

In other words, this book is very little more than uninhibited Communist propaganda of the less skilful kind. If it should find any readers in the free world, it may well have the effect of persuading them that there cannot possibly be any truth at all in any single one of the disturbing allegations which it contains. This, of course, is not so. But there is a certain type of propaganda which achieves the very opposite of what it tries to achieve. This book by its language and its contents belongs to this class. E. J. COHN

DOKUMENTATION DER VERTREIBUNG DER DEUTSCHEN AUS OST-MITTELEUROPA. Ed. by Theodor Schieder with the cooperation of Werner Conze and others. Bonn, Bundesministerium für Vertriebene Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte, 1953–1957. Vol. 1: Part 1, xxi + 494 pp.; Part 2, xv + 896 pp. Vol. 2: viii + 199 pp. Map. Vol. 3: xviii + 408 pp. Map. Vol. 4: Part 1, xiii + 357 pp., Map; Part 2, xvi + 818 pp. *DM* 20 for these 2 parts. Supplement to Part 2: Ein Tagebuch aus Prag 1945–46. 279 pp. Map. *DM* 8.50.

AMONGST those who have assisted in these compilations of documents on the eviction of Germans from Central and Eastern Europe are Professor Hans Rothfels and Professor Werner Conze, who are well known for their work at the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich. Each volume covers a different region: the territories east of the Oder–Neisse line (Vol. 1), Hungary (Vol. 2), Rumania (Vol. 3), and Czechoslovakia (Vol. 4). They deal mainly with the period from 1944, although in the case of Rumania the date is 1940. Introductory chapters on each region survey the whole subject and are followed by texts of laws, decrees, and plans, and eye-witness accounts. The whole has been carefully edited and the authenticity of the accounts has been thoroughly checked. D. H.

POGROM 10 NOVEMBER 1938. By Lionel Kochan. London, André Deutsch, 1957. 159 pp. Bibliog. Index. 13*s.* 6*d.*

MR LIONEL KOCHAN has utilized the documentary and other source materials in the Wiener Library to reconstruct the history of the winter pogrom of 1938 and has also made a contribution to the study of the pathology of modern anti-Semitism. The book is a part of the Wiener Library's research programme into the history of the Jews in Nazi Germany.

Mr Kochan describes the pogrom as a transitional phenomenon, possessing on the one hand the mass character of its earlier forerunners, but on the other anticipating the purely technical and almost impersonal policy of extermination. The events of November 1938 were not spontaneous, but neither were they wholly organized. Goebbels' speech, which sparked off the first stage of the pogrom, was positive in the sense that it invited action, but did not indicate precisely what sort of action should be taken. Hitler's immediate reaction, apparently, was to allow the S.A. to indulge their long-frustrated desire for violence. The pogrom was significant as the first example of a deliberate and publicized act of policy by the Government of a totalitarian State with the modern technology of mass communications at its disposal. It was a pogrom by telephone and teletype. As it proceeded the action became more organized and co-ordinated, until Goering finally transformed it into an enterprise for the wholesale expropriation of Jewish property. IEUAN G. JOHN

DAS GEWISSEN ENTSCHEIDET: Bereiche des deutschen Widerstandes von 1933–1945 in Lebensbildern. Ed. by Annedore Leber with the collaboration of Willy Brandt and Karl Dietrich Bracher. Berlin, Frankfurt am Main, Mosaik Verlag–Annedore Leber, 1957. 303 pp. Illus. *DM* 19.80.

LIKE its predecessor (whose English edition, *Conscience in Revolt*, was reviewed in this Journal in April 1958, p. 233), this volume about opponents of the Hitler regime impresses most by its photographs; and of the photographs it is the ones taken in the People's Court after 20 July 1944 that most impress and move. One feels one has no right to look on the faces of these men on trial for their lives—and all subsequently killed.

The text, unfortunately, tends to detract as much as add. It lacks focus and firmness; and that it is by several hands is only part of the reason. The emphasis of the first volume was on individuals and their decision; the second tries harder to systematize into '*Gruppierungsbereiche*'—social democrats, trade unionists, Communists, clergy, bourgeois, etc. It gives the Left its due and provides a lot of useful information but lapses too much into vague generalization or secular hagiography.

But the reader who feels overwhelmed by a preponderance of abstract nouns (preferably compounded) can return to the pictures and contemplate the bearing and physiognomy of courage. B. RUHM VON OPPEN

DEUTSCHLAND UND POLEN. By Paul Roth. Munich, Isar Verlag, 1958. 113 pp. Maps. (Schriften des Arbeitskreises für Ostfragen. 4.) *DM* 8.80.

POLAND AND GERMANY: A Reply to Congressman B. Carrol Reece of Tennessee. By Jędzrej Giertych. London, Jędzrej Giertych, 16 Belmont Road, N.15. 158 pp. 7*s*. $1.

DR ROTH'S book is a short history of the relations between Germans and Poles from the arrival of the Slavs in Eastern Europe to the end of 1957. It is a simple and clear statement without overtones, but also without any particular inspiration: indeed there is nothing to be found in it which has not been said before. It re-states the official view of the West German Government that it is self-evident that the frontiers of 1937 should be reinstated. Much of *Deutschland und Polen* is what one is accustomed to hear in official or semi-official, but moderate, circles in the Federal Republic—Hitler and Stalin demonically created a sad feud in which the German case must, it appears, be accepted as irrefutable. The Germans set out to identify the interests of Poland with those of Germany, since both are menaced from Moscow. Dr Roth best illustrates this identification when he writes: 'Solange (aber) die Sowjetzone in sowjetischer Hand bleibt, ist sie zugleich die "Faust im Nacken" Polens. Das ist wohl auch einer der Grünge, weshalb man sich in Moskau gegen die Wiedervereinigung

Deutschlands stellt' (p. 102). The bibliography is slight and the maps are undistinguished.

Dr Giertych's book, *Poland and Germany*, is a reply to a speech made by Congressman B. Carrol Reece of Tennessee in the House of Representatives on 16 May 1957. This speech appears to have been based upon rather more extremist German propaganda, and it unconditionally condemned the allotment of formerly German territory east of the Oder and western Neisse to Poland. Dr Giertych pours out a great deal of information to prove Mr Reece to be wrong. He is most alarmed by the not unreal danger, of which he believes Mr Reece to have spoken without compunction, of a fresh German–Russian deal at the cost of yet another partition of Poland. ELIZABETH WISKEMANN

NORWAY AND THE WESTERN POWERS: A Study of Comparative Constitutional Law. By Frede Castberg. Oslo University Press; London, Allen & Unwin, 1958. 24 pp. 3*s*. 6*d*.

FREDE CASTBERG, Legal Adviser to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Counsellor to the Norwegian Nobel Institute, in this paper makes a useful contribution to the study of comparative constitutional law. After a brief sketch of the historical background of Norway's Constitution, which dates from 1814, he explains its ideological basis, which rests on popular sovereignty, the doctrine of the separation of powers, and the axiom of the inviolable rights of the individual against the Government. In the framing of the Norwegian Constitution the British and French Constitutions proved a great source of inspiration and continued to do so during the subsequent development of Norwegian political principles throughout the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, there are some characteristic peculiarities in Norwegian constitutional law, and the concluding nine pages dealing with them form not the least interesting part of Mr Castberg's excellent treatise. AGNES H. HICKS

THE MODERN PRINCE AND OTHER WRITINGS. By Antonio Gramsci. London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1957. 192 pp. 21*s*.

ANTONIO GRAMSCI is today probably not much more than a name to the majority of people in this country outside the circles of Marxists or of students of Italian affairs. Yet he, with his near-contemporary Togliatti (Gramsci was but two years the older), was responsible for founding the Italian Communist Party, now the largest in Western Europe. Born in Sardinia in 1891, Gramsci came to Communism via the Socialist Party and his studies of Marxism and of working-class conditions in Turin. Arrested by the Fascists in 1926, he spent the next eleven years in prison and died in 1937.

During the years of his imprisonment, despite conditions which completely undermined his health, Gramsci continued to study in accordance with his convictions and produced, in thirty-two notebooks, the body of writings (since published in a series of volumes in Turin by Einaudi) which have established him as the philosopher of the Italian Communist Party. These writings covered a vast range, from Machiavelli (the essays of the title) to the organization of modern education, and a selection of them is here given in translation, together with some early writings from *Ordine Nuovo*, the paper which Gramsci founded in Turin in 1919, and an important essay on the Southern Question. The selection and translation, by Dr Louis Marks, has been carried out with the approval of the 'Istituto Gramsci' in Rome, and Dr Marks also provides a biographical introduction and brief notes on personalities (one of them, that on Tasca, highly misleading). While welcoming this effort to make Gramsci's work known in this country, it seems regrettable that the present selection appears to have been made on a narrowly political basis, and includes nothing from the moving *Lettere dal Carcere* (Einaudi, 1947) which conveyed much more of this exceptional man's personality. MURIEL GRINDROD

A GEOGRAPHY OF ITALY. By D. S. Walker. London, Methuen, 1958. 256 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. 30*s*.

'CERTAIN facts of Italian physical geography have been of the greatest human significance' (p. 13): few readers will quarrel with this statement—few, certainly, among those whose acquaintance with Italy's geography was made at first-hand when battling against its obstacles during the last war. But the author of this book, himself a teacher of geography with a wide first-hand knowledge of Italy, is thinking in terms of a much longer time-span, going back even to before the post-Pliocene age when the modern outline of Italy first became recognizable (p. 79). 'Geography' is here treated in a thoroughly comprehensive way: besides the usual physical data, Mr Walker includes a section on geography-cum-history, from the time of the earliest settlements down to the present day; detailed accounts of the different regions; and a brief section on the economic aspects. This last suffers from extreme brevity of treatment; moreover, this method of arrangement inevitably gives rise to occasional repetition when topics are treated both regionally and from the economic angle—and one or two inconsistencies have crept in, e.g., Sardinia's coal is barely mentioned in the section on the island (p. 213) though it is rightly given in the economic section as Italy's main source of domestic supply (p. 228). The bibliography is somewhat sketchy, and the index definitely inadequate—a quite serious defect in a book which will be used for reference; but the numerous maps to illustrate particular points are most useful. The book as a whole presents a sound picture of a country in the history of which geography has played so large a part, and is a welcome addition to Messrs Methuen's valuable series of advanced geographies.

MURIEL GRINDROD

IL SILLABO: Gli Errori del Secolo. 2nd ed. By Ernesto Rossi. Florence, Parenti Editore, 1958. 91 pp. 300 *lire*.

IL MATRIMONIO CONCORDATARIO: Non tutti uguali di fronte alla Legge. By Mario Berutti. Florence, Parenti Editore, 1958. 183 pp. 500 *lire*.

GLI SPRETATI: O del Diritto all'Apostasia. By Carlo Falconi. Florence, Parenti Editore, 1958. 405 pp. 800 *lire*.

I PRETI IN CATTEDRA: Dall'asilo d'infanzia all'Università. By Luigi Rodelli. Florence, Parenti Editore, 1958. 327 pp. 800 *lire*.

RISORGIMENTO SCOMUNICATO: Legislatori coraggiosi. By Vittorio Gorresio. Florence, Parenti Editore, 1958. 301 pp. 800 *lire*.

THESE are all volumes in the series *Stato e Chiesa* edited by that old anti-Fascist hero, Ernesto Rossi. He himself leads off with an analysis of that epitome of illiberalism, the Syllabus of 1864. Mario Berutti deals with the troubles of the unhappily married in a country where the Roman Catholic Church forbids divorce while sanctioning ecclesiastical dispensation. Carlo Falconi's book provides an interesting history of heretical priests since the sixteenth century—this volume is dedicated to Calamandrei and Salvemini. Luigi Rodelli is a schoolmaster who deals with clerical influence upon education in Italy. Finally Vittorio Gorresio summarizes the history of the Risorgimento in terms of its condemnation by the Vatican. The champions of the Church have recently exposed the weaknesses of the Italian patriots of the nineteenth century. Thus it is useful to be reminded of the totally negative attitude of the Curia towards their aspirations, even if these were not shared, as Gorresio claims, by the whole people.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN

RIFORME E RIVOLUZIONE. By Antonio Giolitti. Turin, Giulio Einaudi, 1957. 62 pp. Bibliog. 300 *lire*.

ANTONIO GIOLITTI who, in the last Italian General Election (May 1958), stood as a Nenni Socialist and is now a Socialist Deputy, had a prolonged 'crisis' which ended in his withdrawal from the Communist Party in 1957. This pamphlet was

composed to vindicate the orthodoxy of his Marxism in the face of the Communist inquisition.

Signor Giolitti, now aged 43, is a collateral descendant of the great Giovanni Giolitti, for so many years Prime Minister and member for Cuneo in Piedmont at the end of the last and the beginning of the present century. He himself had sat as Communist Deupty for Cuneo since 1946. Between the lines of his argument, conducted in the internal vocabulary of Marxism, one may, without being a trained inquisitor, discern the trend of thought which so much upset the party of Togliatti: for example, this:

> The task of the working class today is not to prepare for the great revolutionary leap towards the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat but to begin concretely to acquire and exercise its own leadership, grouping the public interest around concrete solutions which it is in a position to propose (p. 24).

Little stands between this and the heresy of the inevitability of gradualness.

SYLVIA SPRIGGE

BABEL IN SPAIN. By John Haycraft. Preface by Gerald Brenan. London, Hamish Hamilton, 1958. 222 pp. Illus. 21*s*.

THE author's enterprising scheme to teach English in Cordoba, with the help of his wife, not only brought financial success but achieved their objective of getting to know really well a cross section of society in Andalusia. The region may differ greatly from the rest of Spain but it nevertheless shares many features and problems with the other regions of the country. Although in this book politics and economics are barely mentioned as such, by its description of the living conditions and outlook of the people it helps to explain both the current situation in Spain and the possible dangers for the future. A Preface by Gerald Brenan brings a cachet of its own.

D. K. M. KIRKPATRICK

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, EAST GERMANY, AND POLAND 1937–56. By A. Zauberman. Mimeographed. London, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1958. 70 pp. Tables. (Chatham House Memoranda.) 4*s*. 6*d*.

THIS memorandum provides valuable material to those who are collectors of cases of economic deception and connoisseurs in the science of international comparability. The student of political affairs may find it somewhat technical, but he can expect interesting conclusions from the forthcoming study on the same subject of which the paper under review is a mere sample. It will prove an asset if the final product is kept free of technical jargon.

Much work has been done in recent years on economic growth in the Soviet Union. The same cannot be said of other countries of the orbit. In fact, less than before the war is known nowadays of the economies of Eastern Europe. Mr Zauberman, who is well known as a student of Soviet and East European economic affairs, has undertaken the difficult task of comparing the economic development in the three industrial countries of Eastern Europe. The outcome of his studies can be regarded as a full success.

At a time when certain untenable statistical methods were being discarded in the Soviet Union, they were still copied faithfully in Eastern Europe. The author's main pre-occupation has thus been the correction of exaggerated official indices. The results are striking: whereas by 1955 Western Europe's industrial production had increased by more than three-quarters since pre-war, in the three industrial countries of Eastern Europe taken together it had grown only half as much. The comparison would hardly give more favourable results if it were broadened to include farming and public services. Eastern Germany alone of the countries of the area is in the same class as the principal industrial countries of Western Europe.

W. K.

COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE IN EASTERN EUROPE. By Enno E. Kraehe and others. Edited by Irwin T. Sanders. Lexington, University of Kentucky Press, 1958. x + 214 pp. Maps. Tables. $5.

THE papers in this compilation deal with three general themes: Eastern Europe and World Affairs, The Peasantries of Eastern Europe, and Collectivization in Soviet Strategy; and with six particular countries: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Poland, Hungary and Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Professor Sanders' own contributions are distinguished; his introduction deals well with the broad issues, and particularly well with the necessary 'double-take' if the word 'co-operative' is used, while his paper on the peasantries is realistic and simple. Other contributions are useful chiefly because they competently collate numerous references to sources, mainly official Communist, as evidence of failure. Their dullness is due in part to the inevitable necessity of relying on sources of this kind, and in part to the seminar method, which evidently encouraged contributors to stick flatly to 'the facts'—in this case the quotations—and leave speculation to the subsequent discussion, which is summarized too briefly to rouse interest. Delay in publication (the seminar was held in 1955) has rendered some of the contributions out-of-date. Had it been possible to include the figures for agricultural production now available for Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia, and references to recent discussions in Poland, the hypothesis of failure could have been verified and the impression of generalization ahead of the data would have been removed. DOREEN WARRINER

POLAND. Ed. by Oscar Halecki. Foreword by Robert F. Byrnes. Atlantic Books. New York, Praeger; London, Stevens for the Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee, 1957. xviii + 601 pp. Maps. Tables. Bibliog. Index. 70s.

THIS is a fairly full and up-to-date survey of the Communist system and policies in Poland. A considerable amount of useful facts and statistics have been assembled, including short biographies of leading politicians, and historical sections link the present with the pre-war situation. Economics forms about half of the volume and seems its most valuable part; 'culture' is treated rather superficially, and 'politics' is confined to a bare outline. Social problems, too, receive very scant attention.

In so far as the book goes beyond description its central theme is the progress of sovietization in Poland and its various consequences. The authors make no secret of their dislike of Communism and use perhaps unduly emotive language, but they strive to be fair and their balance-sheet does not consist entirely of debits. Nevertheless, the overall picture that emerges is of an enslaved, exploited, terrorized, and indoctrinated country, whose powers of resistance to Communism are great though being steadily undermined.

The volume was prepared before the Poznan riots of June 1956 and therefore before the beginning of the most interesting chapter in post-war Polish history. Virtually all the statistical tables stop in 1955 or earlier, and many individuals who have distinguished themselves by their critical or reforming zeal since 1956 are treated as examples of Stalinist orthodoxy. A short section on 'Recent Developments' fills in a number of gaps, but fails to alter the whole perspective of the work. Had it been written before the end of 1954, its conclusions would have been more plausible and its pessimistic outlook justified. Not knowing the outcome of the 'thaw' which was in progress while the book was being finished, the authors naturally tended to minimize its scope and importance, and treated it as a merely temporary deviation from Stalinism. The book thus misses the chance to answer the important question of why the sovietization of Poland has, after all, proved to be a relative fiasco. Z. A. PELCZYNSKI

HOME TO POLAND. By Christine Hotchkiss. New York, Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1958. 247 pp. $3.95.

THIS book gains immensely from having been written by a Polish woman, married to an American, who left Poland in 1939 as a young girl and returned for a visit in 1957. Mrs Hotchkiss does not deal in political analysis or academic knowledge, but with living people in Poland and their own comments on their problems. She describes meetings in town and countryside with Poles of different kinds, some of them old friends rediscovered after many years. Such a book might have been merely a lament for 'the good old days', but the author shows a lively understanding and tolerance, blended with humour. The conviction which she found among many Poles that their 'October Revolution' opened the gates to freedom may be somewhat tarnished, but this book vividly reflects their unquenchable spirit and a sense of Polish unity which adversity has only strengthened.

GUY HADLEY

CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Ed. by Vratislav Busek and Nicolas Spulber. Foreword by Robert F. Byrnes. Atlantic Books. New York, Praeger; London, Stevens for the Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee, 1957. xvii + 520 pp. Maps. Tables. Bibliog. Index. 70s.

IN publishing the series 'East-Central Europe under the Communists', the Mid-European Studies Center is trying to meet the need for comprehensive reference books in this field. The volume on Czechoslovakia inevitably suffers from the shortcomings of its kind—some of its conclusions have already been overtaken by events, and the book as a whole is rather uneven as some of the contributions do not reach the standards obviously desired by the editors. The economic and demographic chapters are excellent and most valuable for reference purposes. Education and social legislation are also well covered. The account of political developments and cultural trends, however, is less admirable. The book does not give a coherent picture of political life in post-war Czechoslovakia, and the treatment of events before 1945 can only be described as potted history. Even for the post-1945 period there are some serious omissions, such as the Plzeň riots in 1953, and the 1948 *coup d'état* is oversimplified to the point of distortion. On the other hand, the organization of the Communist Party and its auxiliaries is lucidly explained, as is the rather complicated constitutional arrangement covering Slovak self-government. The chapter dealing with literature does little more than give a catalogue of writers and their works, although a more thorough analysis of the cultural background and its connexion with political manifestations would have been useful. The other arts are completely ignored.

The bibliography and index are well compiled, but for £3 10s. it should have been possible to provide diacritical marks for the Czech and Slovak names and words used in the text.

OTTO PICK

HUNGARY. Ed. by Ernst C. Helmreich. Foreword by Robert F. Byrnes. Atlantic Books. New York, Praeger; London, Stevens for the Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee, 1957. xiv + 466 pp. Maps. Tables. Bibliog. Index. 70s.

THIS substantial, but unduly expensive, work gives a large amount of detail on many, although not all, aspects of Hungarian conditions and institutions up to August 1956. The articles are by various hands. Some reach a high standard, particularly the technical chapters, among which those by M. Wselaki, on mining and industry, are truly informative. The geographical and demographical chapters show careful study of the available sources. M. Körmendi is lively on literature and the arts, but there is no chapter devoted to religion.

The historical and political chapters have been badly planned and co-ordinated, and some of them are unsatisfactory in themselves. Professor Helmreich's own pages on Hungary in History are sketchy, and many of the state-

ments in it are just off the mark. Professor Kértész' Hungary in International Affairs since 1945 (a reprint) is admirable for the ground which it covers, but stops short, in substance, at the end of 1946. We badly miss a single, coherent account of events since 1945. These have to be picked out of the various chapters, chiefly those on the Constitutional System and Government, and on the Party and Political Institutions; and these partially duplicate one another, besides containing matter which would have been more appropriately placed in the historical sketch. Most of these chapters, again, contain small factual errors, and they are usually less than just to the pre-1955 regimes.

A postscript gives a summary of the U.N. Report on the 1956 revolution. There is a large but oddly selective bibliography and some useful biographies of Hungarian Communist leaders. C. A. MACARTNEY

U.S.S.R.

THE RISE OF KHRUSHCHEV. By Myron Rush. Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1958. vi + 116 pp. Index. $3.25.

DR RUSH'S detailed recapitulation of Khrushchev's rise to leadership is an excellent piece of 'Kremlinology' and provides evidence of the keen observation, patience, and experience required for success in this branch of Soviet studies. His careful reading of Soviet newspapers and journals did, in fact, enable him to forecast a probable clash between Khrushchev and the 'Anti-Party Group', as well as the subsequent fall of Zhukov. As a historical record and assessment, the book is of absorbing interest, based as it is on the clues to the power situation in the U.S.S.R which the astute reader of the Soviet press may learn to recognize. The prominence given to this or that policy and the appointments and demotions of official personnel may be obvious signs of the times, but often the less publicized pointers are almost as revealing (e.g. the order of names on State occasions, incidents emphasized or omitted in biographies of leading figures).

Some of Dr Rush's arguments may be contested. That Mikoyan was Khrushchev's main opponent in 1956–7 and set the pace of de-Stalinization in order to reduce the risk of a cult of Khrushchev is open to doubt. The author does not satisfactorily explain why, if this thesis is correct, Mikoyan is still in office. It could be that Khrushchev has not taken his revenge because Mikoyan has no personal following and therefore presents no challenge to the leader's position. The same considerations, however, applied equally in Bulganin's case but did not prevent his disgrace. Khrushchev clearly does not allow his opponents to remain in their former positions and, from the evidence available, it would seem that Mikoyan, if he opposed Khrushchev at all, would have been extremely careful not to provoke him too far.

Such defects apart, this book should stimulate even the most *Pravda*-hardened specialist. It should also be a revelation to the general reader, who would be well advised to look first at Appendix Two ('The Role of Esoteric Communication in Soviet Politics') as a guide to the author's method of interpreting the Soviet press. A. R.

THE NEW ROLE OF THE SOVIETS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: A Supplementary Paper of the Committee for Economic Development. By Michael Sapir. Introduction by Herbert Stein. New York, Committee for Economic Development, 1958. 64 pp. Tables. 50 *cents*.

THIS is a useful study. Mr Sapir sets out to answer these questions: how big is the economic drive of the Communist bloc beyond its frontiers, in what areas is it centred, what are its methods, and what are its achievements? He brings out the relative smallness of resources engaged in the drive, and its concentration in a few countries, some of which are becoming, however, increasingly de-

pendent on the Communist orbit: in 1956 the orbit accounted for over one-tenth of total trade in seven free-world underdeveloped countries. The drive, as Mr Sapir notes, concentrates in Asia and Africa on economic-development assistance: in the Middle East aid and trade are combined with military assistance: in Latin America it is limited mainly to trade (but, as we know, in the meantime Russia has moved in as the aid-giver to Argentina). There is in Mr Sapir's study an interesting discussion of techniques of the drive, of some psychological factors which tend to favour it, of illusions it created, and of the modicum of disillusionment that comes in its wake.

One would quarrel perhaps only with the writer's appraisal of the aid-and-trade 'potential' of the Soviet Union. He takes it to be 'obvious that Russia alone has the capacity to devote $1 billion or more annually to programming of foreign credit-aid involving exports to countries seeking economic development' (p. 31). Now, Soviet exports of equipment all told, i.e., including exports to China and European Communist countries, in 1956 totalled between $600 and $700 million, and were by far outweighed by imports half again as large. Against this background, is the sum of $1,000 million of Soviet aid-exports of equipment to the non-Communist underdeveloped countries alone a realistic possibility? The question can hardly be answered in the affirmative, even if one agrees (as I do) that in the final instance magnitudes as well as directions of such exports depend to a great extent on the priority accorded on extra-economic grounds.

ALFRED ZAUBERMAN

FACTORY AND MANAGER IN THE U.S.S.R. By Joseph S. Berliner. Foreword by Clyde Kluckhohn. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1957. xv + 386 pp. Bibliog. Index. $7.50. 60s.

FOLLOWING the two pioneer surveys[1] by Bienstock-Schwarz-Yugow and by Granick on management in the Soviet Union, Professor Berliner has published the results of his scholarly researches into the behaviour of Soviet industrial managers, based on a wide variety of sources ranging from national laws to technical journals. The book's main value, however, lies in the thoughtful analysis of interviews, carried out under the auspices of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, among former Soviet managers stranded in Western Germany after the war. The interviews ranged over such matters as planning, production, purchasing, marketing, and finance, and they brought unexpectedly rich returns on such subjects as *'blat'* (personal favour) and the *'tolkach'* (the 'fixer'). As the sample is small, the author treats those interviewed 'not as data, but as sources of data' (p. 9).

It is the main object of the survey to answer the question: 'What is it like to run a Soviet enterprise?' The combination of high targets with perpetual shortages 'constitutes the most salient fact of life for the Soviet manager' (p. 24). Overfulfilment rather than fulfilment is the target, and an elaborate system of bonuses operates as the main stimulus to produce. The outcome is often strange indeed: gross output matters more than market supply, volume more than quality and productivity, stocks of the superfluous more than necessary spare parts. Freedom of manœuvre and economic rationality are at a discount in a society in which central control is backed by inducement and threat. The flexibility of the system should however not be underrated; it does work, though at a high rate of human and material waste. Padding and mutual involvement hold it together, and the 'fixer' and the 'connection' take the place held by the market mechanism in so imperfect a society as our own.

W. K.

[1] Gregory Bienstock, Solomon M. Schwarz, and Aaron Yugow, *Management in Russian Industry and Agriculture* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1944).
David Granick, *Management of the Industrial Firm in the U.S.S.R.: A Study in Soviet Economic Planning* (Columbia University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1954).

SOVIET TRANSPORTATION POLICY. By Holland Hunter. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1957; London, Oxford University Press, 1958. xxiii+416 pp. Map. Charts. Tables. Bibliog. Index. $9. 68s.

HOLLAND HUNTER never believed that the railways would be a Soviet Achilles' heel. Kaganovich, referring to these views, once said: 'Our heel is tougher than that of the ancient Greek, Achilles. On this heel we reached Berlin' (p. 109). Apart from the railway crisis of the early 'thirties, the Soviet transport system has done remarkably well what it was charged to do. It rarely held up the process of industrialization, although its share in the country's investment programme seemed often insufficient. Mr Hunter shows this in his masterly survey, which is commendably free of technical detail and professional jargon. He is fully conversant with the sacred works of party literature, which he treats as 'a problem in translation' (p. 42).

Western observers have often argued that Soviet economic growth was bound to be delayed as a result of insufficient replacements and additions to existing transport capacities. They have tended to underestimate the possibilities of improved performance and intensive exploitation of motive power and rolling stock. Five-year programmes remained, of course, often unfulfilled, but they 'should be considered agenda rather than firm commitments' (p. 119). By comparison with the success of the freight carriers, passenger services, officially regarded as unproductive, leave much to be desired; Soviet journals rarely discuss them.

The economics of Soviet transport are often shrouded in obscurities. As a result of an intricate system of taxes, subsidies, and unequal inflation, the price structure has evolved into a complex barrier to the analysis of welfare-economics (p. 199). But, as Jasny showed some years ago, transport data can be regarded as a measure more dependable than many economic indices for assessing the rate of Soviet growth. Mr Hunter's book greatly facilitates comparative research in this sphere. W. K.

THE SOVIET CULTURAL SCENE 1956–1957. Ed. by Walter Z. Laqueur and George Lichtheim. New York, Praeger; London, Atlantic Book Publishing Company, 1958. Distributed in Great Britain by Stevens. viii+300 pp. Index. 27s. 6d.

THE periodical *Soviet Survey* has provided during the past two years a great deal of well-documented information about the interaction of politics and intellectual life in the Soviet Union. Several of its more interesting articles are here grouped together, sometimes rather uneasily, under the general headings 'Literature and the Arts', 'History and Philosophy', 'The Social Sciences and the Social Scene', and 'Beyond the Soviet Frontiers' (including articles on the intellectual ferment in Poland and Hungary).

Miscellanies of this kind are always open to the objections that they are sketchy and insufficiently co-ordinated. The present book is no exception, and indeed the editors disarmingly admit that its title is somewhat misleading. The Soviet cultural scene, in the ordinary sense of the words, is inadequately covered; there is much material which certainly broadens our knowledge of the Soviet Union but has nothing to do with culture, and some which is 'cultural' but has little to do with the Soviet Union. The book has little to say about extremely revealing developments in some fields of cultural life, notably music and the theatre, at this time. We hear only rather muffled reports of the literary explosion which momentarily shed a powerful light on the Soviet cultural scene. There is no full account of the heretical literature of the period, which would enable the reader to understand the attitudes of the Party on the one hand and the dissident or in some cases over-enthusiastic writers on the other. Instead, we are invited to measure with our micrometers the slow and uncertain crawl of Soviet philosophy and psychology.

Nonetheless, every one of the articles included is sound and useful in itself. Mr Labedz on 'History', Mr Kolarz on 'The Soviet Attitude Towards Religion', and Mr Utechin on 'Educational Problems' are particularly worth reading. Altogether the book is a very worthwhile acquisition for those who were improvident enough not to acquire *Soviet Survey* serially in these years. T. S.

MIDDLE EAST AND MEDITERRANEAN

BRITISH INTERESTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST: A Report by a Chatham House Study Group. London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1958. vi + 123 pp. 12s. 6d.

MUCH of this Report was already in its first draft, we are told, before the Suez crisis of October 1956. It finally went to press only shortly before revolution burst upon Iraq and American and British troops landed in Lebanon and Jordan. Despite this handicap, most of the analysis still seems sound, though the passages on the Baghdad Pact are partly outdated. While hoping for peaceful social change in Iraq, the Study Group gave clear warning that revolution was only just below the surface in Baghdad. How it would have judged the Anglo-American action is harder to guess. It advises strongly against military intervention in general but leaves a loophole for a possible response to a local request such as the Lebanese and Jordanian Governments made.

The historical introduction and the account both of trends within the Arab world and of the tangled interests which numerous outside Powers have in the area are admirably done. The lessons for Britain are firmly drawn, notably the lesson that she can no longer claim a special or exclusive mission in the Middle East. There are commendably objective assessments of the Arab–Israel dispute, of the aims of the Soviet Union, and of the extent to which the pretensions of Nasser's Egypt are legitimate or excessive. The problems of the Sheikhdoms of the Gulf and the Aden Protectorate would probably have been accorded greater urgency had the Report appeared after the events of last summer.

Mr Mack Smith, the rapporteur, has presented his complex subject clearly and with great economy of words. KENNETH YOUNGER

TENSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By Philip W. Thayer. Introduction by Charles Malik. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1958. xiv + 350 pp. $5.50. 35s.

THIS book consists of the papers read at a conference held in Washington in August 1957, under the sponsorship of the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. The presence of a large number of highly qualified scholars and government officials must have made the conference one of the most interesting meetings on the Middle East held anywhere; and if some of the papers fall short of what might have been expected from their authors, that is no uncommon occurrence when spoken words are put down in cold print.

The papers fall into three groups. In the first, the strategic and political aspects of the Middle East are discussed by R. Strausz-Hupé, J. C. Hurewitz, Vice Admiral Ruthven E. Libby, Paul H. Nitze, Bernard Lewis, C. Grove Haines, Elie Salem, and Harold B. Minor. The second part is a study of economic and social factors and contains papers by Robert Sethian, John Gunter, Norman Burns, Carl Marcy, Paul Stirling, Afif Tannous, P. Vatikiotis, and George Makdisi. Of particular interest are the discussions on 'Structural Changes in Middle East Society' between Stirling and Tannous and on 'Recent Developments in Islam' between Vatikiotis and Makdisi. Then follows a series of Problem Studies, including Cyprus (by C. M. Woodhouse and A. J. Meyer), Israel (by Lincoln Hale and Harlan Cleveland), Suez, and Communism. The

liveliest discussion in this group is that between A. L. Goodhart and Quincy Wright on 'Some Legal Aspects of the Suez Situation' which is supplemented by interesting studies on the United Nations and Suez by Clyde Eagleton and Francis Wilcox. Walter Lacqueur has also contributed a thoughtful paper on 'Prospects of Communism in the Middle East'. An introduction by Charles Malik raises some important issues, as does the conclusion by Ernest Lindley. Altogether, and notwithstanding certain weaknesses inevitable in a symposium of this kind, the book can be recommended to those interested in Middle Eastern affairs.

CHARLES ISSAWI

MIDDLE EAST INDICTMENT: From the Truman Doctrine, the Soviet Penetration and Britain's Downfall to the Eisenhower Doctrine. By Arslan Humbaraci. London, Hale, 1958. 288 pp. Index. 21*s*.

THE writer of this work is a left-wing ex-Turkish (now de-naturalized) polyglot journalist, who, today a stateless refugee in Great Britain, has been a Communist, anti-Communist, and semi-Communist and is now unclassified, but (with a hearty appreciation of Soviet achievement) certainly non-Communist. He has travelled widely, has or had an interesting and unusual range of Russian contacts in the Middle East, is equally at home in French or American journalism, regards Israel as 'a refreshing oasis in the Middle East' (p. 261), but has (as his pages show) only a limited knowledge of the Arab world, and speaks little or no Arabic.

Mr Humbaraci, writing admirable English and sincerely devoted to his present opinions, gives his readers some interesting pages of self-revealing autobiography, and devotes the rest of his book to exposing the shortcomings of Western policy, the follies of the Baghdad Pact, the outdated British attitudes (both past and present), the ineptness of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the iniquities of the oil companies, and the dangers of Soviet cunning, consistency, and strategic grasp. He offers much that is well argued, and rightly attacks Western complacency—if any still remains! But his version can scarcely be accepted as the calm, yet penetrating and fully-informed, appraisal for which one might have hoped. The book, by no means without merits and good intentions, is a polemical and in places over-written political treatise; it gives weight to authorities of very differing value (often mere journalistic passers-by), sometimes accepts foolish and mischievous gossip as fact—or as innuendo worth repeating—ignores wide areas of the patent truth, is guilty of statements which border on the absurd, and in a word fails to inspire the confidence which its reader would gladly feel, if he could. The author should study, *inter alia*, the full facts and setting of the oil industry in the Middle East before he writes of it again; exactly who, one wonders, is to impose on the oil-owning States, obviously by force, the internationalizing of their cherished revenues? Such plans are so easy for theoretical publicists to formulate, but so remote from practicability.

S. H. LONGRIGG

DEFENSE OF THE MIDDLE EAST: Problems of American Policy. By John C. Campbell. New York, Harper for the Council on Foreign Relations; London, Oxford University Press, 1958. xiv + 392 pp. Maps. Tables. Bibliog. Index. $5. 40*s*.

MR CAMPBELL'S title defines a problem that is much the same from the point of view of United States policy, with which he is concerned, as from that of British policy: the problem, namely, of ensuring that the Middle East should never be dominated by a potentially hostile great Power. There are variations and qualifications, certainly. United States policy has never had to concern itself with more than the one potentially hostile great Power of today, whereas Great Britain has had half a dozen in succession to worry about; United States policy is still not based so decisively upon immediate economic considerations, since

the U.S.A. is not yet critically dependent on Middle East oil; and for the U.S.A. strategic considerations concerning the Middle East are global rather than regional. Nevertheless, basically 'defence of the Middle East' means the same thing for Great Britain and the U.S.A. It is therefore important to remember not only that it does not mean the same thing to the Soviet bloc (nor even to all members of the Western alliance), but even more that it does not mean anything at all to most people in the Middle East, who think, when they think of defence at all, not of any threat from the Soviet Union but generally of a threat from their own next-door neighbours within the area.

This, then, is the problem which Mr Campbell sets out to analyse: how the U.S.A. (and Great Britain) can defend an area in which they have a vital interest—an interest which they believe to be shared by the inhabitants of the area and which can be defended only with the help of those inhabitants—when most of the peoples and even governments in the area are sceptical of the common interest and indifferent to the alleged threat. Mr Campbell picks his way carefully, dispassionately, and skilfully through the resulting tangle. In the first half of the book he does it historically (up to the middle of 1957) and in the second half analytically, examining each aspect of the problem in turn. He emerges at the end at least not in despair, even if without any definitive prescription. The caution of his conclusions will certainly commend itself to British readers, who are perhaps more accustomed than Americans to being told that there are such things as insoluble problems. It is important that both should read this book: Americans because they will receive soundly based advice from it for the guidance of public opinion and policy-making; and Englishmen because it may help to remove from their minds the absurd stereotype which too many of them have lately formed of American policy in the Middle East—the first cousin, in fact, of the equally absurd stereotype which too many Frenchmen have long since formed of British policy there.

C. M. WOODHOUSE

THE PASSING OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY: Modernizing the Middle East. By Daniel Lerner with the collaboration of Lucille W. Pevsner. Introduction by David Riesman. Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1958. xiii+466 pp. $7.50.

As the author puts it (p. 78), 'I have made one book out of two enterprises—a theory of modernization and a set of case studies'. The basic material for both parts was provided by a survey carried out in 1950 in seven Middle Eastern countries, 'by native scholars, usually teachers or advanced students at a major university, who were briefed and supervized by the American in charge' (p. 80). Their findings were analysed by the Bureau of Applied Research at Columbia University which also sponsored the present work.

The first part of the book consists of an excellent and well-known essay 'The Grocer and the Chief', which describes the impact of modernization on the Turkish village of Balgat, and of two interesting chapters in which the author expounds his basic theses, e.g., 'high empathic capacity is the predominant personal style only in modern society, which is distinctively industrial, urban, literate and *participant*' (p. 50). The correlation between these factors is examined and a broad survey of the Middle Eastern countries, based on them, is made. The second part consists of studies on Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iran and a Retrospect and Prospect. The questionnaire and other material are given as Appendices.

The main concern of the book is with the impact of mass-media of communication on the three social types distinguished by the author: Traditionalists, Transitionalists, and Modernists. However, the emphasis varies from country to country—for example, more attention is paid to political factors in the chapters on Egypt and Syria than in those on Turkey and Lebanon—and many social and political questions are raised. In dealing with them, Professor Lerner, a

sociologist of distinction, has made full use of his materia and drawn on most of the available literature, reaching conclusions which cannot fail to stimulate the reader even if, like the present reviewer, he is unable to agree with some of them. The result is an extremely interesting and useful book which makes an important contribution in a hitherto sadly neglected field. CHARLES ISSAWI

FONDEMENTS HISTORIQUES DES PROBLÈMES DU MOYEN-ORIENT. By Fernand L'Huillier, Paris, Sirey, 1958. 122 pp. Maps. Bibliog. *Frs.* 900.

THIS little book affords a brief historical context for the affairs of the contemporary Middle East. The shadows of coming events are indicated in passing although the narrative is not carried beyond the year 1945. There are four sections, with an introduction which neatly summarises the area and its principal characteristics. A section on the nineteenth century—conveniently and legitimately prolonged to 1914—deals separately with the French, British, Russian, and German sides of the story. It ends with a section which, although it is headed 'La recherche spirituelle des Arabes', describes, along with the work of al-Afghani, Muhammad Abdu, and Mustafa Kamil, that of Zia Gökalp and the formation of the Committee of Union and Progress. The other three sections cover the developments of the period 1914–23 and the settlement imposed upon the Arabs: the emergence of Kemalist Turkey and of the new regime in Persia; inter-war developments in Arab lands, with surprisingly little reference to Arabia proper and the 'problems of western control'; and the events of the years 1939–45, with a characteristically neat summary of the Anglo-American differences which developed during those years. Careful and helpful attention to the development of ideas within the Middle East is maintained in all sections of the book. H. S. DEIGHTON

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1956–1957. Supplement to *World Economic Survey, 1957*. Mimeographed. New York, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs; London, H.M.S.O., 1958. xi+163 pp. Tables. $1.75. 12*s.* 6*d.* *Sw. frs.* 7.50.

INFLATIONARY and disinflationary pressures experienced by eight Middle East countries in the quinquennium 1953–7 are the main subjects of this supplement to the *World Economic Survey, 1957*. Country-by-country accounts are preceded by a brief regional summary, which contrasts the consistently inflationary trend in Israel and Turkey with the relative price stability in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria and with the intermediate position of Egypt and Iraq, where a rise in prices became prominent only in the last two years, and of Iran where, on the contrary, prices were stabilized at a high level about mid-way through the period under review. The usual account of recent economic developments in the region was sacrificed to this special study, but the relevant statistical information on all phases of economic activity has been brought up to date and expanded in a separate section containing thirty-two tables accompanied by brief descriptive notes. MARIANNE GELLNER

SUEZ AND AFTER: Year of Crisis. By Michael Adams. Cartoons by Low. Boston, Beacon Press, 1958. xi+225 pp. Maps. Index. $4.50.

As correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, Michael Adams has established a reputation as one of the most thoughtful and well-informed reporters of the contemporary Middle East scene. In this book he has brought together a number of his dispatches, linked with a narrative and commentary, to illustrate the Suez crisis and its aftermath. The book opens with a description of President Abdul Nasser's speech in Alexandria on 26 July, 1956, announcing the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, and ends with a summing-up of the Middle East outlook a year later, after the impact of Suez, the Eisenhower Doctrine, and the Jordan coup. A book in this form is inevitably rather shapeless,

uneven, and repetitive. But in addition to some excellent descriptive reporting, Mr Adams provides many sound comments on his general theme of Arab–Western relations. ROBERT STEPHENS

I SAW FOR MYSELF: The Aftermath of Suez. By Anthony Nutting. London, Hollis & Carter, 1958. viii+103 pp. 10s. 6*d*.

BILAN DE L'ÉQUIPÉE D'ÉGYPTE. By Bernard Laforesse. Paris, Éditions Ethéel, 1957. 158 pp. *Frs.* 450.

THE SUEZ CANAL COMPANY AND THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT ON 26TH JULY 1956. 2 parts. (26th July–15th September 1956.) 78 pp. (August 1956–May 1957.) 125 pp. Paris, London, Suez Canal Company, 1956 and 1957.

LE CANAL DE SUEZ 1854–1957. (In French and Arabic.) By B. Boutros-Ghali and Youssef Chlala. Alexandria, Al-Bassir for the Société Égyptienne de Droit International, 1958. 211 pp. Bibliog. *P.T.* 100.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE SUEZ CANAL STATUS: From 1869 up to 1956. A Historico-Juridical Study. By Benno Avram. Geneva, Librairie E. Droz; Paris, Librairie Minard, 1958. 170 pp. Bibliog. *Sw. frs.* 14.

MR NUTTING, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs at the time of Sir Anthony Eden's Government, who resigned because of disagreement with the British policy over Suez, wrote this book in the spring of 1957 after a whirlwind tour of the Middle East, financed by the *New York Herald Tribune*. In the summer of 1958, Mr Nutting's views on Iraq (p. 48) made melancholy reading:

> The Iraqis are buoyant, vigorous and going places. . . . They are writing a story of solid success with which the hollow bombast of Colonel Nasser's military clique will finally vie in vain. Iraq is ready to lead the Arab world in the ways of peace and plenty by the simple method of a good example and a bountiful result.

And his hints at a counter-coup in Syria against Colonel Serraj (p. 83), or at a co-ordinated Iraqi-Saudi Arabian agreement by which Iraq and Syria, on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and Jordan on the other should link up, with Abdullah becoming King of Syria (p. 84), seem today so much of a hubble-bubble pipe-dream as to destroy any faith in the author's judgement. This is a pity, for these pages contain much sensible observation which repays reading even today.

In *Bilan de l'équipée d'Égypte* Bernard Laforesse has written a book which, if printed in English, would not cause any surprise. In French, however, it is remarkable, comprising as it does the orthodox indictment of the Anglo-French ultimatum and expedition to Suez of November 1956 as 'une guerre perdue d'avance' (p. 55). It is worth reading if only for its misjudgement of Eden:

> Ce bourgeois anglais conformiste et sans imagination, elevé au rang de pair au crépuscule de sa carrière, . . . un conservateur non seulement par tempérament, mais surtout par son incapacité congénitale de s'adapter à l'évolution. Esprit médiocre mais méthodique, ce prototype du gentleman préfabriqué à Eton et à Oxford est sorti de l'anonymat grâce à ses excellentes manières, à son élégance vestimentaire et à son aspect distingué . . . (pp. 73–74).

Much can be said about the tragic figure of the last Prime Minister, but not surely this. M. Laforesse's main targets however are MM. Pineau and Mollet, whom he holds guilty for the loss of French cultural and intellectual primacy in the Arab world, a 'présence française' which could outlast France's political withdrawal in favour of Germany. 'Et tout celà, pour permettre à MM. Mollet et Pineau de continuer à pratiquer une politique, résumée récemment par Henri Frenay en un seul mot: "coco-rico" ' (p. 158).

In September 1956 and May 1957, the Suez Canal Company issued two small collections of documents (*The Suez Canal Company and the Decision taken by the Egyptian Government on 26th July 1956*) to prove to their shareholders that the directors had not been backward in protecting their interests, the real fault lying

with the statesmen who wrote the Company off immediately after the Canal's nationalization. Some of the more interesting documents are those (Part I, Ch. III) dealing with the Company's instructions to its employees in Egypt. They show the heavy pressure which was brought to bear on the Company to stay its first reaction to withdraw its employees from operating the Canal until the London Conference and the subsequent negotiations with Colonel Nasser in Cairo were ended. No light is thrown on the allegations made at the time of inducements offered to Company employees on leave not to return to Egypt. The second part covers the long and melancholy failure of the Canal Company to obtain any diplomatic support for its position other than promises to press for compensation, which, partly through its own efforts, the Company has now secured.

Dr Boutros-Ghali and M. Chlala have produced, in *Le Canal de Suez 1854–1957*, a detailed collection of documents, arranged chronologically, linked together by a commentary. The book must have been intended as a kind of Egyptian White Book. For all that it is surprisingly objective, although it accepts the Bromberger thesis without question. The only comment the authors permit themselves is in the conclusion to their introduction:

> En dernière analyse, la crise de Suez a marqué un tournant dans l'évolution des rapports entre le monde occidental et le monde afro-asiatique, et ce tournant coincide avec un moment où, malgré les apparences, le dialogue Orient-Occident pourrait reprendre cette fois-ci d'égal à égal.
>
> La nationalisation de la Compagnie du Canal de Suez apparait jusqu' ici dans toutes ses conséquences comme un acte hautement positif qui a permis à l'Egypte de prouver au monde que le courage, l'organisation et la compétence ne sont pas le monopole des seuls Occidentaux. Elle a permis au monde de prouver à l'Egypte qu'il existe une solidarité oecuménique et une conscience internationale.

Mr Avram's book on *The Evolution of the Suez Canal Status* is another of those competent Israeli surveys provoked by the Egyptian closure of the Canal to Israeli shipping. Its most novel and interesting feature is the examination of British practice and theory as revealed in the proceedings of the Prize Courts during the two World Wars, on which much of Egyptian prize court practice has been based. There is also a valuable little section on the arguments about closing the Canal to Italian shipping during the Italo-Abyssinian war of 1935–6, and an interesting comparison of the differences between the status of the Suez Canal and that of the Panama and Kiel Canals under the Versailles Treaty.

Despite the very wide range of material he has examined, the author does not come to any very definite conclusions, except that in barring the Canal to Israeli shipping Egypt was in breach of the Constantinople Convention. He does however point out (pp. 153–4) that this Convention

> . . . was based on three main principles; free passage for all ships at all times, respect for the terms of the Convention and observance of the rights reserved to the territorial Power within certain limitations. Since 1888, the means provided for the practical implementation of these three principles had become totally ineffective . . . efficient organs should be provided for the supervision and assurance of free passage, in the form conceived of in the 1888 Constantinople Convention. . . . An equitable solution acceptable to the territorial power and to the users of the Suez Canal should be sought in the principles of the United Nations Charter.

The pity is that Mr Avram preaches to the converted in the West, while in the Middle East his name will deny him a hearing. D. C. WATT

LE MAROC À L'ÉPREUVE. By Jean and Simonne Lacouture. Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1958. 384 pp. *Frs.* 1,200.

THIS is undoubtedly the best book yet written about modern, and particularly about post-independence, Morocco. The authors, who are husband and wife and have had long experience of Morocco as journalists and in other capacities, each contribute chapters on the subjects in which they are specially interested.

While fairly systematic treatment is given in many fields, such as agriculture and education, their account is in general based on the description of some particular scene or event and the conversations which it provoked with Moroccan acquaintances. One of the book's special merits is the sympathetic approach to Moroccan personalities; these are seen and portrayed as friends and acquaintances and not as the dehumanized stock figures (nationalists, agitators, extremists, moderates, and so forth) which appear in so many books dealing with the Arab world. The book is indispensable to anyone who wishes to understand the Morocco of today, its people, its problems, and its leaders.

NEVILL BARBOUR

L'ALGÉRIE OU LA GUERRE DES MYTHES. By Jacques Duquesne. Brussels, Desclée de Brouwer, 1958. 200 pp. *Bel. frs.* 80.

THIS book, by the editor of *La Croix*, was published after the revolution of 13 May 1958, to which it refers, but is in fact a general survey in which the May rising takes its place in the general picture. The author is a practising Christian, and moral considerations play a leading role in his estimate of the situation. For example, the French dilemma is well put. 'If', he says, 'it were a question of defending an undoubted portion of French territory against an aggressor, unity would be achieved at once. In fact, however, while one section of French opinion holds this to be the case, another does not, but considers the issue as a typical exercise in "decolonisation". In the latter case, the problem is one not of defending France but of deciding how French interests can best be served—and this is not necessarily by forcibly maintaining the links by which Algeria and France are at present united' (p. 174). A thoughtful and balanced survey.

NEVILL BARBOUR

LA RÉVOLUTION D'ALGER. By Henri Pajaud. Paris, Les 4 Fils Aymon, 1958. 153 pp. Illus. *Frs.* 600.

LA RÉVOLUTION DU 13 MAI. Avec les témoignages inédits de ses principaux acteurs. By Alain de Sérigny. Paris, Plon, 1958. 184 pp. Illus. *Frs.* 690.

LA RÉVOLUTION D'ALGER. By Raymond Dronne. Paris, Éditions France Empire, 1958. 238 pp. *Frs.* 480.

THESE three books are all more or less diaries of the events which began on 13 May 1958 and terminated with the assumption of power by General de Gaulle and his visit to Algeria. They are all written by enthusiastic supporters of the rising—a journalist from France, the editor of the *Écho d'Alger*, and a deputy from the French National Assembly.

M. Pajaud's book is a straightforward piece of reporting by a journalist whose previously formed views predisposed him strongly in favour of the demonstrations and their objective. The second, by M. Alain de Sérigny, is also the work of one whose mind was made up in advance, but is of much greater interest owing to the part which the author himself played in promoting and directing the course of events. Once a strong supporter of Marshal Pétain, his feelings on the subject of Algeria now turned him into a leading member of the pressure group working for the installation of General de Gaulle as redeemer of France. In the intervals of composing leading articles to forward this objective, his time was spent in cabling important personages, in flying to Paris to influence them in person, and in general in endeavouring to exert a decisive influence from the wings. He defends himself against the charge of being an *ultra*, but when he alleges that the wish of Algerians and, in the first place, of Muslim Algerians is that there shall no longer exist the least difference between the French of Mostaganem or Tizi Ouzou and the French of Bayonne or Nancy he ignores the fact that 100,000 Muslim Algerians have died in the last four years, and at least another 200,000 suffered exile, precisely because they do not wish to be Frenchmen at all. The fact should at least be recognized and taken into consideration.

M. Raymond Dronne was one of the only three deputies, out of a number who made their way to Algeria from France during the revolution, who were permitted to remain in the country, the other two being Jacques Soustelle and Arrighi, a Corsican deputy. Even in their case they were not accepted without considerable hesitation on the part of General Salan, and it is one of the most interesting points in M. Dronne's book to learn how near M. Soustelle himself was to being returned to Paris. In general M. Dronne is far more informative than M. de Sérigny about the internal difficulties and the disagreements which had to be overcome and his book is the more illuminating of the two for this reason. He is also more aware of, or at least more willing to admit, the enormous difficulties which remain to be overcome; and he discusses the issues in an interesting and relatively impartial manner. One point that stands out from these accounts is the debt which France owes to the cautious and calculating General Salan; more than any other person he seems to have been responsible for the avoidance of an open clash which could so easily have led to bloodshed or even to civil war.

NEVILL BARBOUR

LES REBELLES ALGÉRIENS. By Serge Bromberger. Paris, Plon, 1958. 278 pp. Maps. *Frs.* 750.

M. BROMBERGER is already known to the British public as the joint author of a brilliant piece of writing on the Anglo-French expedition to Suez. He has the gift of making journalistic writing as thrilling as a detective story. This book is no exception and the account of the breaking-up of the terrorist organization in Algiers city in the winter of 1956–7 makes fascinating reading. It would appear that the author has had much information collected by the French Intelligence Services at his disposal—and there is no doubt that much of it is authentic though, as in the case of the Suez book, it is difficult always to be sure what is fact and what is fiction. A more serious criticism is that every development in the organization of the Front of National Liberation is attributed to the effect of personal ambition or jealousy among the leaders or to the result of disagreement between Arab and Berber elements. In the case of a cause for which 100,000 Algerians have now sacrificed their lives, it is, on the contrary, to be expected that action must sometimes be attributable to genuine conviction and to the desire to further the general interest. The picture is thus partial, and too much that of the policeman or official towards the people whom it is his duty to arrest or to oppose. The book is nonetheless of great interest to students of the Algerian rebellion.

NEVILL BARBOUR

THE QUESTION. By Henri Alleg. Trans. from the French by John Calder. Preface by Jean-Paul Sartre. London, Calder, 1958. 96 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*

THIS is an English version of the French booklet *La Question*, published in France in 1957. In it the author gives an account of how French parachutists in Algiers tortured him for the purpose of extracting information—a purpose which in this case was not achieved. He thus describes an experience which has befallen a small number of Frenchmen and, it is said, Frenchwomen also, in Algeria, and a very large number of Muslim Algerians, during the last four years; and it is surely well that the world should know what methods have had to be employed in Algeria to maintain European rule there. The French original, we are told, sold 60,000 copies in the first fortnight after publication, but was later seized by the police, being the first book since the eighteenth century to suffer this fate in France for political reasons. In the English version the very powerful effect of the straightforward narrative of M. Alleg is weakened rather than heightened by the inclusion with it of an article by Jean-Paul Sartre, some of whose comments and deductions hardly seem justified by the narrative.

NEVILL BARBOUR

OLD ILLS AND NEW REMEDIES IN EGYPT: A comprehensive review of the different measures adopted in recent years to deal with the problems resulting from over-population. By Eva Garzouzi. Cairo, Dar al Maaref, 1957. 159 pp. Maps. Tables. Bibliog. 50 *piastres*.

THIS book usefully summarizes the social work which is being done—perhaps attempted is a better word—by the Nasser Government. As it is published in Egypt, it bears signs of the tact which the author has sometimes had to use in dealing with difficulties of execution. Nevertheless, a careful reading reveals clearly those points at which she has herself remarked how promise has fallen short of performance, and if she avoids emphasis on shortcomings, the statistics she has carefully amassed often bear witness to them. She remarks of resettlement projects at Abis that 'though there are several hundred settlers homes and several thousand feddans of reclaimed land ready for distribution, up to the time of writing only about 90 families are living in the newly created villages' (p. 123); and she asks a very pointed why. Her tables of costs reveal how the sharp slowing down after the Suez affair created financial problems and she shows that the remarkable Tahrir Province project is limited by the shortage of water—a fact which might have been obvious before £10 million was spent. Again, the ambitious programme for combined social, educational, and health centres in villages is obstructed by the lack of trained personnel. Yet the book makes clear that the Government is making a great effort on behalf of the common people in areas where there is little to gain in terms of effective political opinion and where results will require years of patient work. Eva Garzouzi, in short, has given a useful reminder that Nasser's Egypt is something more than the political circus its enemies represent it to be. There are some errors: a feddan is 1·038, not 1,038 acres, and the Egyptian pound is £1 0s. 6*d*. sterling, not £1 2s. 6*d*.

T. R. LITTLE

JORDAN. By Ann Dearden. London, Hale, 1958. 224 pp. Illus. Map. Tables. Bibliog. Index. 21s.

THE KINGDOM OF JORDAN. By Raphael Patai. Princeton University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1958. ix+315 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. $5. 40s.

THESE two books make a useful pair in that, by reading both, a student would get a good idea of Jordan's face and idiosyncrasies. To say that one provides the letter and the other the spirit of the place would be unfair to Mrs Dearden, for she too gives a great deal of information. But this she hands out with the affectionate tolerance of the British old-timer, appreciative of what can be done on a shoe-string, while Dr Patai sets his forth (as befits a director of research heading a team of first-class American, Arab, and Israeli inquirers) with the clinical competence that is needed for case history.

His preface claims to lay emphasis on 'the people'; he classifies them, but as individuals they escape him. His book is a handbook, and its value lies in its compression of accurate information on topics ranging from mineral resources to folk-dancing. His technique is well suited to the giving of economic data, and his economic chapters are his best.

Mrs Dearden is at a tremendous advantage over him in that she knows the country not just from case studies and analyses done by scholars swooping in to make reports, but from ten years of living in Arab countries, three of them spent in Amman. She likes Jordan, and knows that she is partial and at points too kind to it, but she has written a discerning book. Examples of the kind of home truths she singles out (points that may escape the student who thumbs the neat mass of Dr Patai's card indexes) are best illustrated by quotation; for instance, 'Thanks to a special grant from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund . . . Transjordan became a country of peasant proprietors long before other Arab states had even begun to think of land reform' (p. 53), and—no doubt a corollary

—'the left wing in Jordan is exclusively concerned with foreign policy' (p. 165). Most of her personal portraits are good likenesses; altogether, she has done a work of human understanding. ELIZABETH MONROE

ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINE ARABS. By Don Peretz. Foreword by Roger Baldwin. Washington, D.C., The Middle East Institute, 1958. xi+264 pp. Bibliog. Index. $5.

DR PERETZ, an American Jewish scholar and journalist who shares the belief in Arab–Jewish co-operation of the late Dr Judah Magnes of the Hebrew University, has attempted in this book a detailed and dispassionate survey of the relations between the State of Israel and the Palestine Arabs. He deals both with the treatment of the Arab minority now in Israel and with the question of the Palestine Arab refugees still in other Arab countries. He describes the central role of the refugee problem in the failure of the early peace talks between Israel and the Arab States and the repeated efforts made since then with little success to deal with the problem piecemeal and non-politically, through limited repatriation and compensation proposals and attempts at resettlement in the Arab States. With careful documentation, chiefly from Israeli and United Nations sources, he gives a clear picture of the gradual hardening of Israeli policy against repatriation of the refugees on national security grounds and a disturbing account of the extent to which the same grounds have been used to justify discrimination against the Arabs in Israel herself. The chapters on absentee property contain some striking details of the very large part which has been played in Israel's economic development and immigration policies by lands, industries, houses, indeed whole towns and villages, formerly owned, worked, and populated by Palestine Arabs. The attitudes of both Israelis and Arabs are described with a careful impartiality, and in many respects this is the most thorough and useful book on its subject that has yet appeared. Perhaps a fuller account of the present position of the Arab refugees in their various countries of exile, not merely from a statistical or political but from a human and social point of view, would have made this sober but sympathetic report on a national tragedy even more complete. ROBERT STEPHENS

THE EXILED AND THE REDEEMED: The Strange Jewish 'Tribes' of the Orient. By Itzhak Ben-Zvi. Trans. from the Hebrew by Isaac A. Abbady. Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society of America, 1957; London, Vallentine, Mitchell, 1958. xiv+334 pp. Illus. Index. $4. 30s.

THE author of this book is the second President of the State of Israel. He has been deeply interested all his life in the Jews of the Mediterranean basin and the Middle East. His many essays on this subject, originally published separately in Hebrew, were collected and published in a single Hebrew volume.

The volume contains extracts from the author's own diaries of his visits to Persia and Aden. It also includes accounts of the Jewish sovereign States that, strange to relate, have existed in the Diaspora at one time or another, for longer or shorter periods. These run all the way from ancient Mesopotamia to eighteenth century Surinam. Mr Ben-Zvi also deals at some length with the Jewish traditions that still persist among Muslim tribes in Arabia, Persia, and Afghanistan. But the longest section of the book concerns the ancient Jewish communities that still manage to exist in Muslim countries today—in Yemen, North Africa, the Caucasus, Bokhara, and Persia. The security of these Jewish communities was weakened over the decades by the Christian Armenian massacre and the Christian Assyrian massacre; and by the annihilation by Hitler of millions of Jews in European countries, traditionally protectors of the Jews in the Middle East. This sense of insecurity was immeasurably increased by the Arab–Israeli war. Israel, however, was also the beacon, and hundreds of thousands of Middle Eastern Jews emigrated thither forthwith.

Mr Ben-Zvi has done much for the study of these immigrants and their integration into the general community of Israel. He has assisted in the establishment of the Ben-Zvi Institute, housed in the new buildings of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Here research scholars may consult the manuscripts and books that have been collected on the subjects dealt with in this volume.

EDWIN SAMUEL

FORBIDDEN FRONTIERS. By W. Byford-Jones. London, Hale, 1958. 188 pp. Illus. Index. 21s.

THIS book describes episodes and journeys occurring in the course of a visit by the author—not his first—to Israel in 1957. The style, in spite of the writer's admitted eagerness for 'incidents which had an anecdotal quality' (p. 77), is undistinguished and more than suggestions of banality, or ignorance, are given in parts of the narrative—the listening to a muezzin who continues the call to prayer for *half an hour* (p. 87), the comment that a glimpse of the shore of Galilee 'reminds me of the Bible' (p. 144), a character possessing 'the dark, heavy eyelids of the Asiatic' (p. 86), the repeated attribution to the word 'Semitic' of a racial or moral significance which it does not properly possess, and so on. But such lapses, and the more serious lack of background knowledge of the Islamic world, or of any adequate appreciation (as far as appears) of the instructed Arab viewpoint, do not deprive the book of all value. On the contrary, Colonel Byford-Jones is, within his limits, an authentic, extrovert, and interested observer, who cheerfully faces much discomfort, mixes with all types, and sees for himself; and, though his interests and preferences are overwhelmingly pro-Israel, he is not unwilling to talk to Arabs. The descriptions of the birth and growth of Eilat, of near-frontier travel, of the hard, dangerous, and depressingly collectivized life in the *kibbutz* settlements, and the infinitely mixed human types they contain (some of whom the author well characterises), are of real interest and will increase most readers' knowledge of the facts of life in countryside Israel.

S. H. LONGRIGG

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ISRAELI SOCIALISM AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE. By Julius Braunthal. Foreward by J. B. Kripalani. London, Lincolns-Prager, 1958. 46 pp.

THIS pamphlet is written by the former secretary of the Socialist International. A foreword is provided by the leader of the Praja Socialist Party of India. The first part describes the *Histadrut* (the General Federation of Jewish Labour) and its complex of component parts, including the *kibbutz*, one of Israel's major contributions to Socialist living. In the second part, having established Israel's right to exist, the author attempts to solve the Arab–Israeli dispute. He calls on the Socialists on both sides to display Socialist unity and tolerance in place of nationalist rivalry and hatred.

EDWIN SAMUEL

ISRAELI SHIPPING AND FOREIGN TRADE. By Baruch Boxer. Research Paper No. 48. University of Chicago, Department of Geography, 1957. x+162 pp. Illus. Maps. Tables. Bibliog.

MARITIME shipping has special significance for Israel since the country is almost entirely dependent on sea routes in her foreign trade. This study describes the history and development of the Israeli merchant marine, assesses the part played by foreign-flag shipping, and considers Israeli port facilities. Among the main points made by the author is the necessity for Israel to develop new markets in Africa and the Far East, and the consequent importance of continuing efforts to expand Israel's own shipping tonnage, which in 1955 still carried little more than one-fifth of the cargo handled in Israeli ports.

MARIANNE GELLNER

AFRICA

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICA: Report of the Group of Experts presented to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. Strasbourg, Council of Europe; London, H.M.S.O., 1957. 69 pp. Tables. 7*s*. 6*d*.

THE intention of this Study Group, in which Mr Arthur Gaitskell was the British representative, was to devise a system for 'the development of Africa built around collaboration on an equal footing between the African countries and the member countries of the Council of Europe' (p. 8). The report is concise, and moderate in tone, and is supported by some useful statistics on the pattern of African trade with Europe, including factors for assessing the effect upon Africa of the Common Market policy. After examining the principal problems such as the stabilization of prices and the organization of markets the Study Group recommended that an 'effort of cooperation is amply justified' with mechanism 'largely similar to that of the Colombo Plan' (p. 45). The report concludes with tentative proposals for such a mechanism. C. E. CARRINGTON

THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA. Final ed. Background papers prepared for the use of participants, and the Final Report of the Thirteenth American Assembly, Arden House, Harriman Campus of Columbia University, Harriman, New York, May 1–4, 1958. The American Assembly, Columbia University, 1958. xiv+252 pp. Maps. Tables. Hard cover copy $1.25. Paper $1.

BACKGROUND papers prepared for a conference commonly make dull reading. So remarkable, however, is the change in the American view of Africa in the last ten years that the contents of this book are far from dull. Professor Emerson of Harvard leads off with the admission that America has just discovered Africa and has not found there what was expected. 'The basic assumptions of all the earlier and leftward theory of imperialism make inescapable the conclusion that the free countries should be well ahead of the colonies which have by definition been ground under the imperial heel. Much testimony bears witness to the contrary' (p. 12). From this admission the contributors proceed to consideration of the little that America has done for Africa, the little she can do by political pressures, and the much that remains to be done by way of social and economic development. The chapters dealing with political and administrative problems are well-arranged and accurate. While they add nothing to the information available in the authorities usually consulted by British students, they will be invaluable to American students. The economic sections, especially the chapter by Mr Kamarck of Johns Hopkins University, contain an admirable analysis of American trade, aid, and investment in Africa which is not to be found elsewhere. The statistical tables and maps with which this little volume concludes are of great interest. C. E. CARRINGTON

SCIENCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICA: A Review of the contribution of physical and biological knowledge south of the Sahara. By E. B. Worthington. Foreword by Paul Henry. Prepared at the request of the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara (C.C.T.A.) and the Scientific Council for Africa South of the Sahara (C.S.A.), 1958. xix+462 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. 30*s*.

IN the last twenty years science has probably accomplished more in the development of Africa than in the whole preceding period. This successor to the author's *Science in Africa* (1938) reviews the principal achievements in physics and biology and describes the organizations which now foster scientific research. It is not a comprehensive catalogue; instead it is a broad survey, illuminated by vivid examples. Authoritative and readable, it should be of great value to the specialist seeking information outside his speciality and to the general public interested in making Africa less of a zoo and more of a farm. RICHARD GRAY

THE WEALTH OF NIGERIA. By G. Brian Stapleton. London, Oxford University Press, 1958. xii+228 pp. Maps. Tables. Bibliog. Index. 16s.

THE author, Lecturer in Economics at the Nigerian College of Technology and formerly a regional tutor of the Extra-Mural Department of University College, Ibadan, has attempted an objective, factual analysis of the problems of Nigerian development 'in a form which, whilst not superficial, will be easily readable and useful to a wide public: to teachers, business men, clerks, politicians, students and all those who have the well-being of their country, and indeed themselves, at heart' (p. vii). Readers elsewhere must remember, and allow for the fact, that the prime audience is reckoned to be in Nigeria, and that the book has been dedicated, as it is directed, 'to my students'. Undoubtedly the book gains more than it loses through its preoccupation with the needs and understanding of the citizens of the country with whose wealth it is concerned. There is a freshness and a stimulus in the approach that makes the text both readable and enlightening.

First, the resources of the Federation are described: its agriculture against the essential background of climate, soils, and vegetation; its minerals and power supplies; the size, composition, and distribution of the population; and the 'social capital' of the public services, with special reference to the all-important and still far from adequate system of internal communications. The country's national income is then evaluated and the principles of economic development are applied to the specific circumstances of Nigeria. The author helpfully compares Nigerian conditions with those elsewhere and so illustrates both the quite considerable possibilities and the very real limitations of the Nigerian economy. Thus the way is paved for the final chapters which are, in essence, an expanded and illuminating commentary upon the 'integrated development programme' of the International Bank Mission. Some reference is made to a succession of subjects to which the attention of the citizens of the Federation ought to be directed. They include the problems of agricultural labour and methods and of land tenure, the obstacles facing industrialization, the role of foreign capital, Marketing Boards, and expatriate personnel, and the present inadequacy of the system of taxation.

The author often expresses himself as forcibly to his readers as he must do to his classes. With reference to political developments he writes (p. 207), 'It is emphatically not true . . . that self-government will immediately and automatically lead to an increase in the wealth of the country. . . . Complete economic freedom is impossible for Nigeria'. In the same strain he states categorically (p. 211) that, whatever the political necessity, the splitting of Nigeria into Regions 'is economically a backward step' and 'to divide the country still further would only lead towards economic chaos'.

The book is illustrated by a series of maps, all but one reproduced directly from two well-known sources, K. M. Buchanan and J. C. Pugh's *Land and People in Nigeria* and the International Bank Mission Report. Many of the latter's maps have been over-reduced to the point of being illegible. Maps specially prepared for the author's text would have been much better and more helpful. Could not the O.U.P. be introduced to its own atlas-making Cartographic Department for guidance in what is surely a very important side of book production?

R. W. STEEL

NAISSANCE D'UN ÉTAT AFRICAIN. LE GHANA: La Gold Coast de la colonisation à l'indépendance. By Jacques Boyon. Preface by Georges Balandier. Paris, Armand Colin, 1958. xiv+274 pp. Maps. Charts. Bibliog. (Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 93.)

THIS careful, if somewhat pedestrian, account of Ghana is based on a study of documents in London and a brief visit to West Africa. It consists of 16 pages of introduction, geographical and historical; 78 pages of economic analysis, stress-

ing the fragility and rigidity of a monoculture of cocoa; 92 pages of social and political analysis, stressing the opposition of town and country, and recapitulating some of the stages of the political history of the last ten years; and 76 pages of 'solutions to actual problems', with a chapter on *mise en valeur*, another on actual development plans including the Volta River project, a third on the implications as regards labour and *étatisme*, and yet another on political problems and education. The annexes include party political programmes, development tables, the education scheme, and a fairly full bibliography of recent works. M. Boyon's conclusions are that the struggle is now for economic independence; the country's existence is still only symbolic, as it has no economic policy, no Volta scheme, no national feeling, and the events of the autumn of 1957 cast doubts on its 'democracy'; its independence is of less danger to French Africa than was expected; but its success is important to the rest of colonial Africa, which will follow its path, if that is at all possible. H. V. L. SWANZY

THE NEW GHANA: The Birth of a Nation. By J. G. Amamoo. London, Pan Books, 1958. xi+145 pp. Bibliog. 2*s*. 6*d*.

THIS modest and well-written account of the last ten years in Ghana, the work of a young Fante historian and journalist of 27, has already sold 45,000 copies in England and Ghana, and for that reason alone is important. On the whole it is well-balanced, with a perfectly clear view of the principal lions in the path of development, and a useful summary of the main stages of the Independence struggle. Its limitations are due partly to space, and partly perhaps to the need to satisfy the two kinds of readership, in England and in Ghana. It seems to contain few inaccuracies, beyond a reference to the Volta scheme as actual (on a mountain in Eastern Ghana, instead of in Ashanti), the treating of the myth of Tetteh Quarshie as historical, and the assumption of British rule as starting in 1844. There is also the limitation that it was completed in July 1957, and may read a little optimistically in the light of subsequent events. But all in all, it is a clear piece of work, reflecting credit on the author and on the Ghana University College, where he graduated. Incidentally, the small but useful appendices pay tribute to the paper prepared at the time of Independence by the Information Department at Chatham House.[1] H. V. L. SWANZY

VOICES OF GHANA: Literary Contributions to the Ghana Broadcasting System 1955–57. Compiled by Henry Swanzy. Accra, Government Printer for the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1958. 266 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.

THOUGH not in the strict sense a contribution to international affairs, this book deserves notice as the first appearance of a Ghanaian national literature. It consists of original compositions in verse and prose contributed to broadcast programmes by citizens of Ghana. Most are in English but some are specimens of the six African languages used by the Ghana Broadcasting System. This is no place for literary criticism and it will suffice to say that here are fresh, lively, and genuine voices from Africa. The historical note on Ghanaian languages by Henry Swanzy should interest British readers. C. E. CARRINGTON

L'ÉVOLUTION POLITIQUE ET JURIDIQUE DE L'UNION FRANÇAISE DEPUIS 1946. By François Borella. Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, R. Pichon et R. Durand-Auxias, 1958. 499 pp. Tables. *Frs*. 4,200.

M. BORELLA gives a detailed exposition of the evolution of the French Union, considered in relation to the legal texts by which it was instituted. Those who wish to study the subject from this aspect will derive great profit from his narrative. He shows that developments in French overseas territories and in Algeria by no means always corresponded to the theories which the legislation creating

[1] *Ghana: A Brief Political and Economic Survey* (Oxford University Press, 1957).

the Union was supposed to embody. For example, the Algerian Assembly created by the Statute of 1947 theoretically contained the germs of a parliament and a local executive. In practice, however, a congenital vice which afflicted it rendered it incapable of bringing to birth the reforms with which it was pregnant —such as the liberation of the Islamic religion from State interference, the suppression of the 'communes mixtes', and the institution of Arabic education. 'It failed ever to be effective because the elections to it were a swindle' (p. 226). Thus when it was dissolved and brought to an end as a political institution by M. Guy Mollet's Government on 12 April 1956, 'the situation in Algeria still remained precisely as it had been before the Statute' (p. 227).

Two basic facts about the French Union, according to M. Borella, are that it was established unilaterally by the action of the French Government and that many of its provisions appeared to be 'inspired more by the desire to design a façade which would mask the continuation of the former situation than by a determination to create a new framework' (p. 451). Not of course that great changes did not ensue; but, in the author's view, the French Union did not establish a durable new regime but acted simply as a 'stage in decolonization'; it created a 'new power relationship, not an association founded on mutual confidence'. After an exhaustive study, he concludes that there is no magic virtue in the word federalism either. A community is created not by legal enactments, but by common feelings and common interests except where, as in the case of the Soviet Union, it is the result of a common ideology applied by the methods of totalitarianism. His own preference is not to draw up a new Constitution but simply to abolish existing dispositions and build a community by a series of bilateral, negotiated agreements between France and the various overseas territories.

NEVILL BARBOUR

L'AFRIQUE NOIRE DEVANT INDÉPENDANCE. By Africanus. Paris, Plon, 1958. 82 pp. (Tribune Libre. 26.) *Frs.* 300.

THE anonymous author of these interesting reflections on the limitations of the reforms instituted in 1956–7 in French tropical Africa is apparently a senior official whose views his publishers claim are shared by many of his colleagues. The reforms are confused and frustrating and will have to give way to more complete self-government, but at the same time neither French nor African opinion is prepared for complete independence although, to an unprejudiced mind, that would be the course of common sense. Equality of status is the essential basis for future co-operation and at bottom the passionate African insistence on its achievement is even more psychological than political. In this context, the author correctly emphasizes the effect in the French territories proper of the greater concessions made to the Trust Territories (Togoland and Cameroons), a factor which events have subsequently reinforced. He is concerned to point out that French investment and technical assistance will be no less essential after full self-government is secured if Franco-African co-operation is to be maintained; and does not, perhaps, do justice to the tide of feeling against continuing French overseas financial aid or to the considerable practical difficulties of maintaining an adequate supply of technical and administrative personnel once existing cadres are allowed to disappear. He has no illusions about the difficulty of a constitutional democracy in providing effective government in an underdeveloped territory and suggests that a presidential system and measures to obviate the multiplication of parties are the most hopeful possibilities. (He might have mentioned that the French system of multi-member constituencies with single-list voting, as used in the African territories, in fact greatly assists large parties.) His wise words on the importance of 'strong government' (pp. 75–82) might with advantage be studied by some of Dr Nkrumah's less percipient critics in this country.

KENNETH ROBINSON

L'ITINÉRAIRE DES PARTIS AFRICAINS DEPUIS BAMAKO. By André Blanchet. Paris, Plon, 1958. 205 pp. *Frs.* 690.

RECENT events in France and in the French Union already necessitate a revision of this book. Nevertheless, the political development of French Black Africa did not begin at Algiers on 13 May 1956; if one is to try to find a starting-point for this development, certainly a convenient place to begin would be the Congress which the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (R.D.A.) and other representative groups held in Bamako in September 1957; and for an understanding of what has happened in the African territories since General de Gaulle has been in power one must go back at least as far as Bamako, and to the discussion which took place there.

It is rather a confused picture, and one may criticize the author for not having made it simpler. He describes rather than explains the conflicting political groups and trade union movements. He clearly considers that much of the disagreement can be explained in terms of the leading political personalities, such as Houphouët-Boigny, Senghor, Lamine Guèye, and Sekou Touré; one wonders whether a discussion of the situation of particular territories would not have clarified much of the apparent confusion. Monsieur Blanchet does not hesitate to explain Houphouët-Boigny's refusal to accept a federal executive at Dakar in terms of the special position of the Ivory Coast (pp. 87 ff.) and this method could usefully have been applied to other areas (Dahomey for example). One is struck by the extent to which the author describes an activity which is purely political, and taken up with problems of political organization; yet behind the argument of federalism *versus* secession, there are economic considerations which might well have been discussed at greater length.

However, it is obvious that the political life of the territories is in process of rapid development—this is a movement which is of considerable importance in itself; but, just as the French territories have been influenced by events in Ghana and Nigeria, it may now be their turn to influence areas beyond their frontiers. It is to be hoped that a revised edition of this book can be translated into English.

DOUGLAS JOHNSON

L'AFRIQUE RÉVOLTÉE. By Albert Tevoedjre. Preface by Alioune Diop. Paris, Présence Africaine, 1958. 157 pp. *Frs.* 650.

THE books about French Africa which analyse the political parties or describe the economics are indispensable; nevertheless, they are incomplete, and one must turn to such pamphlets as this in order to increase one's understanding. This is the sort of bitter and passionate writing which causes Europeans to talk of ingratitude, and which worries many African politicians; at the same time it is representative of a certain type of African intellectual, and more moderate opinions are sometimes obliged to make concessions towards this clear and simple attitude.

Albert Tevoedjre denounces 'colonialism' and metropolitan France; he attacks the system which, after three hundred years of French 'presence' in Senegal, permits only 10 per cent of Senegalese children to go to school (p. 61); he does not believe that any social or economic progress is possible until political independence has been granted; he therefore refuses to accept the principle of the *loi-cadre* or, indeed, any principle which implies 'association' with France. At the same time he denounces the dangers to which Africans are subject—regionalism, corruption, forms of ideological dictatorship. Not the least interesting part of this violent book is the section where the author describes the role that Christianity can play in the new Africa. It would seem that this particular brand of nationalism not only has its eyes fixed on Dr Nkrumah or Cairo and Moscow, but also on the Vatican.

DOUGLAS JOHNSON

THE LAST TREK: A Study of the Boer People and the Afrikaner Nation. By Sheila Patterson. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957. viii+336 pp. Bibliog. Index. 28s.

THE emergence of Dr Verwoerd as Premier of South Africa gives new point to the argument of this good-humoured and well-written book. Sensitive though the South Africans are to criticism they can have no cause for complaint that Miss Patterson fails to appreciate their point of view. If the book, she writes, 'gives non-Afrikaners sufficient material for a revision of their ideas, and provokes sufficient irritation among Nationalist Afrikaners to induce them to write more about themselves for outside consumption, it will have served its purpose' (p. vii). She does not burden the book with much political history but allots her space to the emergence of Afrikaner nationality in the aftermath of the Boer War. In those years Afrikaans as a literary language provided a new unity at a time when the traditional 'Boer' culture was being modified by the growth of industrialism. The conflict between the heroic, if obscurantist, myth of the Afrikaner nationalists and the realities of urban society is the real problem which Dr Verwoerd, the straitest of his sect, must now resolve. 'It seems probable that the future of the Afrikaner people, and indeed of South Africa as a multi-racial country, may turn on this internal tug-of-war between profits and principles' (p. 175).

C. E. CARRINGTON

DURBAN: A Study in Racial Ecology. By Leo Kuper and others. Introduction by Alan Paton. London, Cape, 1958. 254 pp. Diagrams. Map. Tables. Index. 21s.

THIS is a book written in generous anger at injustice. The application to Durban of the Group Areas Act would mean—if the Report of the Technical Sub-Committee had been approved—moving from their houses, in round figures, some 70,000 Indians; 8,500 Coloureds; 40,000 Africans; and 12,000 Europeans. Indians, Africans, and Europeans are each about one-third of Durban's population. There had been talk of equality of sacrifice, which had emboldened the Sub-Committee to make their recommendations, but Indians are not represented on the City Council, while Europeans are. The Council modified the proposals so that about 3,100 Europeans would be affected—more than half being from one Government-owned estate—and displacement was 'virtually confined to non-Europeans' (p. 194).

And it is an injustice based on absurdity; it proceeds on the assumption—at variance with those of Town Planning authorities in the rest of the world—that keeping races apart will promote harmony between them. Yet from time to time adherents of this peculiarly South African doctrine betray themselves. ' "What is the use" ', asked the late Prime Minister of South Africa, ' "of having a law to deal with mixed marriages, if we have conditions . . . where Europeans and Non-Europeans live alongside each other, . . . where the children play together in the streets and where the colour feelings of the Europeans are becoming dulled . . .?" ' (p. 216). (Quoted from House of Assembly Debates, p. 7724.)

Generous anger and a consciousness of absurdity, however, are not proper emotions for sociologists. Much of this book is taken up with charts, graphs, and tables which go to show that some parts of Durban are occupied by rich white people and other parts by poor brown people; no doubt it is desirable that this conclusion (which a casual visitor will reach in his first twenty-four hours) should be confirmed by figures—but the question arises whether analysis need really be so minute. And an even more displeasing question obtrudes itself. Professor Kuper indicates (pp. 215–16) certain fields in which research should be undertaken; these would be valuable studies where minds are still open to conviction, but where the concept of justice has become so distorted one begins to wonder whether social research can ever be translated into action, whether in

conditions so disheartening it may not become so unreal as to be meaningless. But such questions must have been asked at the beginning of every period of revolution.

PHILIP MASON

SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

INDIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS, FEBRUARY 1950–DECEMBER 1953: A Review of India's Foreign Relations. By K. P. Karunakaran. London, Oxford University Press for the Indian Council of World Affairs, 1958. 266 pp. Bibliog. Index. 27*s.* 6*d.*

THIS is the second volume in a series sponsored by the Indian Council of World Affairs, the first of which, also written by K. P. Karunakaran, covered the years 1947–50. The hard core of this volume treats of the revolution in China, the peace treaties with Japan, and the war in Korea, but it also reviews the range of India's relations with neighbouring States, notably Pakistan and Nepal, and with international organizations. One important chapter deals with the emergence of the Asian-African group, another with India's external economic relations. The author detects a new trend in India's relations with other States by the close of his period. There was nothing very pronounced, but Indo-Soviet relations 'though still limited, showed greater signs of cordiality' (p. 239) and, despite misgivings over China's Tibetan policy in 1950, there were also indications of developing Indo-Chinese understanding. Such trends 'did not substantially change the basic fact that India's external economic relations in general, and commercial ties in particular, were primarily with the Western countries and not with the Soviet bloc' (p. 240). But equally, since the political questions on which India and the Western nations, and especially the United States, differed vitally were concerned with peace and war, the importance of this shift in emphasis was not to be discounted. It represents, though the author does not say so, a partial but significant failure of Western diplomacy in Asia, deriving largely, one suspects, from a continuing failure to comprehend the viewpoints and dominant interests of the new Asia.

In these respects Shri Karunakaran's review, written with a bias that assists understanding, has an importance of its own. It is well documented, contains much information not readily accessible to Western students, and is clearly arranged and presented. One's principal criticism is that it is not probing enough. There is, for example, a reasonably detailed account of the Iranian oil crisis and of the Egyptian revolution with the consequent intensified pressure upon Britain to evacuate Suez, but in both instances without reference to Indian interests. But might they not be affected, either favourably or unfavourably, quite apart from whether there was a solution acceptable to nationalist sentiment, and was no consideration given to the probable consequences for India? The balance between 'world affairs' and the particular country with which a particular volume deals poses major questions of purpose and presentation, and while in this case they are generally happily resolved, the earlier chapters would have gained in value and significance, at least for non-Indian readers, by being more firmly anchored to Indian policies, interests, and attitudes.

NICHOLAS MANSERGH

THE MAKING OF THE INDIAN NATION. By B. G. Gokhale. Bombay, Calcutta, New Delhi, Madras, Asia Publishing House, 1958. 355 pp. Bibliog. Index. *Rs.* 15.50.

THIS book is an interesting example of a new approach to Indian history now being increasingly adopted by the younger generation of Indian historians. Sardar Panikkar may perhaps be regarded as the leader of this school, which seeks to interpret Indian history in terms of culture rather than of politics and

to assess objectively the contribution of foreign influences to the sum total of Indian life. Polemical writing, whether in defence of ancient India or in criticism of foreign activities and influences, is notable for its absence; there is an attempt to understand rather than to advertise or to condemn.

The present book is a good example of the class. It is divided into two parts. The first provides a brief historical survey from Harappa to modern India, the second deals with 'ideals and institutions' and the place of India in the modern world. With the book's emphasis on the recent past it is inevitable that it should be largely concerned with the impact of the modern West upon Indian society; in Part II there is an interesting exposition of some of its main features and an attempt to measure the effect of Western influence upon it. The treatment is discursive rather than profound and the author widely read rather than deeply versed in any one aspect of the subject. But he is thoughtful, fair-minded, and aware of many of the issues involved, and the book can be recommended as a useful contribution to the understanding of modern India.

PERCIVAL SPEAR

THE FIRST PUNJABIS: History of the First Punjab Regiment 1759–1956. By Major Mohammad Ibrahim Qureshi. Prologue by Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck. Aldershot, Gale & Polden, 1958. xix+484 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. 30s.

IN the war of 1939–45, the Indian Army became the largest army ever raised without conscription; its best troops were of superlative quality. Yet hardly any of the rank and file could have said what they were fighting for and many of the Indian officers were deeply divided between two loyalties, of which both were creditable. What held them together was regimental tradition and personal affections, emotions proved on a score of battlefields to be capable of triumphing over nationalism as well as over privation and the fear of wounds and death. Here British and Indians became comrades as nowhere else; here is one of the finest traditions we left India. How did this miracle come about? The answer must lie in the history of the regiments.

To write a regimental history is a difficult task; it is perhaps more difficult to persuade anyone not a specialist to read it. The historian will be judged by his mastery of details and is certain to be challenged if he slips by a hairsbreadth off the path of minute accuracy; further, he has to deal in this spirit with a number of battalions which have been engaged in different campaigns. Yet this accumulation of details is the stuff from which history is made. Major Qureshi has dealt in this volume (so far as one who is not a specialist can judge) admirably with the detail and is aware of the wider issues, though he does not stray into discussing them. His book is a model of what such a book should be; it keeps early history in balance with recent and gives re-organization its due place against battlefields. No one interested in the history of British India should ignore the Indian Army; the historian ought to have read at least one regimental history, and there can be no better regiment with which to start than the senior regiment of the old Indian Army.

PHILIP MASON

THE ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN. By J. Russell Andrus and Azizali F. Mohammed. London, Karachi, Dacca, Oxford University Press, 1958. xviii+517 pp. Tables. Map endpapers. Index. 45s.

UNTIL the publication of this work students of Pakistan's economy have had to rely on the volume *Pakistan* in the series of Overseas Economic Surveys published by H.M.S.O. under the auspices of the Board of Trade. And a very excellent survey that was. But events are moving fast in Pakistan, and an economic survey which—drawing on a great deal of new statistical material—carries

the story on from May 1954 (the date of the Board of Trade survey) to the middle of 1957 is greatly to be welcomed. The authors have indeed collected and appraised a considerable mass of material relevant to Pakistan's present and future economic prospects.

The appraisal would perhaps be better for a more objectively critical approach. We read, for example (p. 163), that 'every possible assistance and facility has been provided for industrial development . . . fiscal policies in this connection call for tariff protection in carefully justified cases and for liberal tax incentives to industry—particularly new industry'. This bears too much resemblance to a Government prospectus, and the sad fact is that industrial enterprise in Pakistan has found to its cost that official practice differs a great deal from precept. As for the 'liberal tax incentives', the 1958 budget has placed an intolerable burden on companies in general. This was an aberration which the authors of this book could not, of course, have foreseen. Nor can they justly be blamed for the unhappy falsification of their estimate (p. vii of the Preface) that there was a fair prospect, at the time of writing, that the country's external accounts could be balanced. But the fact is that Pakistan's economic situation was, and is, considerably more precarious than they realized.

As a factual survey the book is admirably comprehensive and accurate—so much so that it can be described as indispensable for students of the subject. Attention should however be drawn to a mistake of some significance: the splendid soda ash factory at Khewra, a show place in what was previously a derelict area of the Punjab, is described (p. 181) as having been set up after Partition, whereas in fact it is a pre-1947 venture. It is interesting to watch the growth of the legend that everything worth having in Pakistan began after 1947!

F. M. INNES

BUILDING A WELFARE STATE IN BURMA 1948–1956. By Frank N. Trager. New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958. x+118 pp. $4.

THIS work is substantially a re-issue of *Toward a Welfare State in Burma* (1954), noticed by the present writer in this Journal in July 1955 (p. 397). Former criticisms still apply in wide measure, though this is a much more attractive publication. Some stylistic obscurities and short-cuts have been eliminated; some remain. As an account of the annexation of Upper Burma we are offered the following (p. 52): 'The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation (teak) was affronted by the King of Burma and so, it is disingenuously told, the British took the third and final bite of Burma.' Tables and other statistical matter have been corrected and now cover the period up to 1955–6: a useful source of reference to figures otherwise available only in Burma Government publications. Of the original work, it was suggested that Professor Trager's analysis of economic planning and performance lacked realism, contact with actuality. This is now less noticeable. The author underlines emphatically the necessity for the Burma Government to devote more attention to agriculture as first priority. Yet one pre-condition for agricultural expansion will be the provision of an adequate substitute for the former commercial credit system of the chettyars, now demolished. This need has not been squarely recognized by the Burma Government, nor by Professor Trager, who states that it is 'on the road to solution' (p. 39). The penultimate chapter, 'The Development Goals for 1960', has been much expanded, and the author shows courage in probing into some of the failures of foreign aid and advice. Of the K.T.A. Master Plan, he writes (p. 106): 'It was costly and over-ambitious because American technical know-how is often inclined to ignore or belittle the social, psychological and cultural aspects of underdevelopment and automatically and impatiently tends to apply the standards of advanced technology.' He believes, however, that 'It served as a springboard for the future'. Many will doubt whether this is really true.

HUGH TINKER

MALAYA: A Political and Economic Appraisal. By Lennox A. Mills. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1958. xi+234 pp. Index. $4.75. 30s.

PROFESSOR MILLS has provided a succinct description of the political development of Malaya and Singapore since 1945, an operation undertaken by the British Government with the object of achieving the independence of these territories with the minimum delay and in the face not only of the divisive forces of Malay and Chinese nationalism but also of the Communist rebellion. His account of the landmarks in this development is particularly useful, and he has taken pains to ensure a well-informed interpretation of the events. The treatment, for example, of the less well-known period of the late Sir Henry Gurney's regime (1948–51) puts in perspective the watershed period of recuperation from the political upheavals of the Malayan Union immediately after the war.

Professor Mills presents his study as a political and economic appraisal. The prospects it suggests are none too promising. The state of the rubber and tin industries does not seem to be sufficiently secure to sustain a social policy which will keep at bay discontents which the Communists will exploit. Moreover, the nationalist appeal of Communist China may swell the ranks of Communist supporters among the younger generation of local Chinese. These problems will require statesmanship if they are to be overcome, and the author is concerned about the outcome of later elections in both territories. His appraisal could therefore with advantage have included an opinion on the extent to which radical but basically non-Communist political parties were likely to emerge. In Malaya bitter memories of Communist terrorism are shared by capitalists and workers alike and may protect many from Communist subversion. An analysis of the attitude of the Peking Government towards Malaya and its Chinese population would also have been useful. Time may be on the side of Malaya rather more than Professor Mills believes. O. W. WOLTERS

NOONE OF THE ULU. By Dennis Holman. Foreword by Field-Marshal Sir Gerald Templer. London, Melbourne, Toronto, Heinemann, 1958. xviii+253 pp. Illus. Map endpapers. Index. 21s.

'PAT' Noone was the young anthropologist who, before the war, made a study of the Temiar aborigines of the Malayan jungle, and in doing so became not only a legendary figure in the country but also a kind of mystic father to the aborigines themselves. When the Japanese invaded he stayed in the jungle, living partly with aborigines and partly with Chinese Communist guerrillas. Then, in 1943, he mysteriously disappeared. This book is an account of the quest of his younger brother Richard to find out what happened to him, a quest which was only brought to a successful conclusion in 1957. But it is also the story of how, through an enlightened policy implemented by Richard, many thousands of aborigines were weaned away from the control of Communist terrorists and induced to assist the Government in the fight against them. This was a vital part of the Emergency operations in Malaya, and it is to be hoped that a fuller history of it will be written in due course. This is not a historian's book. But it is good that the story of these two 'dedicated men'—as Sir Gerald Templer calls them—should be on record, and the author has told it in a most workmanlike manner. R. N. B.

CHINESE SOCIETY IN THAILAND: An Analytical History. By G. William Skinner. Ithaca, Cornell University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1957. xvii+459 pp. Maps. Charts. Tables. Bibliog. Index. $6.50. 52s.

WITH the emergence of the Chinese People's Republic as a major Communist Power the political potential of the overseas Chinese settled in Thailand has

acquired a new and vitally important dimension. In this exhaustive socio-analytical study of the Chinese minority in Thailand Mr Skinner has provided the historical background necessary to a sound understanding of the 'Chinese problem' which has confronted successive Thai Governments in the past fifty years, and which has over the years been tackled by officialdom in a variety of ways ranging from tempered benevolence to harsh containment. Subject to conditions outside Thai governmental control, Mr Skinner sees hope for the future in the liberal and pro-assimilationist policies introduced at the time he was writing, in 1956.

Mr Skinner was Director of the Cornell Research Centre in Bangkok in 1954–5. Longer association with Thailand might well have led him to employ a more precise selectivity in marshalling the host of historical detail collated from other sources in his earlier chapters, and later to judge more closely the springs of twentieth-century Thai official purposes. Again, one is inclined to query as an underestimate his figure of 2,315,000 (for which he claims 'probability') for the total of ethnic Chinese in Thailand in 1955 (p. 183), and as an overestimate his conclusions, based on the unlikely assumption that King Rama I's mother was a full Chinese, about the Chinese strain in the Chakri Royal Family (p. 26).

Use is made throughout the book of a form of transliteration from Siamese into English which failed to attract credit when it was introduced twenty years ago, and which now offers no more than a test of patience to readers accustomed to more firmly established, if less 'scientific', ways of romanizing Thai words and names. While noting in addition that Mr Skinner allows himself not infrequently to reveal a lack of objectivity in recounting British views and actions, it should be stressed that these are minor defects in a well-written, timely, and valuable work of reference, which covers a field largely neglected by previous writers, and for which students of Thai contemporary history have reason to be warmly grateful.

The bibliography is comprehensive and the index, with one or two curious aberrations, unusually competent. Misprints are not frequent enough to be disconcerting.

D. C. R.-C.

UNDER CHARTERED COMPANY RULE (North Borneo 1881–1946). By K. G. Tregonning. Singapore, University of Malaya Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1958. 250 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. 30s.

'IT is a little known but very creditable history, a sixty-year rule that produced from warring and poverty-stricken anarchy a peaceful and contented people and an ever-expanding economy', writes Mr Tregonning, in his Preface, of the record of the British North Borneo Company. Today, when it has become the fashion in some quarters to stress the defects of colonial regimes and to mention their virtues in a hesitant, apologetic tone, such straightforward praise is at first almost a little disconcerting. But the evidence he adduces appears amply to justify his verdict. His is the first complete account of the Company's history. In compiling it he has made extensive use of manuscript records in both Borneo and London, and in particular the Company's own records, deposited by it in the Colonial Office Library in 1946, when it went into voluntary liquidation, and previously unused by any historical writer. The Company came into existence during the new and intense phase of Western economic imperialism, which began soon after the opening of the Suez Canal, and its story, as told in detail by Mr Tregonning, throws valuable light upon the rivalries, the personalities, and the problems involved in the impact of the West upon the Malay archipelago, more especially in its earlier, and more romantic, period. Mr Tregonning writes with zest, as one who has obviously enjoyed the study of his often very colourful material. His book is well planned, and the separate chapters on administration, economic development, labour,

health, education, slavery, and rebels, are packed with useful information and frequently extremely entertaining. The University of Malaya is to be congratulated upon publishing this valuable addition to South-East Asian historical studies.

D. G. E. HALL

INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC STABILIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT. By Benjamin Higgins. New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957. xxii+179 pp. $4.

PROFESSOR HIGGINS traces the economic and financial struggles of Indonesia since it became a sovereign State in December 1949 until the opening of the first elected Parliament in May 1956. He is well qualified for this task; he was monetary and financial adviser to the Indonesian Government under the United Nations Technical Assistance Programme.

He has presented a well-documented study, written from first-hand knowledge. But the story he has to tell is not a happy one, and recent events have made the outlook still more depressing. Yet the fate of Indonesia, as he says (p. xi), is of obvious importance to the Western world. It is a large country of well over 80 million people and a bridge of great strategic importance between continental Asia and Australia.

Indonesia has considerable and varied natural resources, including oil. Professor Higgins hopes for a future of development, including industrialization. But this needs foreign capital and technical assistance. Unless Indonesia can achieve political security and a sound currency, and learn to respect the rights and property of foreigners (including her Chinese), economic progress is likely to be slow.

F. BENHAM

THE SMALLER DRAGON: A Political History of Vietnam. By Joseph Buttinger. New York, Praeger; London, Atlantic Books distributed by Stevens, 1958. 535 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. $6. 45s.

THIS is a pioneering work in the truest sense, though it is remarkably free from the defects one might expect. The author's claim that his book is 'the first, and so far the only, book in the English language that can be called a history of Vietnam' (p. 6) is sufficiently near the literal truth to be allowed (although an English-language version of a Communist-line history of Vietnam, by Thanh Luong, has been published in Hanoi).

Mr Buttinger's underlying theme is the tenacity of the Vietnamese nation, which resisted a thousand years of enforced sinization and the short but far-reaching impact of French colonization, while absorbing much that was of value in both cultures. The nearer the author draws to the present, the more controversial he becomes. His account of the French conquest and occupation, though broadly true, is one-sided, emphasizing only the negative aspects and almost completely ignoring the positive benefits conferred on Vietnam by the French administration, whether or not for interested motives.

Mr Buttinger supports his presentation of the facts with copious notes and a fairly exhaustive bibliography, though his failure to mention Célerier's *Menaces sur le Vietnam* is surprising. The last chapter consists of a useful chronology of events from 1900 to 1957. In his Foreword, the author announces his intention to develop this chapter into a second volume of his history. If the naïveté and lack of perspective shown in the Foreword are any guide, there is a danger that the second volume will be much inferior to the first.

In sum, however, this is an important and impressive work of scholarship, which fills a long-felt need. It should perhaps be added that the printing and lay-out are of outstanding quality.

BRIAN CROZIER

FAR EAST AND PACIFIC

JAPAN AND HER DESTINY: My Struggle for Peace. By Mamoru Shigemitsu. Ed. by Major-General F. S. G. Piggott. Trans. by Oswald White. London, Hutchinson, 1958. 392 pp. Index. 30s.

IT is anybody's guess what will happen in (and to) Japan when the American occupying forces are finally withdrawn. The United States may resolve that Japan shall remain as the distant outpost of American influence—if not American power—in the Western Pacific; or they may prefer to draw their own Pacific frontier farther east. Meanwhile, they maintain what is called a Token Force, reinforced by certain units for service in Korea. Whether the American decision be taken early or late, and no matter what the eventual American choice may be, the course of Japanese opinion and policy cannot fail to be an important factor in the whole Western Pacific equation. In choosing her future course, Japan will find guidance in the evidence offered by the late Mamoru Shitemitsu in this pertinent book.

Shigemitsu was one of the most remarkable figures in modern Japan; and had he been born a generation earlier he would have been greeted as one of the *Genro* or Elder Statesmen. When he died, in January 1957, Japan lost an outstanding public servant; and his book well deserves the publisher's description of it as 'authentic history'. It covers the period from the so-called 'Manchurian Incident' of 1931 down to the surrender of Japan at the end of the second World War. And, as one of the leading actors in that tragic drama, Shigemitsu played a part all his own. He has every right to claim that his book contains 'much food for thought in connection with the future rebuilding of our country' (author's preface, p. 11). He is fortunate in his translator, Mr Oswald White, C.M.G., who served in the British Consular Service in Japan for forty-one years; and I feel bound to add that General Piggott's 'Editor's Note' gives us indispensable clues to the origin and character of the book. A. F. WHYTE

JAPAN'S FINANCE AND TAXATION 1940–1956. By Saburo Shiomi. Foreword by Hisato Ichimada. Preface by Carl S. Shoup. Trans. by Shotaro Hasegawa. New York, Columbia University Press, 1957; London, Oxford University Press, 1958. xi+190 pp. Charts. Tables. Index. $6. 48s.

THIS will be a standard work on its subject. Professor Shiomi, an eminent Japanese authority, outlines the earlier history of direct taxation in Japan and deals fully with the fiscal measures and policies of the wartime and post-war periods. The only major fault is his failure to assess the effectiveness of taxation, and the degree of evasion, in Japan; he notes (p. 149) that, though Japan adopted in 1887 a remarkable up-to-date tax system, 'the law went ahead and enforcement lagged behind', but he does not follow up this key point. Foreign residents in Japan today still have reason to complain that taxation weighs unequally on them.

The book sheds some interesting sidelights. For example, the financial and fiscal analysis (Chapter III) brings out with startling clarity the completeness of Japan's economic collapse in 1944–5; and the analysis of the social and distributive effects shows that, whereas the gap between rich and poor in Japan widened during the first World War, the contrary was the case in the second.

Bibliographical and source references are lacking. They should certainly have been supplied in such a work, or at least a list should have been given of the author's previous works, of which the present is apparently a summation (e.g. *Zeimu Tokuhon, Sozeiron, Kakoku Shotokuzeisei Ron, Kokumin Shotoku no Bumpai*). E. STUART KIRBY

HOKKAIDO: Its Present State of Development and Future Prospects. By F. C. Jones. London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1958. viii+146 pp. Maps. Tables. Bibliog. Index. 21s.

THIS is an able and interesting survey of the geographical and economic conditions in Hokkaido, Japan's northern island, and its prospects of development. The volume fills a distinct gap in our documentation, since the potential contribution of Hokkaido, a relatively under-populated and naturally rich area, to the solution of Japan's problems is a question of great importance.

It is perhaps a pity that Dr Jones has not referred to general Japanese discussions of Hokkaido's problems other than the official and yearbook-type materials which he cites (p. 137). However, his general characterization of Japanese views as varying widely between optimism and pessimism about Hokkaido's potentialities is correct. As he rightly indicates, the development of this northern area, the size of Scotland, can make a distinct contribution to Japan's future, but not so great a one as is sometimes supposed.

The conclusion, that Hokkaido's contribution is likely to be in the industrial field rather than in the agricultural or demographic connexions, may surprise some readers, but—in view of the actual relativity of comparative advantages, which is accurately indicated in this book—that assessment seems to be correct. Well adduced also is the evidence of how little has actually been done in basic investment and development in Hokkaido—which, in fact, Japan has been unable to afford during the pre-war period of expansion abroad, the war-period, and the post-war phase of reconstruction of the already-developed parts of the country.

Yet Hokkaido would be a good field of investment from every point of view. The present reviewer would go so far as to suggest, though Dr Jones does not raise the point, and apparently the Japanese authorities have not done so, that it presents also a case for international aid, or at least for a study by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. E. STUART KIRBY

COMMUNIST CHINA TODAY. Vol. 2. Chronological and Documentary Supplement. By Peter S. H. Tang. New York, Praeger; London, Atlantic Book distributed by Stevens, 1958. vi+137 pp. Map endpapers. 30s.

THIS is a somewhat disappointing addition to Mr Tang's earlier structural and historical survey. The chronological summary, which extends from 1918 to July 1956, is detailed and the items listed are on the whole given remarkably full treatment. But there are some serious omissions—the publication of the Chinese 'line' on Stalin's mistakes in April 1956; the fact that Mikoyan's visit in that same month resulted in a substantial increase in Soviet aid; Mao's speech on the 'hundred flowers' (though Lu Ting-yi's explanation of the doctrine is listed). Some items are unimportant—e.g., Chinese greetings to a Dutch Communist Party Congress; or their importance is left unexplained—does Liu Shao-ch'i's reception of Brazilian M.P.s mark the first visit of a Brazilian or Latin American parliamentary delegation to China? Bad proof reading has left the Chinese agricultural programme as dating from 1956 to 1957 instead of 1967. Finally, the chronology is made unnecessarily difficult to use by the failure to put the year at the top of each page, and to italicize or underline the main point of an item.

The documentary section contains the national Constitution, the 1945 and 1956 Communist Party constitutions, and the membership of the Party's central organs as elected at the 8th Congress's first session. One feels that if space was limited the 1945 Party constitution could have given way to half a dozen important policy statements, with the aim of carrying on where *A Documentary*

History of Chinese Communism [1] left off. The list of central committee members accords with the official one, based on votes received, with the odd exception that Nieh Jung-chen is placed first. The omission of an asterisk has led to Chang Wen-t'ien being described as a new member of the Politburo instead of as a former full member. RODERICK MACFARQUHAR

UNITED STATES

THE AMERICAN CONGRESS. By Roland Young. New York, Harper, 1958. ix+333 pp. Index. $4.50.

THIS book differs considerably from the majority of studies of the American Congress which have appeared so far. It is concerned less with the moving parts of the Congressional machine, their nature, functions, and relative significance, than with the dynamics of the political system which keeps the machine in motion. The emphasis is less on form than on forces, and the author's object is to consider, not so much the lines which Congressional activity follows, as the factors which shape it and the effects which it produces. Concepts such as 'authority', 'influence', and 'control' consequently loom large in his analysis.

The book is particularly revealing on the processes by which the aspiring politician emerges from candidate to Congressman, on the impact and significance of the Congressional Committee system, and on the relationship between Congress and the states (where, as the author points out, the Constitution fails to provide a strong institutional bond). There are also two useful concluding chapters on the more familiar controls which Congress exercises over Federal finance and over the Executive Branch generally by means of the investigative process. The 'Research Guide' at the end, however, while ingeniously conceived as a device 'to acquaint students with the availability and usefulness of legislative documents for carrying on research', will probably not serve the needs of some readers so well as a straightforward bibliography. C. J. C.

IN CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER: The Crucial State of Our Freedoms. By John W. Caughey. University of Chicago Press; London, Cambridge University Press, 1958. ix+208 pp. Bibliog. Index. 30s.

WHAT are in danger in the contemporary United States, argues Professor Caughey, are America's traditional freedoms. There has been something more than a series of administrative enactments limiting liberty, something more than an outbreak of demagoguery. 'We are confronted with the saddening facts that a regime of freedom, of "liberty and justice for all" is not as safe in the hearts of the rank and file of Americans as it was even half a generation ago' (p. 3). The Professor of History in the University of California knows whereof he speaks, for he was one of the victims of the 'Year of the Oath' in that institution in 1950, and was reinstated in his post only after a decision of the California Supreme Court. His book is not a personal testament but a sober and grim account of the whittling away of American civil liberties over the last decade by the superpatriots; there is a bitter chapter on the rise and fall of McCarthy, with the conclusion that when the Senator died McCarthyism did not die with him. Professor Caughey makes it clear that intellectuals are among the first victims and that, in *re* Oppenheimer, American science is paying the price; and that, especially in the West and the South, they now speak on public issues with a certain stammer. He calls for a 'summoning of popular determination . . . to take the United States back to first principles'. But the clarion call is not loud in these pages, nor is the author very hopeful. The courts have, on this issue as on

[1] Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (1921–1950)* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1952).

segregation, spoken out boldly, but in general there has been in this field, as in others, an almost total abnegation of responsible leadership. Professor Caughey's list, on p. 86, of the moments when the 'ism' could have been halted is a damning indictment of an Administration that did little to halt the march of the inquisitors. ESMOND WRIGHT

THE CHANGING POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES. By Conrad and Irene B. Taeuber for the Social Science Research Council in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Foreword by Robert W. Burgess and Pendleton Herring. New York, John Wiley; London, Chapman & Hall, 1958. xi+357 pp. Maps. Charts. Tables. Index. 62s.

FROM the omni-curious Jefferson sprang the first United States Census of 1790. It revealed a population of less than 4 million people; that of 1955, some 165 million. A population relatively homogenous in 1790 has become one of the most complex the world has known. The average family of today has less than half as many children as the family of 1790, but the individual's expectation of life is two and one-half times as great. And it is likely that by 1975 almost exactly half the American population will be of economically unproductive ages, below 20 or above 65. The aging population means that America's already vast expenditure in education may well be rivalled, politically at least, by schemes for the care of the aged. And the state where the proportion of young and old is the highest—California—is also the state where the pattern of internal migration is building up future political power, the status of '*the* leading state'. America's allies would do well to learn that the Californian is a unique style of politics and likely to dominate. For international politics, perhaps the most significant statistic is the dwindling of the once mighty river of immigration to—for America—the mere trickle of just over a million a year. America's greatest difficulties stem from her ambivalence between regarding 'Americanism' as an international principle, and as the happy accident of a peculiar isolation. This ambivalence was only containable by the fact of mass immigration; it was the possibility of the disinherited everywhere going to America, not her own actual conduct, that made America seem a principle more than a place.

The present volume is an admirable digest of the totals and trends in the whole great series of decennial U.S. Census Reports and, since 1922, the splendid series of complementary monographs, supplements, and special reports. Maps, charts, and graphs are many and of a high standard of clarity. The chapters on income, education, and on internal migration are especially well presented.

BERNARD CRICK

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS: National, State, and Local. By Harold Zink and others. Princeton, N.J., Toronto, New York, London, D. Van Nostrand, 1958. vii+446 pp. Index. $5.25. 39s. 6d.

THREE professors of political science and government at Ohio State University, Georgetown University, and the University of Maryland have collaborated to produce yet another text-book on the subject of American government and politics. They follow the well-worn path of examining the origin and growth of the Constitution, the role of parties, the functions and powers of the several branches of government, and the many fields, both internal and external, where power is exercised. The final five chapters deal with government at the state and local levels. The authors have avoided the 'exercises' which end chapters in similar volumes and have contented themselves with selected bibliographies for further reading. The text is clear and concise and well provided with graphs, charts, and diagrams but there is little here which cannot be found in any number of equally competently produced text-books. ALAN CONWAY

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

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

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